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Abstract
I present three essays in this thesis. The ﬁrst essay investigates the decision of small
businesses with respect to an optional Flat Rate Scheme (FRS) in the UK. FRS re-
places VAT with a turnover tax providing some traders with a tax saving opportunity.
Using the universe of VAT returns between 2004-05 and 2010-11, I ﬁnd 26 percent
of eligible traders have non-negative tax gains from FRS. I show gains are highly
persistent and not so small, yet only 3 percent of gainers join the scheme after one
year. Temporal and spatial correlations point to information frictions and learning
as potential explanatory factors. Results show traders registering after introduction
of FRS and those registering in high FRS density areas are more likely to join the
scheme. The second essay estimates stimulus eﬀect of the temporary reduction in
the standard VAT rate in the UK. From 1 December 2008 to 31 December 2009,
the standard-rate was reduced from 17.5 to 15 percent. I use the universe of VAT
returns submitted to HMRC between 2002q1 and 2010q4 and compare changes in
sales growth of standard-rated traders during the cut to that of zero-rated traders
(diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences). To control for heterogeneous recession eﬀects, I ﬁrst rely
solely on post-recession observations and utilize the fact that the cut and the reces-
sion don't fully overlap. Second, I allow for sector speciﬁc recession impacts. Both
strategies show a small insigniﬁcant impact on gross sales and purchases which sug-
gest a proportionate increase in quantity demanded in response to the tax induced
price cut. The third essay estimates the impact of Iran Iraq war on educational
attainment of children. I use a two percent sample of 2006 Iran Population Census,
and compare exposed cohorts in war provinces to unexposed cohorts (diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerences). The estimates suggest probability of ﬁnishing high school is respectively
reduced by 4.8 and 1.9 percentage points for cohorts exposed to war in early child-
hood and those exposed during schooling (former signiﬁcant at 10 percent, latter
insigniﬁcant). Interestingly, the war impact on early childhood cohorts is robust to
controlling for diﬀerential linear trends while the impact on school cohorts is not.
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Chapter 1
Optimization Frictions in the Choice
of the UK Flat Rate Scheme of VAT
1.1 Introduction
There is growing evidence in public economics that optimization frictions play an
important role in shaping individual behavior. Whether small businesses are subject
to similar frictions has not received much attention. An individual owner-manager
is often responsible for business decision making but theoretically, one cannot gener-
alize the individual-based evidence to small businesses. Business owners have shown
particular skills (e.g. started a business) that might reduce the eﬀect of frictions.
Understanding role of optimization frictions in the business environment is important
from two perspectives. Conceptually, it aﬀects the way economists think about proﬁt
maximization. From a policy perspective, it is important to understand frictions in
business decision making to design eﬀective support schemes.
In this chapter, I study the decision of VAT registered traders with respect to the Flat
Rate Scheme of VAT for small businesses (FRS). I use HM Revenue and Customs'
(HMRC) VAT returns data to calculate FRS tax gains for eligible traders. This is
the ﬁrst paper that analyzes FRS using tax return data. FRS is an optional scheme
introduced in 2002 to alleviate compliance burden of VAT on small businesses. Nor-
mally, VAT liability is the diﬀerence between VAT on sales and purchases. HMRC
requires record keeping of business transactions showing separation of zero, reduced,
and standard-rated sales and purchases. FRS liability1 is, however, calculated as a
1I refer to VAT liability under FRS as FRS liability, but once traders join FRS this is their VAT
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percentage of gross sales, relieving traders of the need to account for various rates
separately. In order to compensate for the inability of FRS traders to reclaim pur-
chases VAT, HMRC sets sector speciﬁc ﬂat rates so that on average FRS and VAT
liabilities are equalized.
In order to join the scheme, traders need to ﬁll out a one-page form telling HMRC
of their main activity (and hence ﬂat rate) and declaring their eligibility. In the
absence of optimization frictions, eligible traders should join FRS when expected
net beneﬁts are positive. While the scheme could potentially beneﬁt traders via
reduced tax payments and lower compliance cost, I focus on pure tax savings for
two reasons. First, anecdotal evidence suggests tax savings play a key role in the
FRS joining decision. For example, an HMRC study of compliance cost of VAT
conducted by KPMG reports the predominant theme ... is that [traders] enter
into the FRS to save them money in terms of the amount of VAT paid to HMRC
(KPMG (2006)). Second, returns data does not provide any information on the
amount of time businesses spend on preparing their VAT returns or whether they
use tax preparators.
I deﬁne FRS gainers as eligible VAT traders with observed FRS liability less than
or equal to the reported VAT liability. I show that between 2004-05 and 2010-11, 26
percent of eligible traders are FRS gainers. Following FRS gainers over time reveals
little responsiveness. The estimated probability of joining within one year of gaining
is 3 percent and increases to 10 percent after six years. This is despite the fact that
gains are persistent and not very small. On average 70 percent of FRS gainers in a
given year remain a gainer in the following year and the median FRS gainer would
save about 12 percent on VAT payments upon joining the scheme.
Since FRS joining decision is made ex ante, inaction of gainers is not necessarily a sign
of sub-optimal choices. Risk neutral traders would join the scheme when expected
beneﬁts are positive. Presence of uncertainty could result in observed gains even
if expected gains are negative. Two pieces of evidence, however, go against this
explanation. First, I show the probability of joining FRS rises sharply as traders
get slightly positive gains. This suggests that at least for a sub-sample of traders,
observed gains could be interpreted as expected gains2. The caveat here is that
the sub-sample of responsive traders might have diﬀerent risk preferences or face a
liability from HMRC's perspective. Similarly I refer to tax liability under normal VAT accounting
as VAT liability.
2This requires the assumption that traders joining the scheme are not making a mistake them-
selves.
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diﬀerent level of uncertainty.
The second piece of evidence against uncertainty is the fact that FRS gains are
highly persistent. Even after controlling for sector and year dummies, last year
gainers are on average 62 percentage points more likely to gain in the following year.
Furthermore, the probability of gaining in future rises very sharply right at zero past
gains and goes beyond 80 percent for traders with gains above ¿1000 during last
year. The distribution of current FRS gains conditional on gaining in the last year
shows a median tax saving of 10 percent of VAT liability and a mean of just above
zero for large enough traders3.
After discussing that uncertainty cannot fully explain inaction of FRS gainers, I
move to characterize the frictions that prevent traders from joining using temporal
and spatial correlations. Here, the FRS joining patterns support a combination
of broadly deﬁned information frictions and learning as key drivers of inaction. I
deﬁne information frictions to include both lack of knowledge about FRS rules and
unawareness of its existence. I use learning to refer to a case where traders know
about the scheme but are not certain about its beneﬁts. This could be a result of
uncertainty or a consequence of incorrect prior beliefs about suitability of FRS.
First, I conjecture that VAT registration is a period of intense learning about VAT
rules. Therefore the chance of coming across FRS is the highest during this time.
I split the sample into three groups based on the date of VAT registration: a) pre-
FRS traders who registered before introduction of FRS, b) early-FRS traders who
registered after introduction of FRS but before major reforms in 2004, and c) late-
FRS traders who registered after favorable FRS reforms in 20044. Late-FRS traders
could learn about the reformed FRS and are expected to have the highest chances of
joining the scheme. On the other hand, pre-FRS traders registered when FRS was
not in place and should have least awareness of the scheme. Consistent with this
reasoning, non-parametric estimates of joining probabilities are always signiﬁcantly
higher for late-FRS compared to early-FRS traders. Similarly early-FRS traders
show higher joining probabilities relative to pre-FRS traders. Restricting the sample
to FRS gainers conﬁrms a similar pattern: late-FRS gainers are signiﬁcantly more
likely to join FRS with early and pre-FRS groups lagging behind.
3With risk averse preferences, positive expected FRS gains may not justify optimality of uptake.
In section 1.5 I discuss some features of the scheme to argue that even gainers with risk averse
preferences might beneﬁt from the scheme.
4In 2004 FRS rates were reduced and a temporary 1 percentage point discount was applied to
traders joining the scheme during ﬁrst year of VAT registration.
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Second, I argue that traders registering in postcode districts (outcodes) with a higher
density of FRS traders are expected to have higher FRS awareness (e.g. through
peer groups). I look at joining probabilities for traders registering in high and low
FRS density outcodes. The non-parametric estimates show, traders registering in
the highest decile of FRS density are signiﬁcantly more likely to join the scheme
compared to those in the lowest decile. Furthermore, FRS gainers registered in
outcodes with higher FRS densities are signiﬁcantly more likely to join the scheme
later on.
For both temporal and spatial correlations, I observe that joining probabilities in-
crease over time. In other words, it seems that some FRS gainers realize that they
could gain from FRS and join the scheme later on. While this pattern could be consis-
tent with inertia (sluggish responsiveness), learning, or gradual spread of information
about the scheme, I argue that the spatial correlations are not fully consistent with
inertia. For example, inertia cannot explain the higher joining probabilities for high
FRS density outcodes unless a disproportionate number of more active traders are
registered in these places.
To look at the relative importance of these explanations and to rule out inertia
I estimate Cox proportional hazard (CPH) models. After controlling for 5-digit
sectors and FRS density deciles (stratiﬁed CPH), I still ﬁnd traders registering later
are more likely to join the scheme. Furthermore, I ﬁnd support for learning. An
additional year of gaining leads to higher likelihood of joining even after controlling
for period of registration. Including a continuous variable for FRS density (instead of
stratiﬁcation on decile dummies) shows traders in outcodes with higher FRS densities
are more likely to join the scheme.
The conclusion that small traders are susceptible to optimization frictions resonates
with the results of Devereux et al. (2014) who ﬁnd small incorporated businesses are
not completely shifting their incomes to the corporate base while in a frictionless
world it is optimal to do so. Their preferred explanation is illiquidity of corporate
proﬁts and the need for having a stable ﬂow of income (e.g. in the form of personal
income). In this paper, however, I argued for presence of information frictions which
implies gainers would join FRS if they get the right information. My results suggest
small businesses might be subject to optimization frictions similar to those observed
in the context of individual decision making. Accepting this view in the case of FRS,
calls for a more eﬀective role of the government in publicizing the scheme.
The results are also consistent with the large empirical literature on the importance
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of frictions in the process of individual decision making. Chetty et al. (2011) ﬁnd
that presence of search costs and hours constraints imply individuals re-optimize only
when the tax gains are suﬃciently high. This is consistent with an observed positive
correlation between estimated labor supply elasticities and size of tax variations in
Denmark. Kleven and Waseem (2013) ﬁnd a signiﬁcant mass of individual tax ﬁlers
in Pakistan locate in strictly dominated regions above tax notches. They provide
evidence that 90% of wage earners and 50-80% of self-employed in these areas are
not responsive to tax incentives potentially due to frictions. Jones (2012) provides
evidence that inertia could explain why so many income tax ﬁlers receive a tax refund
although it might be optimal to adjust tax payments and not pay the money in the
ﬁrst place.
Bhargava and Manoli (2013), Chetty et al. (2013), Liebman and Luttmer (2011), Saez
(2009) ﬁnd direct evidence that provision of information changes individual decisions.
Bhargava and Manoli (2013) design a randomized experiment to understand high non
take-up of EITC beneﬁts. They ﬁnd re-sending a reminder letter for potential EITC
beneﬁts is most eﬀective in increasing take-up when the information is simpliﬁed and
the size of potential beneﬁts is displayed. Chetty et al. (2013) show neighborhoods
with higher EITC information are more responsive to the incentives created by the
program and households moving into high information areas start to optimize their
EITC soon after. In the context of social security Liebman and Luttmer (2011)
ﬁnd an information brochure and an invitation for a web based tutorial increases
labor force participation by 4 percentage points one year later. Saez (2009) shows
both explaining incentives and presentation details matter for take-up of retirement
savings subsidies.
Some other studies however ﬁnd a minimal role for information indirectly pointing
to signiﬁcance of other frictions. Chetty and Saez (2013) show there is a limited
eﬀect of providing information on take-up of EITC in a randomized setting. Jones
(2010) ﬁnds providing information about advance EITC, an add-on feature paying
interim installments, does not change take-up of the program signiﬁcantly. Inves-
tigating retirement saving decisions Choi et al. (2011) ﬁnd providing information
to 401(k) participants with strictly dominated contribution rates does not change
their behavior signiﬁcantly. They conjecture presence of biased preferences might be
responsible for unresponsiveness.
In the next section, I give a detailed account of the rules around FRS. In the third
section I describe the data. Section four establishes the fact that a signiﬁcant number
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of VAT traders beneﬁt from FRS but fail to join the scheme. In section ﬁve I discuss
why uncertainty cannot fully explain inaction of FRS gainers. Section six presents
temporal and spatial correlations that suggest information frictions and learning are
potential explanations for low uptake. The last section concludes.
1.2 Flat Rate Scheme
HMRC ﬁrst announced the Flat Rate Scheme of VAT for small businesses (FRS)
with a consultation in June 2001. The scheme came to force from 24 April 2002
as part of the Finance Act 2002 with the stated purpose of reducing compliance
burden of VAT on small businesses. Businesses in the UK must register for VAT
when their annual turnover goes beyond a registration threshold (¿67,000 during
2008). VAT features three diﬀerent rates (standard, reduced, and zero) and a set of
exempt activities. Normal VAT liability is the diﬀerence between VAT on sales and
purchases while VAT liability under FRS is the multiplication of a sector speciﬁc tax
rate and total turnover. As a result FRS requires businesses to keep track of total
turnover rather than separate record of transactions under each of the various VAT
rates and therefore it is thought to simplify compliance. Eﬀectively VAT is a tax on
value added while FRS liability is a tax on gross sales as shown below:
TV = τV vSg (1.1)
TF = τFSg (1.2)
where TV and TF respectively represent VAT and FRS liability, Sg is gross sales, v is
share of value added (deﬁned as Sg−Pg
Sg
, with Pg being gross purchases), τV is eﬀective
VAT rate (deﬁned as TS−TP
vSg
, with Ts and Tp respectively showing sales and purchases
VAT), and τF is the ﬂat rate percentage. Eligible traders decide ex ante to be liable
either for TV or TF over an accounting period. HMRC sets ﬂat rates by sector so the
average traders within sectors are indiﬀerent between FRS and VAT: We calculate
the ﬂat rate percentages from the net tax paid by all the businesses that are currently
registered for VAT and eligible for the scheme. The net tax paid varies with diﬀerent
trade sectors and so there are a variety of ﬂat rate percentages5. Nevertheless traders
with lower than average purchases VAT would get substantial gains from FRS. For
example, a management consultant with no purchases VAT could save 16 percent
5HMRC, Notice 733: Flat rate scheme for small businesses, February 2004.
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on VAT payment by joining FRS during 2004-76. There are around 16 distinct
ﬂat rates ranging from 2 to 14.5 percent (appendix A). On January 2004, HMRC
lowered all but one ﬂat rate, increased eligibility thresholds, and incentivized new
VAT registrations to join FRS by oﬀering a 1 percentage point discount on ﬂat rates
within the ﬁrst 12 months of registration. To maintain the attractiveness of FRS
when standard VAT rate changed, HMRC revised the ﬂat rates on 1 December 2008,
1 January 2010, and 4 January 2011.
While FRS is advertised as a compliance cost saving scheme7, anecdotal evidence sug-
gests most businesses view the scheme as a tax saving opportunity. An HMRC study
of VAT compliance cost reports that the predominant theme ... is that [traders] en-
ter into the FRS to save them money in terms of the amount of VAT paid to HMRC
(KPMG (2006)). Same study states that businesses spend resources to determine
whether FRS is suitable for them, which suggests information about FRS gains is
not readily available. In addition, in the initial FRS consultation, accountancy ﬁrms
argued the scheme would not generate any of the intended savings and opposed the
scheme as undermining VAT accounting discipline (HM Customs and Excise (2002)).
Presence of any compliance cost savings would strengthen the evidence on the sub-
optimality of the inaction of FRS gainers. But I ignore compliance cost savings in
what follows because returns data does not provide any information on the amount
of time businesses spend on preparing their VAT returns or whether they use tax
preparators8.
Eligible VAT traders could easily and quickly join or leave FRS. Traders wishing
to join, ﬁll in a one-page application form declaring main activity from the list in
appendix A, the corresponding ﬂat rate, and sign that they are eligible. FRS start
6τF for management consultants is 12.5 percent. With a standard-rate of VAT equal to 17.5
percent, the VAT rate on gross sales is τV =
0.175
1+0.175 = 14.9 percent. Therefore, when the trader
does not use any tax-refundable inputs (i.e. v = 1) the FRS gain as a percentage of current VAT
liability is 1− TF/TV = 1− 12.5/14.9 = 16.1 percent.
7Initially FRS was claimed to save on average about ¿750 (HM Customs and Excise (2002)) but
later an impact assessment puts the average compliance savings at ¿45 (HMRC (2009)). The ﬁrst
estimate is based on saving 45 minutes of clerical time at an hourly wage of ¿16 over the course of
52 weeks plus ¿100 saving on accountants' fees. The second estimate uses a Standard Cost Model
but details of calculations are not disclosed.
8There is some evidence that a move to FRS might actually increase compliance costs. Account-
ing software seemed to have lacked FRS capability until recently. For example SAGE 50 Accounts
introduced FRS capability in the 2011 upgrade (GfK Business (2008), an HMRC sponsored study,
shows from the 58 percent of businesses using accounting software for VAT, 61 percent use SAGE.).
Furthermore, there is anecdotal evidence that FRS traders calculate both VAT and FRS liabil-
ities not to lose money on FRS. The mental cost of worrying about losing money and the time
cost of calculating two tax liabilities are likely to increase FRS compliance costs. This could be a
competing story for the frictions I study in section 1.6.
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date is normally the beginning of next VAT period (a quarter for most of traders)
and backdating is not normally allowed. Businesses wishing to leave the scheme
write to HMRC of their decision and normally stop FRS at the end of current VAT
period. Again retrospective departure is usually not allowed. There is no statutory
minimum term for being on FRS but once left FRS, the trader cannot rejoin within
the following 12 months. As a measure of revenue protection HMRC reserves the
right to withdraw the scheme (even back date the withdrawal) in fraudulent cases.
FRS eligibility is based on turnover and non-turnover criteria. Table 1.1 shows
turnover eligibility rules. Joining eligibility is based on two tests. Expected taxable
turnover should be below a threshold (¿150,000 during 2004-10) and expected total
turnover should be less than a second threshold (¿187,500 until December 2010).
Once on the scheme, traders remain eligible until their FRS turnover crosses the
continuation threshold (¿225,000 during 2004-10). The joining tests are based on
forecasts of turnover. Instead, I use actual turnover to determine eligibility. This
should do no harm because HMRC suggests traders could use last year turnover as a
benchmark for their forecasts and also there is no penalty for falling above the joining
threshold once on the scheme. Furthermore, during my sample, a small fraction of
eligible traders become ineligible in the following year (8 and 10 percent of FRS
gainers and losers respectively).
There are ﬁve mostly unobservable non-turnover eligibility criteria that apply at all
times9. Since the main claim in this paper is that some eligible traders are missing
out on tax saving opportunities, it is important to rule out unobserved ineligibility
of gainers as a potential explanation. First, traders who were on FRS during the
past 12 months cannot rejoin the scheme. Second, ﬁrms registered or eligible to be
registered as a VAT group in the past 24 months are ineligible. While I observe
traders registered as groups during the sample, I do not have information on those
eligible for group treatment or prior group registrations. It is, however, encouraging
to note that only 0.3 percent of VAT traders below FRS continuation threshold are
registered as a group.
Third, FRS cannot be combined with certain VAT schemes (capital goods10, cash
accounting, retail, tour operators, margin and auctioneer's schemes). I do not have
reliable information on take-up of these schemes but several observations justify
9Unfortunately, oﬃcial data on the number of ineligible traders or applications ruled out as
ineligible is not available.
10Traders purchasing property or doing refurbishment with a value greater than ¿250,000 or
acquire computer and related equipment with value greater than ¿50,000 must use the capital
goods scheme.
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Table 1.1: FRS turnover eligibility criteria
Dates
Joining eligibility Continuation
eligibility
FRS turnover (incl.
VAT)
Test 1
Taxable turnover
(excl. VAT)
Test 2
Total turnover
(excl. VAT)
April 02 - December 03 <100k <125k <150k
January 04 - February
07
<150k
<187.5k
<225k
March 07 - December 10 <187.5k
January 11 - now - <230k
Notes: Taxable turnover (test 1) is the sum of zero, reduced and standard rated supplies excluding any VAT. It
excludes exempt supplies and non-business income like charitable or educational activities. Total turnover (test 2)
is taxable turnover plus exempt supplies, and non business income such as charitable and educational activities.
During March 2007 until December 2010, total turnover for test 2 includes VAT. FRS turnover is VAT inclusive total
turnover (e.g. includes exempt, zero, reduced, and standard rated supplies plus any VAT but exclude non business
income). Non turnover eligibility criteria are the same across the years. Sources: FRS notices dated February 2004,
March 2007, January 2010, April 2011, August 2011, October 2012.
ignoring them. FRS provides an alternative to cash accounting and retail schemes.
Furthermore, it is unlikely that traders on margin and tour operator schemes beneﬁt
from FRS because of the high level of VAT refunds they receive with these schemes.
Therefore, remaining on another scheme is unlikely to be an important factor in
analysis of FRS gains.
Fourth, any VAT conviction or dishonesty in the past 12 months disqualiﬁes the ﬁrm.
Data on VAT dishonesties and convictions is not available. It is, however, unlikely
that a big part of FRS gainers fall in this category. National Audit Oﬃce reports
that out of 196,000 investigations during 2002-03 ﬁnancial year around 30% of cases
had VAT under-declaration but only 4% received a penalty (National Audit Oﬃce
(2004)). Furthermore, traders with negative VAT liability are under greater scrutiny
and a disproportionate number of them are caught in fraudulent activities (National
Audit Oﬃce (2006)). But traders receiving a net VAT refund would not gain from
FRS since my calculated FRS liability is always positive.
Fifth, businesses associated with others11 are ineligible. This measure was put in
place to stop artiﬁcial splitting of activities into diﬀerent entities for tax beneﬁts.
For example, a trader with several businesses could concentrate standard rated sales
11HMRC clariﬁes that this is based on commercial reality not legal form and applies to cases
where a company has the right to give directions to another or complies with directions of another.
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under FRS running entity but report purchases under the one using normal VAT.
While HMRC collects data on connections to other businesses from VAT registration
form, this data is not available for the current paper. Given the large number of
gainers and the small size of traders involved it seems unlikely this criterion creates
a major problem.
1.3 Data
Data used in this paper is the annualized version of all VAT returns submitted to
HMRC between 2004-5 and 2010-11 ﬁnancial years. This data has become available
recently and this is the ﬁrst paper analyzing FRS using this data. VAT returns
include information on sales, purchases, and corresponding VAT on each but does
not provide separate account of transactions under each VAT rate. The returns
data is merged with part of HMRC's trader characteristics dataset which provides
information on date of registration, date of deregistration, date of joining/leaving
FRS, sector of activity, frequency of submitting returns, ownership form, and a few
other variables. I refer to this dataset as returns-level data as it includes all returns
submitted by traders. From this, I also construct a trader-level dataset which has
one observation per trader and records the date of certain events of interest (e.g.
VAT registration, joining FRS, etc.). The trader-level dataset only contains traders
who are observed to be eligible at least once during the sample (includes FRS traders
as well).
Table 1.2 shows the total number of available observations before and after cleaning,
and the number of returns submitted by VAT and FRS traders during each ﬁnancial
year. There are around 2 million VAT registered traders in each year (column (1)).
Dropping inactive traders, returns reporting zero sales, and other anomalies (see
table notes and appendix C for more detail) result in around 1.5 million returns per
year (column (2)) . This constitutes the working sample for the analysis in the paper.
Based on observable eligibility criteria (see section 1.2) on average 54 percent of VAT
traders are FRS eligible (column (4)). Column (5) reports the number of returns
submitted by FRS traders which is a relatively small fraction of total returns (column
(6)). The fraction of FRS returns increases from 9 to 21 percent of all eligible traders
between 2004 and 2010 (column (6))12. The increase in share of FRS traders during
12Eligible traders is used to refer to VAT traders who are eligible for FRS. All eligible traders
include eligible VAT traders and FRS traders.
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Table 1.2: Number of VAT and FRS traders
Financial
year
All obser-
vations
Workable
Sample
VAT
traders
% FRS
eligible
FRS
traders
FRS % of
eligible
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2004-5 1,894,281 1,472,918 1,398,324 56% 74,594 9%
2005-6 2,177,146 1,512,156 1,413,470 57% 98,686 11%
2006-7 2,221,095 1,529,537 1,404,911 54% 124,626 14%
2007-8 2,118,562 1,575,018 1,420,959 54% 154,059 17%
2008-9 2,173,977 1,422,206 1,256,822 51% 165,384 21%
2009-10 2,123,413 1,448,423 1,280,881 52% 167,542 20%
2010-11 2,120,552 1,499,923 1,320,226 52% 179,697 21%
Total 14,829,026 10,460,181 9,495,593 54% 964,588 16%
Notes: Column (1) is number of all available returns. Column (2) shows the cleaned data used for all subsequent
analysis and restricts the sample to a) live traders (not reported to be deregistered and identiﬁed as live trader at
the end of ﬁscal year by HMRC), b) observations with positive and non missing sales, c) observations with outputs
and inputs less than the 99th percentile of the respective distributions, d) observations implying an eﬀective output
and input tax rate less than the standard rate plus half a percentage point, e) ﬁrms listed as sole proprietors,
partnerships, and incorporations, and f) traders with monthly or quarterly VAT returns. Column (3) shows number
of VAT returns on normal VAT accounting. Column (4) demonstrates the fraction of VAT traders eligible for FRS
based on all observable eligibility criteria (see text for details). Column (5) shows the number of FRS traders and
column (6) present FRS traders as a fraction of all eligible traders (actual FRS and FRS eligible traders).
the sample period suggests FRS awareness is increasing but this pattern could be a
result of sluggish responsiveness (inertia) or experimenting with VAT (learning).
Many of the traders joining FRS are doing so right at the time of VAT registration.
Figure 1.1 shows Kaplan-Meier nonparametric estimate of probability of joining FRS
over time13. The analysis time reﬂects the months FRS option was available to the
trader. 9 percent of traders join FRS as soon as they have the option to do so. While
in principle this jump could be a result of existing VAT traders joining when FRS
was introduced, evidence shows this is due to a large number of new traders joining
FRS at the time of VAT registration (ﬁgure 1.14). After the initial jump, the joining
probability continues to rise and by the end of 9 years of exposure to FRS it reaches
18 percent14.
13See section 1.6 for a discussion of Kaplan-Meier method.
14The end point estimate of probability of joining FRS is smaller than the fraction of FRS traders
as of April 2011 (reported in column (6) of table 1.2) for two reasons. First, the analysis here is
based on once eligible traders which includes traders eligible for FRS in 2011 but also those who
were eligible earlier and are not eligible at this time. Therefore the number of FRS traders is
divided by a larger denominator. Second, ﬁgure 1.1 is based on trader rather than return level
data and uses Kaplan-Meier estimate of survival function which is not necessarily equivalent to
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Figure 1.1: Probability of joining FRS on or before analysis time
Notes: Figure shows Kaplan-Meier nonparametric estimate of probability of joining FRS on or before analysis time.
Analysis time measures the time since traders had the option of joining FRS. The zero corresponds to date of VAT
registration for traders registering after April 2002, when FRS is available, but is ﬁxed at April 2002 for those already
registered when FRS was introduced. Traders who were VAT registered at the time of FRS introduction in April
2002 had the option of joining FRS for 109 months at the end of sample on April 2011. Figure uses trader-level
dataset with 1,803,179 traders. 165,967 join FRS as soon as they have the option to do so (t = 1) and 129,318 join
after this time until the end of analysis time. Data includes all traders who were observed to be eligible for FRS or
were on FRS at least once during the sample.
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Exit in t+1
Figure 1.2: Composition of FRS inﬂow and outﬂow
Notes: Figure uses returns-level dataset and follows traders overtime. The inﬂow ﬁgures are based on last year
status of traders observed on FRS during 2005-2010 ﬁnancial years (148,332 average number of traders on FRS in
this period). The outﬂow ﬁgures are based on what happens to traders on FRS during 2004-2009 ﬁnancial years in
the next year (130,815 is the average number of FRS traders during this time). New VAT registrations are traders
within the ﬁrst twelve months of VAT registration.
Figure 1.2 shows composition of traders joining and leaving FRS. On average 81
percent of current FRS traders remain on FRS and only 3 percent revert to normal
VAT in the next year. 16 percent of current FRS traders also exit data which
seems normal given the small size of eligible traders. On the inﬂow side, new VAT
registrations comprise a signiﬁcant addition to FRS. While 71 percent of current FRS
traders were on FRS in the last year, 23 percent are coming from new registrations as
opposed to 6 percent from existing VAT traders. In summary, ﬁgure 1.2 shows FRS
is close to an absorbing state and most of the additions are from newly registered
traders.
Table 1.3 shows summary statistics for three sub-samples: a) VAT traders below FRS
continuation threshold of ¿225,000, b) FRS traders, and c) eligible VAT traders
with gains from FRS (next section). The top panel lists tax variables while the
bottom panel shows indicator variables. Average FRS trader has a similar turnover
to average eligible gainer but they are smaller than average VAT trader. FRS traders
pay higher net VAT compared to VAT traders but slightly less than eligible gainers.
Eligible gainers also have much lower average inputs and input VAT compared to
VAT traders. This is consistent with the intuition that FRS is beneﬁcial for ﬁrms
using fewer inputs. FRS traders report inputs only if they purchase capital goods
with a value greater than ¿2000 or under special circumstances. This pulls down
average inputs and input VAT for FRS traders.
Incorporated businesses, with a share of 70%, dominate the population of FRS
traders. They have a more balanced share among VAT traders and FRS gainers
(43 and 48 percent respectively). Both sole proprietors and partnerships are under-
represented in FRS. This suggests that sole proprietors and partnerships are less
cross-sectional estimates of fraction on FRS.
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Table 1.3: Summary statistics
Variables A. VAT traders
(sales≤225k)
B. FRS traders C. eligible FRS gainers
Mean S. Dev. Median Mean S. Dev. Median Mean S. Dev. Median
Gross Outputs 82,543 61,268 71,711 76,197 82,671 68,393 75,548 45,913 70,916
Output VAT 9,463 8,715 7,306 8,758 9,592 7,809 10,903 6,679 10,211
Gross inputs 62,746 161,909 37,836 4,805 32,542 0 25,068 46,783 12,967
Input VAT 6,335 18,303 3,464 360 2,559 0 2,161 2,889 1,119
Net VAT 3,190 18,837 2,818 8,407 9,323 7,545 8,821 5,672 8,045
% sole
proprietor
37.8 23.8 35.7
% incorporated 43.4 69.8 48.1
% partnership 18.9 6.4 16.2
% EC Trader 21.7 9.6 20.6
%Group
registrations
0.3 0 0
% Partial
Exempt
1.4 0.2 0.91
Notes: Based on 2004-10 data and the working sample shown in 1.2. The number of observations are 5,822,956 for
VAT traders, 964,588 for FRS traders, and 1,049,218 for eligible gainers. 255,215 of FRS returns show non zero
input and input VAT but some of these relate to traders who are submitting a mix of FRS and VAT return. There
are 720,856 pure FRS returns (12 months on FRS) and 85,476 of these report a non-zero input VAT (12 percent)
with an average input VAT of ¿2,125. EC Trader counts both former and present traders with EU transactions.
Partial exempt counts all traders with some form of partially exempt supplies. Group registration shows fraction of
divisional and representative registration.
likely to utilize FRS opportunity15. The last two rows show the fraction of group
registrations and partially exempt traders are very small among VAT businesses.
Group registrations are ineligible for FRS and hence the zeros under panel B and C.
It is also less likely that partially exempt traders beneﬁt from FRS justifying smaller
numbers under panel B and C.
15One likely reason for this could be the fact that a higher proportion of incorporated businesses
use tax preparators and hence are more likely to get tax saving recommendations from their spe-
cialized agents. National Audit Oﬃce (2010) reports that 78 percent of corporation tax returns and
43 percent of VAT returns are submitted through tax agents. Incorporated businesses submit both
corporation tax and VAT returns while sole proprietors and partnerships do not submit corporation
tax returns.
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1.4 FRS gainers
1.4.1 Calculation of FRS gains
In order to assess whether traders are choosing the minimum tax scheme I need
to calculate tax liability under the alternative scenario. VAT traders report VAT
liability (TV in (1.1)). In order to calculate counterfactual FRS liability (TF in
(1.2)), I use traders' reported Standard Industry Classiﬁcation 2007 (SIC2007) codes
to determine the appropriate ﬂat rate (τF ) which is then multiplied by the sum of
reported net sales and corresponding VAT. FRS gains are deﬁned to be TV − TF .
Similarly an eligible VAT trader is an FRS gainer if TV − TF ≥ 0.
I give a brief overview of determination of ﬂat rates and leave further discussions
to appendix B where I also explain some complications in calculation of FRS gains.
HMRC publishes applicable ﬂat rates for 56 categories of business together with the
list of associated trade names. I match trade names to SIC2007 code descriptions
from the Oﬃce of National Statistics (ONS) to form a mapping between reported
SIC2007 codes and published ﬂat rates. For example, ONS describes SIC2007 code
of 70229 as management consultancy activities (other than ﬁnancial management).
This description matches with the FRS category for management consultancy with
τF = 12.5 percent during 2004-07. Using this manual matching, I assign ﬂat rates to
78 percent of eligible traders. The largest sectors left out are construction and some
retail sectors because reported SIC2007 codes map to several ﬂat rates.
FRS traders make an active decision when joining FRS; therefore it is unlikely that
they lose out from the scheme. Comparing FRS and VAT liabilities for FRS traders
could shed light on importance of other issues (e.g. compliance cost savings) that
might inﬂuence the joining decision. For example, observing some traders remain
on FRS despite having a lower VAT liability suggests that they get compliance cost
reductions under FRS. Unfortunately, FRS traders only report gross sales (Sg), and
corresponding FRS liability (TF ), making it impossible to calculate counterfactual
VAT liability (TV )
16. I must estimate VAT liability for FRS traders which requires
estimation of τV and v in (1.1). Absence of enough observable characteristics renders
regression based estimation of gains ineﬀective and therefore, I exclude FRS traders.
Table 1.4 summarizes the focus of this paper. FRS traders are left out but VAT
16To be more precise FRS traders report FRS turnover which in some cases might diﬀer from
gross sales (see appendix B). Also notice that the less demanding reporting requirement is the main
source of compliance cost saving under FRS.
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Table 1.4: FRS gainers studied
FRS gainer FRS loser
FRS traders TˆV − TF ≥ 0
Left out
TˆV − TF < 0
Left out
VAT traders TV − TF ≥ 0
Focus of paper
TV − TF < 0
Analyzed
traders are analyzed. The main message of the paper is, however, about the group
of VAT traders who are observed to gain from FRS.
1.4.2 FRS gainers characteristics
Table 1.5 shows aggregate number of FRS gainers. Column (1) reports the number
of eligible VAT traders under investigation (assigned τF ). On average 26 percent of
573,347 eligible traders are FRS gainers but the percentage of gainers drops from
28 to 23 percent during the sample (column (2))17. Columns (4) shows percentage
of FRS gainers who join FRS in the following year. On average only 3 percent of
FRS gainers join the scheme in the following year and there does not seem to be a
clear time trend. However, 70 percent of gainers remaining on VAT (do not exit or
join FRS) still gain from the scheme in a consecutive year (column (5)). Column (6)
checks the robustness of fraction of gainers by setting τF to the maximum applicable
rate in each ﬁnancial year. Even using this conservative approach 12 percent of
eligible traders are observed to gain from FRS. This, to some extent, alleviates
concerns about errors in assignment of ﬂat rates. Therefore, FRS gains seem to be
persistent but majority of gainers are not responsive and remain on normal VAT.
To compare size of gainers and current FRS traders ﬁgure 1.3 plots sales distribution
(frequency) for the two groups. Both distributions are right-skewed suggesting FRS
is suitable for small businesses and is inline with HMRC's design of the scheme as
a small business program. The number of FRS gainers is almost similar to FRS
traders for low levels of sales, but the ratio of gainers to FRS traders increases after
¿100,000 annual sales. Around the joining threshold (ﬁrst vertical line) there are
three gainers for each FRS trader. Figure 1.3 also sheds light on gainers beyond
17The decline in the fraction of FRS gainers could be a result of information diﬀusion over time
(in 2004 the scheme was in place only for two years). The ﬂip side of this decline is a secular
increase in fraction of traders on FRS which is reported in column (6) of table 1.2.
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Table 1.5: FRS gainers among eligible VAT traders
year FRS eligible
(assigned τF )
% FRS
gainer
# FRS
gainer
% Joined
FRS
% FRS
gainer next
year
% gainer
(max τF )
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2004 618,810 28% 172,421 3.5% 72.0% 14%
2005 635,295 27% 174,639 3.9% 69.0% 14%
2006 596,803 27% 161,942 2.8% 71.0% 14%
2007 602,626 27% 165,170 3.6% 69.9% 12%
2008 503,013 25% 125,155 1.9% 68.0% 11%
2009 523,772 24% 124,967 2.8% 68.5% 7%
2010 533,107 23% 124,924 - - 9%
Average 573,347 26% 149,888 3.1% 69.7% 12%
Notes: Column (1) shows number of VAT registered traders who are eligible for FRS and whom I was able to assign
a ﬂat rate to and calculate counterfactual FRS liability. Column (2) shows the percentage of FRS gainers out of
column (1) traders, i.e. VAT traders with FRS liability equal or smaller than reported VAT liability. Column (3) is
the number of gainers, i.e. column (2) multiplied by column (1). Column (4) follows the population of FRS gainers
to the next period and reports the fraction joining FRS. Column (5) reports the fraction of FRS gainers gaining in
the following year. This fraction is calculated as the number of second year gainers divided by all ﬁrst year gainers
who remain on normal VAT, i.e. do not exit and do not join FRS. Column (6) uses the maximum applicable ﬂat
rate (not the ones I have assigned) and reports the fraction of VAT traders with non-negative tax gains from joining
FRS.
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Figure 1.3: Sales distribution for FRS traders and FRS gainers
Notes: Figure shows number of traders within bins of gross output for FRS gainers and FRS traders. The sample is
the returns-level dataset and includes all VAT returns submitted while traders are observed on FRS and all returns for
FRS gainers during 2004 - 2010 ﬁnancial years. The sample here is bigger than the one reported in the tables because
it includes traders above the FRS eligibility thresholds depicted by the vertical lines. I, however, exclude traders who
are ineligible based on observable non-turnover criteria. The ﬁrst vertical line shows FRS joining eligibility threshold
(150, 000×(1+0.175) = £176, 250 during 2004-2010) while the second vertical line shows FRS continuation eligibility
threshold (£225, 000 during January 2004 until January 2011).
the joining eligibility. As we have seen in section 1.2 the joining threshold is not
binding and traders above this threshold could in eﬀect join the scheme. I ignore
this possibility in table 1.5 but ﬁgure 1.3 shows there is a signiﬁcant mass of traders
who could potentially gain in this region.
In the remaining part of this section I establish four empirical facts about the pop-
ulation of FRS gainers:
Fact 1 Very few FRS gainers join FRS over time. 3 percent join in the following
year and the estimated joining probability 6 years after gaining is 10 percent.
Fact 2 Gains are persistent. Gaining in the last period increases the probability of
gaining by 62 percentage points after controlling for SIC2007 and year dum-
mies. 34 percent of gainers are observed to gain (or join FRS) during all years
they show up in the data.
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Fact 3 Size of FRS gains are not small. Median gainer could save 12 percent on
VAT liability by joining FRS. 92 percent of gainers have a gain of ¿100 or more
and 46 percent gain ¿1000 or more.
Fact 4 Gainers are concentrated in a few services sectors (consultancy and personal
services)18.
Fact 1: Few gainers join the scheme
Figure 1.4 plots Kaplan-Meier non-parametric estimate of (cumulative) probability
of joining FRS on or before the indicated number of months since traders are ﬁrst
observed to gain. Similar to table 1.5, 12 months after gaining, probability of joining
is about 3 percent. Interestingly, the likelihood of joining FRS shows a very gentle
increase over time and reaches 10 percent after 6 years (72 months). The gradual
increase in uptake of FRS suggests a potential role for learning and inertia which I
discuss in more detail in section 1.6.
Figure 1.5 looks at the percentage of gainers eventually joining FRS. X-axis shows
the number of years traders are observed to gain. Figure 1.5a considers all eligible
traders and plots the fraction of traders in each x-axis category that are observed on
FRS at any time during the sample. 13 percent of one-year gainers and 12 percent of
two year gainers are ever observed on FRS while only 8 percent of traders gaining for
more than two years join the scheme. Interestingly, 4 percent of traders who never
gain join the scheme. While this is one third of the fraction of two year gainers who
join the scheme, it suggests my calculations are unable to uncover gains for these
traders.
Splitting the data into traders with diﬀerent lifespans19 in ﬁgure 1.5b conﬁrms the
same pattern but also shows the percentage of gainers joining FRS is the highest
among traders who are present in the full 7 years of my sample: almost 20 percent
of one and two year gainers join FRS. In contrast, around 15 percent of one and two
year gainers from 5 and 6-year traders join the scheme. The patterns observed in
this ﬁgure could be consistent with inertia (sluggish responsiveness) and learning.
18I believe unobserved ineligibility is unlikely to overturn any of these facts. As discussed under
section 1.2, some of the unobserved eligibility criteria are likely to be more binding for FRS losers
and therefore would strengthen my results (e.g. past VAT convictions or uptake of alternative VAT
accounting schemes). The only unobserved criterion that might pose a challenge is being associated
with another business. I have no available information on business associations and assume the
share of associated businesses is not disproportionately high among FRS gainers.
19This is deﬁned as the number of years traders show up in my data.
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Figure 1.4: Probability of joining FRS versus months since ﬁrst gained
Notes: Figure shows Kaplan-Meier non-parametric estimates of the probability of joining FRS on or before analysis
time. The zero of analysis time (x-axis) corresponds to end of ﬁrst ﬁnancial year traders observed to gain from FRS.
Data used here is the trader-level dataset and includes all traders who were observed to be eligible for FRS and
gained at least once during the sample period. Traders exiting the data before joining FRS are censored after exit.
Figure uses the trader-level dataset and estimates joining probability from the sub-sample of 457,297 traders who
gain at least once during their lifetime.
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Observing one and two year gainers for longer (higher lifespan traders) increases the
joining probability. Gaining for second years rather than one year also increases
joining probability for 7-year traders (but not for traders with shorter lifespans).
Fact 2: Gains are persistent
Figure 1.6 looks at the persistence of FRS gains across sales levels. The solid line
shows the unconditional probability of being an FRS gainer is ﬁrst increasing but
quickly reaches a plateau after around ¿30,000 annual sales. The dashed line shows
the probability of remaining a gainer conditional on being a gainer in the previous
year. While this ﬁgure conﬁrms the earlier fact that the conditional probability is
much higher than the unconditional one (table 1.5), it reveals lower persistence of
gains for very small traders and slightly higher than 70 percent conditional probabil-
ity of gains for larger traders. Interestingly the conditional probability also reaches
a plateau after ¿30,000 annual sales and there is little change in persistence of gains
across sales levels after this point.
Figure 1.7 plots distribution of number of years gaining conditional on gaining once.
Figure 1.7a shows the fraction of gainers that gained for less than 50 percent, exactly
50 percent, more than 50 percent and exactly 100 percent of the times they submitted
returns. 34 percent of FRS gainers gain for all years while only 30 percent gain less
than 50 percent of the times20. Figure 1.7b shows separate histograms for traders
with diﬀerent lifespans. For almost all lifespans the highest share is for traders
gaining during their entire lifespan (far right dots for each curve). In summary these
ﬁgures show a considerable share of traders gain during all years in the data, while
many others have multiple years of gaining.
Fact 3: Gains are not small
Figure 1.8 plots the distribution of FRS tax gains for eligible VAT traders. The
gains distribution has a mode at zero with 4.8 percent of the mass falling between
¿-100 and ¿100 FRS gains. This is due to HMRC's targeting of ﬂat rates to make
the average traders indiﬀerent between FRS and VAT. A closer look at FRS gainers,
20In this ﬁgure, I have assumed traders who join FRS after x-year of gaining continue to gain
while on FRS and put them in the 100 percent gains bin. Dropping the traders who join will change
the percentages to 33, 14, 25, and 28 percent for less than 50, exactly 50, more than 50, and 100
percent bins respectively.
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Figure 1.5: Fraction of traders eventually joining FRS after x years of gaining
Notes: Figure shows the fraction of traders ever observed on FRS among diﬀerent sub-samples of traders. The ﬁgures
are based on trader-level dataset where there is one observation for each trader and I record the number of years
gaining and the number of years present in the data. This graph uses the pool of unique traders who are present at
least for two years in the data. Figure (a) reports percentage of joining traders for traders gaining never, one year,
two years, and more than two years during their lifetime. Figure (b) reports percentage joining for traders gaining a
given number of years separately for diﬀerent lifespans. Maximum lifespan is seven years but following trader over
time results in at most 6 years of gains (horizontal axis) for those who could join the scheme in the seventh year.
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Figure 1.6: Unconditional and conditional probability of FRS gains
Notes: The solid line shows unconditional probability of being an FRS gainer within bins of gross output, i.e.
the ratio of gainers to FRS eligible traders within bins. Dashed line shows the probability of gaining from FRS
conditional on being a gainer last year, i.e. the ratio of traders gaining for a second year among last year gainers who
remain on VAT (do not join FRS or exit). The sample here is bigger than the one reported in the tables because
it includes traders above the FRS eligibility thresholds depicted by the vertical lines. I, however, exclude traders
who are ineligible based on observable non-turnover criteria. The ﬁrst line shows FRS joining eligibility threshold
(150, 000 × (1 + 0.175) = £176, 250). The second line shows FRS continuation eligibility threshold (£225, 000).
Figure uses returns-level dataset and combines all years.
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Figure 1.7: Distribution of number of years gaining conditional on gaining once
Notes: Figure shows distribution of the number of year gaining conditional on gaining once. Traders who joined
FRS after gaining over certain years are assumed to continue to gain from FRS and hence are put in all year gaining
bin. This graph uses the pool of 402,894 unique traders who are observed to gain at least once and are present at
least for two years in the data. Figure (a) plots share of gainers that fall into four categories of gaining less than 50
percent, exactly 50 percent, more than 50 percent, and exactly 100 percent of the times they submit returns. Figure
(b) shows separate histograms for traders with diﬀerent lifespans and instead shows the distribution of number of
years (rather than percentages).
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i.e. the positive tail, reveals 92 percent of gainers have a gain of ¿100 or more and
46 percent gain ¿1000 or more.
Gains distribution reveals great asymmetry between gains and losses. Size of losses
could potentially be much larger than gains: the ﬁrst percentile of gains distribution
shows a loss of ¿27,800 while the ninety ninth percentile shows a modest gain of
¿4,800. This is also in line with a high proportion of FRS losers (table 1.5 reports
74 percent of eligible traders lose out from the scheme). One might expect that
given the way HMRC sets ﬂat rates, this ratio should be closers to 50 percent21.
But it should be noted that the gains distribution excludes the traders currently on
FRS and includes eligible zero (and reduced) rated traders who would incur huge
losses under FRS. I have no reliable information about how exactly ﬂat rates were
calculated but it seems HMRC excluded zero-rated traders from this calculation (see
discussion of ﬁgure 1.10 too). Furthermore, FRS traders are likely to have had gains
from FRS and exclusion of such traders in the gains distribution would shift the
ratios in favor of losers.
In order to get a better sense of size of gains, ﬁgure 1.9 looks at FRS tax gains as
a percentage of reported VAT liability across sales levels. The ﬁgure plots medians
of relative tax gains distribution separately for FRS gainers (above zero) and losers
(below zero) within gross sales bins of ¿1000. The top part shows fairly stable and
non-negligible tax gains for FRS gainers. Gainers with annual sales between ¿9500
and ¿10500 (ﬁrst bin) see a median reduction of 17 percent in their tax liability
upon joining FRS. The median gain decreases to 12 percent for larger gainers but
remains stable at this level. Perhaps not surprisingly, the bottom part conﬁrms FRS
losers incur large tax losses if they join the scheme. Median FRS losers with less
than ¿50,000 annual sales would see an increase of 150 percent in their tax liability
should they join FRS. This loss reduces to 100 percent for higher annual sales.
Fact 4: Gains are concentrated
To see the type of activities beneﬁting from FRS, table 1.6 lists ten sectors with
highest number of FRS gainers. These sectors comprise 51% of all FRS traders and
41% of all FRS gainers. This table shows FRS is suitable for a concentrated number
of sectors. The list includes management consultancies, computer consultancies,
21Obviously, this assumes mean and median of VAT liability distribution within ﬂat rate cate-
gories are the same. If the VAT liability distribution is skewed, then targeting average VAT liability
within sectors would not necessarily make 50 percent of eligible traders gainers.
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Figure 1.8: Distribution of FRS tax gains for gainers
Notes: Figure shows distribution of FRS tax gain for current VAT traders, positive numbers show gains from switching
to FRS while negative numbers show losses. The ﬁgure uses returns-level dataset and combines all available years
of data. Sample size is the sum of observations in column (1) of table 1.5, i.e. eligible VAT traders assigned a ﬂat
rate. Figure restricts to the ﬁrst and ninety ninth percentiles of the gains distribution and removes traders with less
than £1000 annual turnover (similar ﬁgures obtained without this or with £10,000 threshold.).
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Figure 1.9: Medians of FRS gains as a percentage of VAT liability
Notes: Figure splits the FRS tax gain distribution at zero and plots medians over gross output bins for FRS
gainers and losers separately. Solid line show medians of FRS gains for FRS losers and dashed line represent
medians of FRS gains for FRS gainers. The sample here is bigger than the one reported in the tables because
it includes traders above the FRS eligibility thresholds depicted by the vertical lines. I, however, exclude traders
who are ineligible based on observable non-turnover criteria. The ﬁrst line shows FRS joining eligibility threshold
(150, 000× (1 + 0.175) = £176, 250). The second line shows FRS continuation eligibility threshold (£225, 000).
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business support activities, and take away food shops. Interestingly, most of these
sectors have ﬂat rates close to the high end of the range of applicable rates. Gains
seem to be more persistent for these sectors: 77% of gainers who remain on VAT
continue to gain in t+ 1 (compared to 70% for all gainers in table 1.5). Conditional
median of gains (columns (6) and (7)) reveals non-negligible potential gains from
joining FRS.
Figure 1.10 generalizes the patterns in table 1.6 by looking at distribution of FRS
traders, gainers, and eligible VAT traders across ﬂat rate categories. Dots in the
ﬁgure show proportion of the speciﬁed group that falls in the given ﬂat rate category.
For example, the two far right solid blue circles show that the last two ﬂat rate
categories contain 31 and 26 percent of all FRS traders. This ﬁgure shows proportion
of eligible traders, FRS traders, FRS gainers, and the ﬂat rate percentages show
positive correlations22. In other words, it seems there is a high concentration of FRS
traders, gainers, and eligible traders in the higher ﬂat rate categories. This pattern
is partly due to the concentration of total observations in these categories. The three
most populous ﬂat rate categories are those with ﬂat rate percentages equal to 6,
12.5, and 13 with a respective share of 17, 14 and 13 percent of total observations
(eligible plus FRS traders). All other sectors have less than 9 percent of traders. The
other factor that explains this positive correlation is the positive correlation between
FRS traders and FRS gainers (both as a % of eligible traders) within 5-digit SIC2007
codes. Sectors with a higher percentage of FRS traders also have a higher percentage
of FRS gainers23.
This counter-intuitive pattern seems to be an artifact of HMRC's conservative ap-
proach in setting the ﬂat rate percentages. Using returns submitted by FRS eligible
VAT traders between 2004 and 2007 ﬁnancial years, I calculated the average of net
VAT to gross sales within 5-digit SIC2007 codes, restricting to traders with a posi-
tive net VAT. This average ratio should approximate the statutory ﬂat rates based
on HMRC guidance on calculation of ﬂat rates. But when I compare calculated ﬂat
rates to statutory rates, I ﬁnd that some sectors have statutory rates that are higher
than the calculated ones24. These are mostly sectors with majority zero-rated traders
22The correlation coeﬃcient between proportion of FRS traders and FRS gainers is 0.76; for FRS
traders and eligible traders it is 0.36; for FRS gainers and eligible traders it is 0.70; for ﬂat rate
percentages and FRS traders it is 0.62; and for ﬂat rate percentages and FRS gainers it is 0.54.
23Notice, this is the share of FRS traders and gainers from all traders in a given 5-digit SIC2007
code which is diﬀerent from the share of population falling under each sector. Figure 1.10 is an
aggregated version of the latter while table 1.6 is showing some evidence based on the former.
24The fact that some traders are on FRS during the time I am calculating the ﬂat rates implies
that calculated rates underestimate the statutory ones. The implicit assumption here is that this
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Table 1.6: Ten sectors with highest number of FRS gainers
Sector τF
(2004-7)
%
FRS
%
gainer
%
gainers
join FRS
in t+ 1
% gainers
gaining in
t+ 1
Conditional
Median of
gains (¿)
Conditional
Median of
gains %
VAT
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Management consultancy 12.5 35 36 5 74 522 7.5
Renting and operating of
Housing Association
12 3 52 0 85 642 15
Computer consultancy 13 45 36 7 79 643 7.4
Other personal service
activities
10 13 31 2 77 849 15
Other business support
service activities
11 17 30 3 79 795 14
Other engineering
activities
12.5 48 35 6 76 530 7.3
Take away food shops 12 31 39 5 84 808 7.2
Freight transport by road 9 17 29 1 67 461 8.5
Maintenance and repair of
motor vehicles
7.5 10 29 2 76 841 13
Artistic creation 11 20 34 3 73 516 11
Notes: Table uses observations from 2004-2010 ﬁnancial years. Column (1) reports the assigned ﬂat rate during
2004-2007 ﬁnancial years. Column (2) shows the percentage of FRS traders out of all eligible traders in each sector.
Column (3) is the fraction of eligible VAT traders who gain from FRS in each sector. Column (4) is the fraction of
FRS gainers who join FRS in the following period. Column (5) reports two year gainers as a percentage of last year
gainers who remain on VAT and are still eligible for the scheme. Column (6) is the median of current FRS tax gains
for the population of FRS gainers in the last year who remain on VAT. Column (7) is the same conditional median
as in column (6) but for tax gain as a percentage of VAT liability.
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Figure 1.10: Distribution of FRS traders, FRS gainers, and eligible VAT traders
across ﬂat rate categories
Notes: Figure shows distributions across ﬂat rate categories. Solid line shows fraction of FRS traders that fall in
each ﬂat rate category, dashed line shows fraction of FRS gainers in each FRS category, and dot-dash line shows the
fraction of eligible VAT traders within each ﬂat rate. Flat rate categories are based on the applicable rates during
2004-7 Flat rates range from 2 to 13.5 percent during 2004-2007, but 13.5 percent is excluded as I could not assign
it. There are, therefore, 15 distinct ﬂat rates. The sample is the returns-level dataset and covers 2004-2010 ﬁnancial
years.
or those with high input use (low share of value added) that feature a large number
of traders with negative net VAT (repayment traders). Such sectors are unlikely to
have a high number of FRS gainers if the calculation of ﬂat rates ignores the repay-
ment traders. On the other hand, sectors with mostly standard-rated traders (e.g.
management consultancy) would receive a statutory ﬂat rate closer to the sectoral
average and hence are more likely to have a higher number of FRS gainers and FRS
traders.
underestimation would not be able to explain the observed discrepancy between calculated and
statutory rates. To justify this assumption, I note that in 2007 only 17 percent of eligible traders
were on FRS. Furthermore, if I repeat the calculations restricting to only 2004 (when only 9 percent
of traders were on FRS) the same pattern emerges between calculated and statutory ﬂat rates.
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1.5 Uncertainty
Traders decide to join FRS before gains are realized. Assuming risk neutrality, basic
economic theory suggests they should join FRS when expected after tax proﬁts
are greater under the scheme. So far, I have shown some traders are observed to
gain. But this is not necessarily equivalent to expected gains. Therefore, inaction
of identiﬁed FRS gainers could simply be an artifact of expected FRS losses, not
sub-optimal choices. In this section I ﬁrst show that observed FRS gains inﬂuence
the joining decision of a sub-sample of traders. Then I reinforce fact 2 from the
previous section on persistence of FRS gains to show that gaining once is a strong
signal of expected gains. Finally, I discuss implications of risk averse preferences and
consider a few features of the scheme that might alleviate concerns.
Figure 1.11 shows that the probability of joining FRS rises sharply around zero last
year gains. In other words, a visibly higher proportion of FRS gainers join the
scheme compared to FRS losers. This pattern conﬁrms that calculated gains are
not irrelevant and inﬂuence the joining decision of a sub-sample of traders. Under
the assumption that the responsive traders are not making a mistake themselves, I
can conclude that observed gains are equivalent to expected gains for these traders.
However, this ﬁgure might be less useful in ruling out uncertainty for the whole
sample because the responsive traders might have diﬀerent risk preferences or face
lower levels of uncertainty.
To show that observed FRS gains signal expected gains I complement the evidence
on persistence of FRS gains by looking more closely at the distribution of FRS gains
conditional on past gains. Figure 1.12a plots twenty ﬁfth, ﬁftieth (median), and
seventy ﬁfth percentiles of current FRS gains for traders falling in ¿500 bins of last
year gains. The gains distribution shows high degree of serial correlation. The whole
distribution of FRS gains shifts to the right for traders with higher past FRS gains.
The comparison of the median line (solid black) with the 45 degree line (one-to-one
dependence of gains over time) shows that the median gains and losses are slightly
less than the absolute value of last year's tax gain. But size of the gains are quite
comparable. For example the median gains for traders with last year tax gains
between ¿5750 and ¿6250 is equal to ¿4800 and the 75 percentile is ¿6,000. The
twenty ﬁfth percentile of gains distribution is positive for traders with last year gains
falling in [750, 1250) bin or beyond.
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Figure 1.11: Probability of joining FRS conditional on last year gains
Notes: Figure depicts probability of joining FRS in year t conditional on falling in a given bin of FRS tax gains in
year t−1. This is the ratio of the number of traders joining FRS to the number of traders remaining on VAT in year
t within FRS tax gain bins of year t− 1. Sample includes all traders who are eligible to join FRS during 2004-2009
ﬁnancial years and do not exit the data in the following year. Figures restrict to last years gains being between
¿-6000 and ¿6000 and categorizes traders in to ¿500 bins of last year gains.
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Table 1.7: Linear probability model of FRS gains
Dependent Var: dummy for gainer (1) (2)
L.gainer 0.647
(.0078)∗
0.617
(.0068)∗
SIC2007 dummies NO YES
Year dummies NO YES
Notes: Table shows coeﬃcient estimates from an OLS regression of a gainer dummy on covariates. Gainer dummy is
equal to one if trader is observed to gain from FRS in a given year and zero otherwise. Columns (1) and (2) control for
trader's VAT registration time (two dummies capturing whether VAT registered between 1 April 2002 and 1 January
2004 and after 1 January 2004), ownership status (two dummies capturing incorporations and partnerships), Average
log of gross output, average and standard deviation of FRS gains as a percentage of VAT liability, fraction of years
trader was eligible for FRS, and a dummy for monthly returns. Column (2) further includes SIC2007 and year
dummies and 9 dummies capturing the 2004 FRS density decile for registered outcode of trader. Standard errors
are adjusted for SIC2007 clusters and shown in parenthesis. * shows if coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant at 1 percent level.
The sample for both regressions is 3,449,070 returns during 2005-2010. It includes traders that were at least eligible
for FRS once during 2004-2010 and drops sectors with less than 1000 observations during the 7 years of the sample.
Notice the sample only includes traders NOT on FRS and those I could calculate whether they gain from being on
FRS.
Figure 1.12b shows FRS gainers as a percentage of traders within bands of last year
gains (the x-axis is the same as in ﬁgure 1.12a). The ﬁgure shows less than 20 percent
of last year FRS losers become gainers. Perhaps more importantly percentage of
gainers rises sharply right after zero to more than 70 percent. The fraction of gainers
increases to 80 percent for traders gaining between ¿750 and ¿1250 during last year
and continues to increase as the size of past gains increases.
To see the robustness of the persistence conclusion, table 1.7 shows the results of
regressing an FRS gainer dummy on lag of the dependent variable and other co-
variates. The coeﬃcient estimate of last year gains is highly signiﬁcant and shows
the probability of gaining from FRS increases by 65 percentage points for last year
gainers. Controlling for sector and year dummies reduces the coeﬃcient to 62 per-
centage points. While these regressions suﬀer from all sorts of endogeneity issues,
they conﬁrm that being an FRS gainer in the past is an important correlate of cur-
rent gains even after controlling for sector and year dummies and other observable
characteristics.
Both ﬁgures 1.12a and 1.12b and table 1.7 indicate very high persistence of FRS
gains and therefore suggest observed gains are a signal of expected gains. To assess
the relative size of gains, ﬁgure 1.13 looks at twenty ﬁfth, ﬁftieth (median), seventy
ﬁfth percentiles, and mean of gains as a percentage of VAT liability. This ﬁgure
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(a) Percentiles of tax gains in year t in bins year t− 1 gains
(b) Probability of FRS gains in bins of year t− 1 gains
Figure 1.12: Impact of last year FRS gains on current gains
Notes: Figure (a) shows twenty ﬁfth, ﬁftieth (median), and seventy ﬁfth percentiles of FRS tax gain distribution in
year t for VAT traders who were eligible for FRS in year t − 1 within FRS tax gain bins in year t − 1. Solid black
line shows median and dashed gray lines show twenty ﬁfth and seventy ﬁfth percentiles. The solid gray line shows
the 45 degree line. Panel (b) shows probability of having non-negative tax gains from FRS in year t conditional on
being in a given bin of FRS tax gains in the previous year. This is the ratio of the number of traders gaining from
FRS to the number of traders remaining on VAT in year t within FRS tax gain bins of year t− 1 . In both ﬁgures
sample includes all traders who are eligible to join FRS during 2004-2009 ﬁnancial years and do not exit the data in
the following year. Figures restrict to last years gains being between ¿-6000 and ¿6000 and categorizes traders in to
¿500 bins of last year gains.
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restricts to traders who have gained a year earlier and shows the dependence of the
distribution on sales. Median gains are fairly stable at around 10 percent of VAT
liability25. Seventy ﬁfth percentile is also stable and shows 25 percent of last year
FRS gainers save more than 20 percent on tax payment upon joining FRS. Twenty
ﬁfth percentile of the gains distribution is negative up until ¿40,000 annual sales
but becomes positive for larger traders26. I have plotted mean of gains distribution
to shed light on expected gains for FRS gainers. Assuming that gains distributions
for last year gainers in the same sales bin are identical, the mean of FRS gains in
each sales bin is equal to expected gains for traders in that bin. Therefore, I can use
the realized gains for this group to back out expected gains for individual traders27.
The mean coincides with twenty ﬁfth percentile of FRS gains. For traders with gross
sales less than ¿60,000, mean FRS gain is negative but traders larger than this level
have positive mean. This suggests expected FRS gains for these traders.
So far I have assumed traders are risk neutral but would the same conclusions apply if
traders are risk averse? Risk aversion could be important because as ﬁgure 1.13 shows
the mean of FRS gains is almost 9 percentage points less than the median. In other
words, there is a probability of incurring large losses even for last year FRS gainers.
Therefore, while the mean of FRS gains is positive, the risk involved in opting in the
scheme prevents risk averse traders from joining. This story suggests FRS liability
is more volatile (involves higher uncertainty of after tax proﬁts) compared to VAT
liability. The summary statistics in table 1.3 shows coeﬃcient of variation for net
VAT is 0.64 for eligible FRS gainers (panel C) while it is 1.11 for FRS traders (panel
B). This shows FRS traders face greater dispersion in distribution of tax liability
compared to eligible gainers which is in line with the above reasoning. It is not,
however, clear that this gap is entirely due to greater uncertainty of FRS liability.
For example, coeﬃcient of variation for gross sales shows a similar pattern. It is 0.61
for eligible gainers and 1.08 for FRS traders.
Two features of FRS alleviate some of the concerns arising from risk averse pref-
erences. Infrequent large FRS losses (and higher volatility) could be a result of
investments in capital goods. For example, management consultants might buy new
computer systems every 5 years or take-away food shops might invest in new stoves
25The median gains as a percentage of turnover is also stable at around 1.5% (results not shown).
2625th percentile ﬂuctuates between a min of 0.2 percent and a maximum of 2.8 percent for
traders larger than ¿40,000 with an average of 1.5 percent. This suggests on average 25 percent of
last year FRS gainers have a gain of 1.5 percent or less (maybe negative) in the current year.
27Obviously this is a crude way of estimating expected gains as there are very few controls (sales).
Table 1.7 below includes covariates but uses a gainer dummy as the dependent variable rather than
a measure of size of tax gains.
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Figure 1.13: Percentiles of FRS gains as a percentage of VAT liability in t for traders
observed to gain in t− 1
Notes: Figure shows twenty ﬁfth, ﬁftieth (median), seventy ﬁfth percentiles and mean of FRS tax gain as a percentage
of VAT liability distribution in year t for VAT traders who are observed to gain from FRS in year t− 1. Traders are
grouped in to bins of gross output in year t and the statistics of the gains distribution are calculated separately for
each bin. The gray dashed lines show 25th and 75th percentiles, while the solid black line is the median. The mean
is coinciding with the 25th percentile for most of sales level and is indicated by dashed blue line. The sample here is
bigger than the one reported in the tables because it includes traders above the FRS eligibility thresholds depicted by
the vertical lines. I, however, exclude traders who are ineligible based on observable non-turnover criteria. The ﬁrst
vertical line shows FRS joining eligibility threshold while the second vertical line shows FRS continuation eligibility
threshold.
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every 10 years. These investments will imply large losses if traders could not recover
input VAT. I do not observe these investments separately in the data and therefore
assume traders cannot recoup any input VAT when I calculate FRS gains. But the
rules of the scheme allow reclaiming of input VAT on capital expenditures exceeding
¿2000. Incorporating this possibility might remove the outliers in ﬁgure 1.13 and
move the mean closer to the median.
The other feature of the scheme is its easy and quick leaving procedure. Traders
can leave the scheme at the end of VAT periods (a quarter for most). Therefore, if
traders could predict large upcoming purchases that do not qualify for FRS input
recovery, they can simply leave the scheme. Inaction of gainers is justiﬁed only
when traders face large urgent (unpredictable) purchases that happen with small
probability and do not qualify for FRS input recovery. For example, traders might
need to purchase large stocks of consumable inputs that could not be postponed
until they leave FRS28.
1.6 Evidence on type of frictions
If uncertainty cannot fully explain inaction of FRS gainers what are the potential
hurdles that prevent these traders from joining the scheme? In this section, I use
temporal and spatial correlations in the data to justify a combination of information
frictions and learning as the most prominent reasons for inaction. I deﬁne informa-
tion frictions to include both lack of knowledge about rules required to calculate
FRS liability and unawareness of the existence of the scheme29. Learning suggests
traders know about the scheme but are not certain about its beneﬁts. Therefore,
they might wait for some time to learn about the optimality of the scheme30. I will
argue that inertia, i.e. sluggish responsiveness to known expected gains, could not
fully explain the observed patterns31.
28It is worth noting that demand ﬂuctuations would not necessarily generate higher volatility of
FRS liability. If traders use a ﬁxed proportion of inputs to deliver their supplies, an increase in
demand increases input use but does not change the share of value added and therefore does not
change the relative merit of FRS and VAT.
29The evidence is silent on deeper reasons responsible for lack of knowledge: e.g. high cost
of acquiring information, biased beliefs about suitability of VAT, tendency to ignore non-default
options, and lack of salience of VAT.
30Notice, learning could still be important even when there is no objective uncertainty. For
example, traders might not know the objective distribution of FRS gains. They would update their
prior beliefs after a few observations and learn that FRS is optimal for them.
31Evidence from Cash Accounting Scheme (CAS), another small business VAT scheme introduced
in 1987, suggests lack of awareness might be key. Traders on CAS pay VAT when they receive money
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Before considering the evidence on type of frictions, it is useful to outline potential
ways traders could learn about FRS. VAT traders could learn about FRS through a)
HMRC, b) tax agents and consultants, and c) business partners and peers. Traders
are engaged with HMRC during VAT registration, submission of returns, and audit
visits. But chances of learning about FRS is highest at the time of VAT registration
because other occasions focus on existing circumstances rather than pointing to new
possibilities32. Registration is a time of intense learning about VAT which could
raise chances of knowing about FRS33. Channels (b) and (c) could be operative
at all times but they could be stronger during registration. Channel (b) might
be less important because less than half of VAT traders use agents34 and tax and
accountancy associations did not support the scheme initially35.
The importance of registration period for acquiring VAT knowledge, suggests traders
registering after FRS was introduced, are more likely to know about the scheme
(hypothesis 1 ). Additionally, peer eﬀects suggest traders with FRS-aware partners
are more likely to know about the scheme (hypothesis 2 ). In the absence of awareness
measures, I rely on estimates of probability of joining FRS for various groups to assess
the validity of hypotheses 1 and 2.
I split eligible VAT traders into three groups based on date of VAT registration: a)
Pre-FRS traders who registered before April 2002 (date of FRS introduction), b)
Early-FRS traders who registered on or after April 2002 but before January 2004,
and c) Late-FRS traders who registered on or after January 2004, when ﬂat rates and
eligibility thresholds were revised favorably. Hypothesis 1 suggests pre-FRS traders
should have the lowest chance of joining because during their registration FRS was
absent. In contrast, late-FRS traders might learn about the favorably revised FRS
from customers and reclaim input VAT when they fully pay for the purchase. Based on a telephone
survey of around 1500 traders in 2006, HMRC reports 28 percent of eligible traders have not heard
of CAS (HMRC (2006)).
32Among the numerous VAT guides, HMRC publishes one to help traders ﬁlling their returns
(Notice 700/12 Filling in your VAT return). Interestingly, there is no mention of FRS here until
October 2011 revision.
33HMRC's website contains a section on special VAT accounting schemes, where FRS is described.
VAT experts indicated from October 2012, traders registering online would face the FRS option on
the entry form.
34Returns data does not show use of agents but National Audit Oﬃce (2010) reports around
43 percent of VAT returns were submitted by agents during 2009-10. Furthermore, GfK Business
(2008) reports 48 percent of businesses use tax agents for any VAT related issues, while 83 percent
of incorporated businesses use agents for corporation tax aﬀairs.
35In response to FRS consultation in 2001, many tax and accountancy associations argued FRS
diminishes the accounting discipline VAT imposes on traders. 54 responses were received from a
total of 225 copies sent out to trade associations, professional bodies, and individual businesses
(HM Customs and Excise (2002)).
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during registration, and hence should have highest joining probability. Hypothesis 2
implies traders registering later (e.g. late-FRS) are more likely to have FRS-aware
partners as the take-up of the scheme was increasing.
To further support hypothesis 2, I use the registered outcodes of traders and deﬁne
FRS density to be the ratio of FRS traders to all eligible ones in each outcode
during 2004-05 ﬁnancial year36. Registering in high FRS density outcodes implies
greater chance of having an FRS-aware partner and hence higher joining likelihood
if information frictions matter. I use the deciles of FRS density distribution and
compare joining probabilities for traders registering in diﬀerent deciles. I restrict
attention to traders joining FRS after 2004-05 ﬁnancial year because this is the year
I use for deﬁning FRS densities.
I take a survival time approach, and look at the probability of joining FRS over
time. Consider a random variable T ∈ [0,∞) representing the time traders join
FRS and t as a realization of this random variable. I use Kaplan-Meier (KM) non-
parametric method to estimate the conditional CDF of T , F (t | X), where X is a
vector of categorical covariates. In survival analysis terminology this is known as
the failure function. The KM estimation method relies on the fraction of traders
experiencing the event of interest. Starting from a total number of traders, n1, who
have the option of joining FRS at time zero, the probability of joining on or before
ﬁrst period is estimated by d1
n1
, where d1 is the number of traders joining FRS in the
ﬁrst period. For the second period onward it is easier to consider the probability of
not joining FRS which is simply the multiplication of probability of not joining in
the ﬁrst period by the probability of not joining in the second period, n1−d1
n1
× n2−d2
n2
,
where n2 = n1 − d1 − c1 is the total number of traders who are still on VAT in the
second period and c1 is the number of traders exiting (censored) the data during
the ﬁrst period. The cumulative probability of being on the FRS by the end of the
second period is 1− n1−d1
n1
× n2−d2
n2
. In general, the probability of joining FRS on or
before jth period is estimated by 1 −∏ji=1 ni−dini , where ni = ni−1 − di−1 − ci−1 for
i > 1.
To complement the non-parametric evidence, I estimate semi-parametric Cox pro-
portional hazard models (CPH) and verify the non-parametric estimates hold after
controlling for observables. The hazard rate is deﬁned as the probability of joining
FRS in an inﬁnitesimal interval around t conditional on not having joined before t,
36Postcodes in the UK consist of two alphanumeric parts. Outcode (postcode district) refers to
the ﬁrst part. For example, WC2A is the outcode associated with WC2A 2AE. The geographical
area covered by outcodes varies substantially. I use FRS density to make outcodes comparable.
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divided by the length of the interval as it approaches zero. Equation (1.3) shows the
deﬁnition of hazard rate and its relationship to CDF and PDF of T .
h(t | X) ≡ lim
→0
Pr [T ∈ [t, t+ ) | T ≥ t, X]

=
f(t | X)
1− F (t | X) (1.3)
CPH postulates that the eﬀect of covariates enter as a time separable exponential
term as follows
h(t | X) = h0(t) exp (β′X) (1.4)
where h0(t) is the baseline hazard function and determines the evolution of hazard
rate over analysis time when X = 0. The model is semi-parametric because the
partial likelihood estimation leaves the baseline hazard unrestricted. In the next
subsection, I provide KM non-parametric estimates of joining probability and in the
second subsection, I show results of CPH estimation.
1.6.1 Non-parametric estimation
Figure 1.14 plots non-parametric estimates of the cumulative joining probability
for pre, early, and late-FRS traders with the shadings around the lines showing
95 percent conﬁdence intervals37. Figure 1.14a estimates joining probability for all
eligible traders within the three registration groups. The horizontal axis captures
the number of months since the FRS option was available to the traders. For early
and late-FRS traders date of VAT registration is set as the zero while for pre-FRS
traders the zero is the date of FRS introduction. Consistent with hypothesis 1, the
ﬁgure shows late-FRS traders have higher probability of joining FRS with early and
pre-FRS traders lagging behind. The diﬀerence between all groups is statistically
signiﬁcant at 5 percent level. For late-FRS traders the probability of joining FRS
jumps to 17 percent right at the time of registration while the same measure remains
close to zero for pre-FRS traders. For all groups, the subsequent increase in the
joining probabilities is small relative to the initial jump.
The caveat here is that late-FRS traders face a more attractive FRS during the
ﬁrst year of VAT registration (due to the 1 percentage point discount on ﬂat rates
introduced in January 2004). Therefore, the higher joining probabilities for this
group could be a result of greater beneﬁts from FRS. To alleviate concerns I notice
that the three groups face identical FRS incentives after t =24 months, yet the
37This is F (t | X) where X contains only one categorical variable indicating the three registration
periods (pre, early, and late-FRS).
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probabilities do not converge. Furthermore, early-FRS traders face similar incentives
as pre-FRS group from the outset, but the former shows a 2 percentage points
increase in the joining probability at t = 1 while the latter does not.
Figure 1.14b focuses on FRS gainers which is perhaps a more relevant population
for the analysis of joining probabilities38. The x-axis here shows months since the
end of the ﬁrst ﬁnancial year traders are observed to gain. It is worth noting that
all FRS gainers face a similar FRS structure because in order to be observed in this
sample they have to be on VAT at least for one year and hence the temporary FRS
discount has expired. Here again late-FRS gainers have a signiﬁcantly higher joining
probability with early and pre-FRS gainers lagging behind.
Figure 1.15 looks at the sub-samples within outcodes falling in ﬁrst, ﬁfth, and tenth
deciles of initial FRS density. In ﬁgure 1.15a, analysis time is months since traders
had the option of joining FRS. Consistent with hypothesis 2, traders registering in
tenth decile have the highest probability with ﬁfth and ﬁrst deciles lagging behind.
Joining probability jumps to 20 percent as soon as traders in tenth decile get the
chance of joining but the jump is smaller for ﬁfth and ﬁrst decile traders. The joining
probabilities increase almost in parallel for tenth and ﬁfth deciles over analysis time
but remain fairly stagnant for the ﬁrst decile. The probability of joining FRS on
or before the end of analysis time is 8, 14, and 30 percent for ﬁrst, ﬁfth, and tenth
deciles. Similarly, for FRS gainers, ﬁgure 1.15b shows gainers registered in higher
deciles of FRS density are signiﬁcantly more likely to join FRS in all times after they
gain.
Patterns in ﬁgure 1.14a could be consistent with inertia. New traders have invested
fewer resources in accounting procedures and VAT familiarization, therefore they
can invest in FRS accounting procedures. Existing traders are more reluctant to
undertake new investments and hence have higher inertia. However, for inertia to
justify observed patterns in ﬁgure 1.14b, one would need to assume traders with
longer experience of VAT have higher inertia. This is a stronger assumption as all
FRS gainers have set up normal VAT accounting procedures. But for inertia to justify
spatial patterns in ﬁgure 1.15, one would need the more demanding assumption of
less inertia for high FRS density areas. This assumption seems unreasonable unless
high FRS density outcodes turn out to have a higher proportion of new traders. In
the semi-parametric estimation I control for this possibility and show spatial patterns
38The sample of FRS gainers excludes traders joining right at the time of VAT registration and
those with missing gains. Since the former group constitutes a big share of FRS traders I started
the analysis by estimating joining probabilities for all eligible traders.
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remain robust.
Both temporal and spatial correlations show a secular increase in joining probabilities
over time which is more visible for FRS gainers. In other words, it seems that some
FRS gainers realize that they could gain from FRS and join the scheme later on. This
pattern could be consistent with inertia, learning, or gradual spread of information
about the scheme. The above arguments suggest inertia may not be important but
to show that learning is probably important I rely on semi-parametric estimates in
the next section.
1.6.2 Semi-parametric estimation
So far I have looked at joining probabilities for various groups without controlling
for potential confounding factors. For example, traders registering later might be
registering in high FRS density outcodes. Therefore, patterns in ﬁgures 1.14 and 1.15
might not necessary reﬂect two distinct correlations. To rule out this possibility and
other observable confounders, I estimate CPH models (equation (1.4)). Estimation
results are reported as hazard ratios for ease of interpretation. For dichotomous
variables hazard ratios are deﬁned as the ratio of the hazard rate when the variable
is equal to 1 to when it is 0, ﬁxing other variables:
HRi =
h(t | xi = 1, X−i)
h(t | xi = 0, X−i) =
h0(t) exp
(
βi × 1 + β′−iX−i
)
h0(t) exp
(
βi × 0 + β′−iX−i
)
= exp(βi)
This suggests the rate of joining FRS is HRi = exp(βi) times higher for xi = 1
traders relative to xi = 0 ones. Alternatively the likelihood of joining FRS is on
average HRi times higher for xi = 1 traders relative to xi = 0 traders during the
analysis period.
Table 1.8 reports estimation results when the start of analysis time is from the
time traders have the option of joining FRS. The variables of interest are gainer, a
dummy variable that is equal to 1 if trader is an FRS gainer, two dummies capturing
early and late-FRS traders, and initial FRS density. In all speciﬁcations, I control
for average and standard deviation of FRS gains over VAT liability for each trader,
average logarithm of gross output, the ratio of number of years trader was eligible
for FRS, dummies for sole proprietors and partnerships, and dummies for frequency
of submitting returns. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at 5-digit SIC2007
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(a) Probability of joining since traders were able to join
(b) Probability of joining since traders ﬁrst gained
Figure 1.14: Probability of joining FRS for diﬀerent VAT registration periods
Notes: Figures show Kaplan-Meier non-parametric estimates of probability of joining FRS on or before the analysis
time for traders registering during diﬀerent periods. Pre-FRS traders are those registering for VAT before April 2002.
Early-FRS are traders registering between April 2002 and before January 2004. Late-FRS are traders registering
on or after January 2004. 95 percent conﬁdence intervals are shaded around the lines. Panel (a) shows joining
probability since the time traders had the option of joining FRS. The zero of analysis time shows time of VAT
registration for early and late-FRS groups but is ﬁxed at April 2002 for pre-FRS traders. The initial (t = 0) number
of traders that could potentially join FRS is 679,510 Pre-FRS, 180,416 early-FRS, and 943-241 late-FRS. Panel (b)
shows joining probability as a function of months since traders ﬁrst gained. This is the end of ﬁnancial year where
traders are observed to gain for the ﬁrst time. The initial (t = 0) number of gainers that could potentially join FRS
is 213,037 Pre-FRS, 52,145 Early-FRS, and 182,310 late-FRS traders.
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(a) Joining probability since traders are able to join
(b) Joining probability since traders gained
Figure 1.15: Probability of joining FRS for deciles of initial FRS density
Notes: Figures show Kaplan-Meier non-parametric estimates of probability of joining FRS on or before the analysis
time for traders registering in outcodes featuring 1, 5, and 10 deciles of FRS density distribution in 2004-5 ﬁnancial
year. 95 percent conﬁdence intervals are shaded around the lines. Panel (a) shows joining probability since the time
traders had the option of joining FRS. The zero of analysis time shows either time of VAT registration or time of
FRS introduction, April 2002, whichever is later. The initial (t = 0) number of traders that could join FRS are
59,094 in ﬁrst, 76,803 in ﬁfth, and 91,146 in tenth decile. Panel (b) shows joining probability as a function of months
since traders ﬁrst gained. This is the end of ﬁnancial year where traders are observed to gain for the ﬁrst time. The
initial (t = 0) number of gainers that could join FRS are 6,484 ﬁrst, 15,056 Fifth, and 15,856 tenth decile.
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codes.
In column (1) a simple CPH model is estimated. The likelihood of joining FRS is
3.862 times (286 percent) higher for gainers relative to those never gaining. In line
with ﬁgure 1.14a, early and late-FRS traders are respectively 55 and 178 percent
more likely to join FRS compared to pre-FRS traders. Columns (2) to (5) estimate
stratiﬁed CPH models with 5-digit SIC2007 codes and deciles of initial FRS density
as grouping variables. Stratiﬁcation allows baseline hazards to vary ﬂexibly across
SIC2007 by FRS density groups but restricts to identical covariate eﬀects across
strata39. Coeﬃcient estimates are slightly reduced when I allow for stratiﬁcation in
column (2) but the main results remain robust. Gainers are still 202 percent more
likely to join FRS. Early and late-FRS traders are 51 and 171 percent more likely
to join relative to pre-FRS traders. In column (3) I remove traders with less than
three years of returns data and the results are still robust.
Column (4) includes interactions of registration period dummies with gainer indica-
tor. The interaction terms capture the change in the hazard rate for gainers register-
ing in diﬀerent periods. Early-FRS gainers are 45 percent more likely (signiﬁcant) to
join FRS relative to pre-FRS gainers (1.45 = 1.851×0.782). Late-FRS gainers are 136
percent more likely to join FRS relative to pre-FRS gainers (2.36 = 4.313× 0.546).
Column (5) includes the ratio of the number of gain years to total observation years
for each trader. The estimates here support coexistence of learning and information
frictions. Estimates of hazard ratios for late and early-FRS traders remain by and
large similar to previous speciﬁcations (information friction). Traders with one more
year of gaining are on average 30 percent more likely to join the scheme (assuming
7 years of returns)40. This result suggests that learning plays a role in the joining
decision, albeit somewhat smaller than the impact of registration periods (early and
late-FRS traders have 52 and 182 percent higher likelihood of joining).
Column (6) only stratiﬁes on 5-digit SIC2007 codes and instead includes a continuous
variable for FRS density of the registration outcode of the trader. Here I restrict
to traders registering from 2005-06 ﬁnancial year onwards (hence remove early and
late-FRS dummies)41. Increasing initial FRS density of the registration outcode of
39Stratiﬁcation is similar to ﬁxed eﬀects in a linear regression. However, in CPH models strat-
iﬁcation allows for more ﬂexibility than inclusion of dummies. Dummies shift the hazard rate
proportionately across categories but stratiﬁcation allows independent time paths for each strata.
40To calculate this, I used the original coeﬃcient estimate from column (4). Speciﬁcally, exp( 17 ×
ln(6.245)) = 1.30.
41This restriction is put in place because by deﬁnition outcodes with higher FRS density in 2004
would show higher joining probabilities in that date.
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Table 1.8: Estimates of hazard ratios (Cox proportional hazards model)
Stratiﬁed: SIC2007 and deciles of FRS density Stratiﬁed:
SIC2007
Baseline Baseline Traders
with at
least 3
returns
Interactions % years
gained
Include
FRS
density
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Gainer 3.862
(.405)*
3.025
(.227)*
2.924
(.269)*
4.319
(.385)*
0.865
(0.045)*
2.488
(0.276)*
Fraction of years
gained
6.245
(.685)*
Early-FRS 1.555
(.126)*
1.510
(.06)*
1.515
(.061)*
1.851
(.157)*
1.566
(.056)*
Late-FRS 2.78
(.189)*
2.716
(.074)*
2.818
(.083)*
4.313
(.224)*
2.873
(.093)*
Early-FRS×
Gainer
.782
(.065)*
Late-FRS ×
Gainer
.546
(.03)*
FRS density 16.393
(0.132)*
FRS density ×
Gainer
0.407
(0.132)*
Observations 918,396 915,887 731,508 915,887 915,887 276,287
Number joining
FRS
28,206 28,206 28,206 28,206 28,206 7,428
Notes: Table reports hazard ratios from estimation of Cox proportional hazard models. Controls included are average
and standard deviation of FRS gains as a fraction of VAT liability for each trader, average of logarithm of gross sales,
fraction of years trader was eligible, dummies for sole proprietors and partnerships, and dummies for frequency of
submitting returns. Standard errors are adjusted for clusters in SIC2007 and reported in parenthesis. Stars show
hazard ratio is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from one at 1 percent level. Reported standard errors are calculated from original
standard errors on coeﬃcient estimates using delta method. This amounts to multiplying the original standard errors
by exp(βi). Test of signiﬁcance, however, relies on the original z-score derived from the ratio of coeﬃcients to the
standard errors. Column (2) to (5) estimate stratiﬁed Cox models using SIC2007 and deciles of 2004 FRS density
as strata. Column (6) only uses SIC2007 as a stratum and restricts the sample to traders registering from 2005-06
onwards.
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traders by 0.05 increases the likelihood of joining by 15 percent for traders never
gaining and 174 percent for FRS gainers. Overall, CPH estimations support the
patterns presented in ﬁgures 1.14 and 1.15.
1.7 Conclusions
Results presented in this chapter show a signiﬁcant number of small businesses with
non-negligible tax savings fail to join FRS. I have provided evidence that observed
FRS gains are a strong signal of expected gains. Therefore, it seems uncertainty can-
not fully explain inaction. This, however, does not imply that traders' prior beliefs
about suitability of the scheme are correct. Some traders might need to spend a few
years observing gains before updating their beliefs about suitability of the scheme.
Others might not even know about the scheme or have diﬃculty calculating potential
gains. Temporal and spatial correlations in the joining probabilities indicate that
both of these stories have some merit. Traders registering when FRS was in place
are more likely to join the scheme. Furthermore, traders registering in high FRS
density outcodes are more likely to utilize the scheme.
The conclusion that small traders are susceptible to errors in their business decision
making resonates with the results of Devereux et al. (2014) who ﬁnd small incorpo-
rated business are not completely shifting their incomes to the corporate base while
in a frictionless world it is optimal to do so. Their preferred explanation for sub-
optimal behavior is illiquidity of corporate proﬁts and the need for having a stable
ﬂow of income (e.g. in the form of personal income). In this paper, however, I argued
for presence of information frictions and learning. This means in the case of FRS,
gainers would join the scheme if they get the right information or can resolve their
doubts about optimality of the scheme more quickly. Accepting this view calls for a
more eﬀective role for the government to publicize business support schemes.
56
Chapter 2
Stimulus eﬀect of the UK 2008 VAT
rate cut
2.1 Introduction
The great recession 2008-2009 has lead to substantial ﬁscal stimuli and unprece-
dented expansionary monetary policy. Tax rebates, incentives for investment and
consumption, and investment in infrastructure are common elements of recent ﬁscal
stimulus packages around the world. Knowing whether ﬁscal policy could stimulate
the economy during recessions and which elements are more successful are key issues
in policy design. While there exist a large body of literature that studies the impact
of ﬁscal policy, the debate about its eﬀectiveness during recessions is far from settled.
In fact as Auerbach et al. (2010) conclude much of what has been learned recently
concerns how such [ﬁscal] multipliers might vary with respect to economic conditions
....
In the UK a temporary reduction of VAT rate was the main element of the ﬁscal
stimulus package. On 24 November 2008 the Chancellor of the Exchequer announced
that the VAT standard rate will be reduced from 17.5 to 15 percent from 1 December
2008 to 31 December 2009. The rate cut was heralded as timely, targeted, and
reversible. The cut was estimated to cost ¿12.5 billion during the 13 months of its
operation which amounts to approximately 15.5 percent reduction in VAT receipts
or 2.2 percent fall in total tax revenue. VAT receipts data conﬁrms the cut shaved
oﬀ around ¿12 billion during 2009 calendar year. Figure 2.1 shows cumulative VAT
receipts over each calendar month. VAT receipts in 2007, 2008, and 2010 all stand
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Figure 2.1: Total VAT receipts
Notes: This ﬁgure plots cumulative monthly VAT receipts from HMRC's VAT bulletin published in February 2014.
The results from receipts data is not the same as those from returns. Furthermore, this ﬁgure includes import VAT
whereas returns data used later on is for home VAT only. VAT rate was 17.5 percent prior to December 2008. It was
reduced to 15 percent between 1 December 2008 and 31 December 2009. Reverted to 17.5 percent from 1 January
2010 and then increased to 20 percent from 4 January 2011.
around ¿80 billion. During 2009, i.e. 12 out of 13 months of the rate cut, VAT
receipts are around ¿68 billion which shows an approximate fall of ¿12 billion (14.9
percent of VAT revenue in 2008).
The theoretical impact of the cut depends on whether traders pass-on the cut to
customers or take home the reduction in tax liability. In the former case, the cut
would result in income and substitution eﬀects while in the latter the substitution
eﬀect would be absent. The income eﬀect could result in higher consumption or
extra savings (e.g. paying debt). But the consumption increase is not expected to
be substantial due to the temporary nature of the cut unless individuals are credit
constrained or myopic1. Two types of substitution eﬀects could be present in the
1Under permanent income hypothesis, unanticipated temporary increases in income would be
spread over the life cycle and therefore should have little impact on current period consumption.
Credit constrained consumers would, however, consume any marginal income. Interestingly, many
recent studies of US tax rebates ﬁnd substantial consumption responses right after the receipt of
rebates (e.g. Johnson et al. (2006), Parker et al. (2013), and Agarwal et al. (2007)). Most of
the rebate money is consumed within a few quarters after receipt. For a review of the empirical
literature on marginal propensity to consume out of income shocks refer to Jappelli and Pistaferri
(2010).
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case of price reductions. First, demand for standard-rated items would increase as
their price relative to zero-rated items is lower (intra-temporal). Second, price of
consumption is lower during the cut and consumers would shift purchases to beneﬁt
from lower prices (inter-temporal). Given about one third of standard-rated items
are durable goods in the UK, the inter-temporal substitution eﬀect could be strong
because consumers can stock up and consume these items later2.
The key diﬀerence between the UK VAT cut and the US tax rebates is that the
former encourages consumption through price incentives (assuming some degree of
pass through) while the latter works purely through an increase in after-tax income3.
Absence of inter-temporal substitution eﬀects for tax rebates could reduce their
eﬀectiveness as a stimulus policy. The same eﬀect could also jeopardize nascent
recovery if the economy has not returned to normal conditions after the expiry of
the VAT cut4.
A common issue to VAT cut and tax rebates is salience5. The VAT in the UK is quite
complex, and it is not obvious that consumers know which products are subject to the
standard-rate. Targeted advertisement by retailers at the time of the cut, however,
increased the salience of the cut6. A related issue is the size of incentives. Small
incentives might not be as eﬀective in encouraging extra consumption. Under full
pass through the standard-rate cut would reduce prices by 2.1 percent which might
be insigniﬁcant in the face of large income drops during the recession (a ¿117.5 item
would see a ¿2.5 price reduction)7.
In this paper, I use administrative VAT returns data between 2002q1 and 2010q4
2The recession might moderate the inter-temporal substitution eﬀect by tightening credit con-
straints and increasing income uncertainty. For a detailed discussion of the potential impact of the
cut refer to Blundell (2009), Crossley et al. (2009), and Barrell and Weale (2009).
3While price incentives are widely used to promote business investment (e.g. R&D and invest-
ment tax credits), use of price incentives was more limited in the US (except for Cash for Clunkers
program of 2009 and First-time Home buyer Credit).
4For the cash for clunker program in the US, Mian and Suﬁ (2012) ﬁnd substantial demand
shifting. They estimate that the two months program has led to 370,000 more car purchases but
car purchases were lower for a period of 10 months after the program expiry. In other words, the
cash for clunkers was ineﬀective in boosting medium run demand.
5For example if posted prices are tax exclusive (as in Chetty et al. (2009)) or the tax cut is
applied at the till, consumers might fail to notice the price reduction. For tax rebates Sahm et al.
(2012) ﬁnd that a tax cut delivered through reduced withholding has half of the eﬀect of a similar
one-oﬀ tax rebate.
6Big retailers like Tesco heavily advertised the VAT cut and showed calculations of extra savings
on their websites.
7In the context of US tax rebates Parker et al. (2013) ﬁnd signiﬁcant impacts on durable con-
sumption for the larger 2008 rebates while Johnson et al. (2006) do not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant impact
on durables from 2002 rebates. Both studies, however, ﬁnd signiﬁcant impacts on non-durable
consumption.
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from HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) to estimate the stimulus impact of the
standard-rate cut. Administrative VAT returns data is well suited for studying the
impact of the cut for several reasons. First, I observe eﬀective tax rates on sales and
purchases and therefore, could identify standard-rated traders (i.e. treated). Second,
amount of measurement error should be minimal relative to survey data because of
potential penalties for mis-reporting. Third, I observe a large number of traders over
the course of 32 quarters and therefore could control for a rich set of ﬁxed eﬀects
(e.g. trader and date ﬁxed eﬀects plus sector by recession interactions) to alleviate
concerns regarding confounding factors. The caveat of this data is that I do not
observe quantities and prices separately. So I will not be able to separately identify
price and quantity responses to the VAT cut.
The key challenge for estimation of the stimulus eﬀect in presence of the great re-
cession is to construct a valid counterfactual: how would sales, purchases, and value
added have evolved for the group of treated traders had the standard-rate not been
cut? The fact that a large part of consumer spending is zero-rated in the UK pro-
vides a natural solution to this challenge. I categorize traders into treatment and
control based on pre-cut average eﬀective output tax rates, i.e. sales VAT divided
by sales. Traders with tax rates close to the standard-rate would potentially receive
a beneﬁt from the cut while traders involved in zero-rated activities would not. I use
a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences (DD) identiﬁcation strategy and compare average growth
rate of sales, purchases, and value added across standard and zero-rated traders be-
fore and during the VAT cut. The identiﬁcation assumption here is one of parallel
trends for the growth rates: had the standard-rate not been reduced the change in
average growth rates during the cut period relative to the pre-cut period would have
been identical for standard and zero-rated traders.
In returns data, growth rate of value added becomes negative from around 2008q1
and remains negative until 2010q2 (ﬁgure 2.3 panel a). The cut period covers 13
months aﬀecting returns submitted in 6 quarters from 2008q4 to 2010q1. As far
as the average impact of the recession is similar across the group of standard and
zero-rated traders, the DD estimate would partial out any recessionary eﬀects and
delivers an unbiased estimate of the stimulus impact. This assumption is, however,
unlikely to hold. In fact as ﬁgure 2.3 panel b) shows right around the recession time
a clear gap emerges between average growth rates of standard and zero-rated traders
with the standard-rated traders showing greater declines8.
8The larger recession impact on standard-rated traders could be due to the fact that most
durable goods fall in this category.
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I use two strategies to isolate confounding recession eﬀects. First, I allow average
growth rates to diﬀer for standard and zero-rated traders during the recession pe-
riod (2008q1-2010q4) by including the interaction of a recession dummy with the
treatment dummy. Estimated stimulus impacts under this strategy are eﬀectively
equivalent to dropping pre-recession data points. The estimated magnitudes reﬂect
the diﬀerential change in average growth rate of standard-rated traders right at the
cut period relative to to the six recessionary quarters before and after the cut. The
identiﬁcation assumption is now reﬁned and this strategy would deliver unbiased
estimates of the stimulus eﬀect when the recession has a heterogeneous but time in-
variant impact on standard-rated traders9. Figure 2.3, however, suggests the deepest
part of the recession coincides exactly with the cut period. Therefore, the diﬀerential
impact of the recession could be changing over time with the greatest eﬀect showing
up right in the middle of the cut.
The second strategy I adopt for dealing with the recession is to allow heterogeneous
recession eﬀects for two-digit sectors by including sector by recession interactions in
the regression. The identiﬁcation of stimulus eﬀect here relies on diﬀerential change
of growth rates for standard-rated traders within the same two-digit sector right at
the time of the cut. To the extent that recessionary eﬀects are on average the same for
standard and zero-rated traders within the same two-digit sector, the DD estimates
from this speciﬁcation would deliver unbiased estimates of the stimulus eﬀect. This
method allows for sector speciﬁc recession responses but assumes standard and zero-
rated traders within the same broad sectors receive a similar recessionary eﬀect10.
DD estimates of the stimulus eﬀect from the basic speciﬁcation show implausibly
large and negative numbers but once I employ either of the above strategies to deal
with heterogeneous recession eﬀects, the magnitudes become much smaller (some-
times positive) and insigniﬁcant. Impact of the cut on sales growth is estimated to
be between -0.1 and 0.2 percentage points depending on the speciﬁcation (all in-
signiﬁcant). Similarly, the cut has led to a reduction of purchases growth by 0.7 to
1 percentage point (insigniﬁcant).
A zero eﬀect on gross sales and purchases is suggestive of a proportionate increase
9The common recession eﬀect could vary over time. This assumption only requires the diﬀerential
impact of the recession to remain constant.
10The ﬁrst and second methods deal with diﬀerent concerns and therefore it might be diﬃcult to
select one as the preferred method. The ﬁrst method allows for a diﬀerential recession response for
standard and zero-rated categories while the second method controls for two-digit sector speciﬁc
recession eﬀects. Since there is not a perfect correlation between two-digit sectors and standard-
rated categories, the two measures control for diﬀerent potential confounders.
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in quantity demanded in response to tax induced price reductions. Under full pass
through, the 2.5 percentage points reduction in the standard-rate would translate to
a 2.1 percent price reduction. This price reduction would unambiguously lead to an
increase in quantity demanded. But unless the price elasticity of demand is greater
than 1, the resulting change in gross sales would be negative. Therefore, under full
pass through a zero eﬀect on gross sales suggests a proportional change in quantity
demanded.
I check the robustness of my results for various sub-samples. First, VAT is eventually
a consumption tax and one might expect that in a perfect VAT system intermediate
production stages do not directly respond to rate changes11. Therefore, the retailers
are a more relevant group to study the direct impact of the VAT cut. When I restrict
attention to the retail sector, I ﬁnd very similar results. I get small insigniﬁcant
coeﬃcient estimates for the impact of the cut on sales growth. Second, the change
in the standard-rate could in principle aﬀect both input and output eﬀective tax
rates. To remove potential confounding eﬀects from the input dimension, I restrict
the sample to traders that use solely standard or zero-rated purchases. Results from
both of these sub-samples conﬁrm the earlier ﬁndings. Finally, large traders might
get more beneﬁts from the cut by spending more on advertising the rate cut. When
I restrict the sample to large traders, I still get estimates close to zero for sales and
purchases.
Several papers study impact of VAT reductions on prices and sales in other countries
using a similar DD strategy (I review the existing work on UK VAT cut in the next
section). Turkey implemented VAT and special consumption tax cuts on certain
durable and luxury goods during the ﬁnancial crisis. Misch and Seymen (2013) com-
pare changes in sales after the tax cuts for ﬁrms selling treated goods to unaﬀected
ﬁrms. The Turkish tax cuts were implemented upon short notice and happened
between March and September 2009 (a period of less than 7 months). Using three
waves of Financial Crisis Surveys12, they estimate that the group of aﬀected ﬁrms
had 39 percentage points higher sales growth relative to control ﬁrms. They justify
the extreme magnitude of this coeﬃcient based on the size of tax cuts. It is however,
not entirely clear whether this could explain the result. The tax rate for passenger
cars was reduced from 55 to 37 percent, but tax rate for white household goods was
reduced from 6.7 to 0 percent. While they control for ﬁrm, industry by time and
11Traders in the intermediate stages might respond to VAT changes because the VAT system in
the UK features extensive exemptions.
12This dataset is available at www.enterprisesurveys.org. The World Bank and International
Finance Corporation commissioned these surveys in several countries.
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region by time ﬁxed eﬀects it is not entirely obvious that their sample allows such a
demanding speciﬁcation. Their sample size is between 880 and 717 observations and
the average number of observations per ﬁrm is 1.6.
Harju and Kosonen (2013) consider the reduction of VAT rate for restaurant meals
in Finland from 22 to 13 percent in 2010. They carry out a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
estimation using hotels and restaurants in neighboring countries as control groups
for restaurants in Finland. The results show a low pass-through of 25 percent and
they are unable to ﬁnd a signiﬁcant eﬀect on sales.
Carbonnier (2007) uses two French VAT rate reductions for cars (33.3% to 18.6%
in 1987) and housing repair services (20.6% to 5.5% in 1999) and estimates a pass
through of 77 and 57 percent respectively in car sales and housing repair services.
The estimates are in line with the market structure of these sectors as car sales is
much closer to oligopoly. He also ﬁnds tax shifting is complete four months after the
rate cuts with most of the change happening within the ﬁrst two months.
In the next section, I brieﬂy describe the VAT in the UK and discuss the timeline of
the standard rate cut. Here I provide a review of existing studies that try to assess
the success of the VAT cut as a stimulus policy. Section 3 discusses VAT returns
data and present summary statistics. This section also justiﬁes the deﬁnition of
standard and zero-rated traders I use. In section 4 I explain the empirical strategy
and discuss various speciﬁcations I use to isolate recession eﬀects. Section 5 presents
the graphical and regression evidence on the impact of the cut. A ﬁnal section
concludes.
2.2 Context
Businesses with annual taxable turnover above a threshold (¿67,000 during 2008
ﬁnancial year) must register for VAT in the UK13. Taxable turnover relates to to-
tal supplies of commodities and services under three diﬀerent VAT rates. Table 2.1
shows the list of activities under each rate. Food, books, children clothes, exports,
and other activities under the ﬁrst column are zero-rated. This means the tax rate
13Business units of a single corporate body usually have one VAT registration. HMRC, however,
allows separate VAT registrations for individual business units or divisions but there are strict
conditions for separate registration. It seems most of big chain stores have a single VAT registration
and submit one tax return in each accounting period. HMRC also allows group registration for a
company with subsidiaries under some conditions. VAT returns data shows a very small fraction
of returns relate to companies with group registration.
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Table 2.1: Activities under diﬀerent VAT categories
Zero-rated Reduced-rated Standard-rated Exempt
Exports
Food
Books, newspapers and
magazines
Passenger transport
Supplies to disabled and
charities, Domestic water
or sewerage services,
Construction and sale of
new domestic buildings,
Children clothing, Cycle
helmets, etc.
Mobility aids for elderly
Energy saving and new
energy items
Domestic fuel and power
Women's sanitary
products
Contraceptives
Children's car seats
Smoking cessation
products
Residential conversions
and renovations
household goods, and
durables
legal, accounting,
consultancy services
catering, taxis, and
everything not in other
categories
Rent on domestic
dwellings
Supplies of commercial
property
Private education and
Health services
Postal services
Burial and cremation
Finance and insurance
Betting, gaming and
lottery
Cultural admission
charges
Notes: Exempt traders are not observed in my data because they cannot register for VAT.
on these supplies is zero but the businesses can still reclaim VAT on their purchases.
Therefore, zero-rated traders would normally receive refunds from HMRC. The sec-
ond column lists supplies under reduced-rated category. The tax rate on supply
of these products is 5 percent during my sample. The observed number of traders
under reduced-rated group is very small compared to the two other categories due
to the narrow deﬁnitions. The last column of the table shows a non-comprehensive
list of standard-rated activities. The tax rate on supply of household goods, most
business services, and other standard-rated items is 17.5 percent prior to December
2008. Apart from the three tax rates, certain supplies are VAT exempt. Traders
involved in exempt activities cannot register for VAT and are absent from VAT re-
turns data14. These traders do not pay any VAT but cannot reclaim any input VAT.
Last column of the table shows the list of exempt activities.
2.2.1 Standard rate cut
Figure 2.2 shows the evolution of the three statutory VAT rates during my sample.
The zero and reduced rates are ﬁxed during the whole sample period. The standard
rate was at 17.5 percent since April 1991. In response to disappointing GDP ﬁgures
in the three ﬁrst quarters of 2008 and deepening ﬁnancial crisis, on 24 November
2008 Alistair Darling, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, announced a 2.5 percentage
14However, traders involved in sale of taxable and exempt supplies can register for VAT. I drop
sectors that qualify for exemptions from my analysis.
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points temporary reduction in the standard rate15. The standard rate was reduced
to 15 percent from 1 December 2008 to 31 December 200916. The cut was heralded
as best and fairest approach to boost the economy by giving back 12.5 GBP billion
of tax to consumers:
A reduction in the rate of VAT has been chosen as the main lever for
the ﬁscal action as this change can be implemented rapidly (timely), will
impact immediately on the purchasing decisions of ﬁrms and individuals
to boost spending (targeted) and is reversible (temporary). A tempo-
rary reduction in the rate of VAT will lower prices for households and
should provide help immediately, when they need it most. It will also
incentivise them to bring forward the purchase of goods, which will help
support ﬁrms and the people they employ as the economy slows. (part
of Chancellor's announcement reported from Seely (2009))
The fact that there was only one week between announcement and implementa-
tion leaves little room for real behavioral responses before the cut17. Although the
standard-rate was announced to return to pre-cut levels, there was some specula-
tion about subsequent rate increases to compensate for the lost revenue. But the
standard-rate was reverted to 17.5 percent as promised. However, on 22 June 2010
the new coalition government announced an austerity budget projecting a 2.5 per-
centage points permanent increase in the standard rate from 4 January 2011. The
standard rate has remained at 20 percent since then. My sample covers returns sub-
mitted between 2001q3 and 2011q2 but I focus on the temporary rate reduction and
its reversal. I refer to quarters from 2008q4 until 2010q1 as the cut period18.
15The cut was quite unexpected. I could ﬁnd speculative newspaper reports from 22 November
2008 onward. It seems the ﬁrst report was by The Telegraph on 22 November 2008 but most of
these reports were inaccurate. For example The Independent reports The cut will be at least 2
percent, possibly to 15 percent, where it will remain for a holiday of one-and-a-half to two years.
16This is a reduction of 14.3 percent in the standard-rate but would result in a price cut of 2.1
percent under full pass through. Before the cut the tax inclusive price is (1+0.175)p, where p is the
tax exclusive price. After the cut and under full pass through this will be (1 + 0.15)p. Therefore
the change in the tax inclusive price is 0.025/1.175 = 0.021.
17There might be pure reporting responses due to the timing of returns submission. Returns are
submitted with one month (and 7 days if online) delay. For example, returns relating to transactions
between 1 August and 31 October 2008 are submitted on 30 November 2008. Therefore, these
returns are submitted with the cut knowledge. I am, however, unable to identify any impact on
average growth rates before the cut.
18A maximum of one month in 2008q4 returns and a maximum of two months in 2010q1 returns
might cover the cut period.
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Figure 2.2: VAT rates over time
2.2.2 Assessments of the cut impact
Crossley et al. (2009) and Blundell (2009) try to predict changes in consumption
as a result of the VAT cut given the existing evidence on elasticities. Due to the
temporary nature of the cut, the authors expect a small income eﬀect but a large
inter-temporal substitution eﬀect. Since luxuries fall in the standard-rate category
in the UK, the authors suggest the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution will be
around 1. Given that the cut lowered prices by 2.1 percent this would suggest an
increase of 2.1 percent in demand for standard-rated items. This is consonant with
my ﬁnding that gross sales did not change in response to the rate cut. Barrell and
Weale (2009) use aggregate consumption data for six European countries with VAT
rate changes (2 rate reductions and 7 rate increases) to estimate likely impact of a
rate reduction in the UK. Their regressions show a 1 percentage point increase in
the standard VAT rate has led to 0.3 percent increase in consumption before the
rate rise and 0.5 percent reduction after the rate increase. Using a simulation model
they conclude that the consumption would be increased by less than 1 percent while
GDP will increase by less than half a percent19.
The cut was speculated to be ineﬀective by many observers on the grounds that
the resulting price change is insigniﬁcant in the face of drastic incomes falls20. Two
19Fernandez-de Cordoba and Torres (2011) get somewhat similar results using a calibrated general
equilibrium model.
20For a discussion of the cut in the media see Iain Dale's blog, and his round up of other blog
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survey based studies ﬁnd little positive impacts. The Guardian reports the results of
a PWC survey that shows 88 percent of consumers said that the VAT cut had not
prompted them to spend more on goods or services. ORC international, on behalf
of HMRC, interviewed 2,005 VAT registered businesses during May and June 2009 to
assess the compliance and commercial impact of the cut (ORC International (2010)).
78 percent of businesses responded that they passed on the VAT cut (almost all to
the full extent) while 15 percent did not change their prices. However, 46 percent
disagreed that the cut had a positive eﬀect on their sales while 26 percent agreed
there was a positive eﬀect. Interestingly, there is not much of diﬀerence between
businesses selling to other businesses or ﬁnal consumers: respectively 17 and 21
percent stated there was a positive impact21. It is worth noting that in neither of
the surveys people are asked questions about quantities. In the PWC survey the
question is about consumer spending and in the HMRC study it is about sales.
Therefore, a zero eﬀect on spending and sales resonate with my ﬁndings and alludes
to a demand elasticity of 1.
Chirakijja et al. (2009) use retail price index (RPI) to estimate the degree of pass
through. They compare 28 two-digit categories containing standard-rated items to
36 groups with no tax change. They ﬁnd the price index for standard-rated categories
fell by 1.5 percentage points relative to other items right at the time of the VAT cut.
Furthermore, there does not seem to be a lagged price change and all the impact
materializes right at the time of the cut. This corresponds to a pass-through of
around 71 percent22. This is close to the literature-based conclusion of 75 percent in
Blundell (2009). The standard errors are quite large here and one can not reject full
pass through at 5 percent signiﬁcance level. Chirakijja et al. (2009) show evidence
on the salience of the cut from a survey of consumer conﬁdence. They show a larger
fraction of consumers declare it is a good time to buy large household appliances
right after the VAT cut while they still have a poor evaluation of overall economic
situation.
Pike et al. (2009) discuss the diﬃculty of collecting price data after the VAT cut.
Oﬃce of National Statistics (ONS) gathers price data partly from shelf labels23 but
posts on the cut. Also BBC interviews show general skepticism about the cut eﬀectiveness.
21The results show traders incurred additional costs to comply with the rate change. The median
time spent on operationalizing and complying with the VAT cut was 2.7 hours. The mean was
dominated by larger businesses and is much higher at 11.4 hours. I abstract from such costs in my
analysis of the cut impact.
22The gross tax rate changed from 1.175 to 1.15 and therefore the change in that variable is 2.1
percent. Therefore pass-through is calculated as 1.52.1 = 0.71.
23ONS also gets some prices centrally for large chain stores or for services like utilities with no
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many businesses did not change shelf prices and gave a discount at the till after
the cut to save on relabeling costs. In the face of this evidence ONS has applied
adjustments to collected price data which might have implications for Chirakijja
et al. (2009) study. Pike et al. (2009) show that from local shops visited by ONS
data collectors only 14 percent changed shelf prices while 43 percent applied the cut
at the till, and 34 percent did not pass on the cut to consumers. This suggests a
pass through rate of 66 percent for local shops which is slightly lower than earlier
estimates.
Crossley et al. (2013) use UK Economic Accounts and Living Costs and Food Survey
(LCFS) to analyze the evolution of diﬀerent elements of consumption through three
recessions of 1980, 1990, and 2008. They document that the fall in real GDP from
peak (2008q1) to trough (2009q2) of the current recession was 7.1 percent which is by
far greater than the earlier recessions. Interestingly, they conﬁrm the intuition that
real consumption of durables fall more than non-durables during recessions. But it
seems the current recession is showing a diﬀerent pattern. While initially the fall in
durable purchases mimics that of earlier recessions, from 2009q1 until 2009q4 durable
purchases starts to rise while non-durable purchases is ﬂat. This period coincides
with the VAT rate cut and also covers the car scrappage scheme. Therefore, they
conclude that two schemes seem to be somewhat eﬀective. The increase in durable
purchases is reversed after 2009q4 and durable purchases start to decline further
which could be consistent with inter-temporal shifting of durable demand (Figure 4
in the paper).
In order to show the diﬀerence between the results from returns data and national
accounts (as in Crossley et al. (2013)), ﬁgure 2.3 shows a comparison of consumption
growth from national accounts and average value added growth from returns data.
Panel a) shows overall movements of the two series is very similar. For both series,
2008q2 is the ﬁrst quarter that growth becomes negative. The two series continue to
decline with equal rates until the beginning of the VAT cut where the fall in value
added accelerates. The growth rates start to rise from 2009q2 until during 2010
when they become slightly positive.
In panel b) I consider average value added growth rates for standard and zero-rated
traders separately (returns data). Growth rate of zero-rated traders is very volatile
while that of standard-rated traders is more stable and follows the overall average
in panel a)24. From this ﬁgure, it might seem that growth rate of standard-rated
regional variation
24The majority of traders are standard-rated, and therefore it is not surprising that the overall
68
traders start to pick up half way into the cut but it is impossible to claim this is
the impact of the cut for two reasons. First, the growth rates for standard-rated
traders remain negative and less than that of zero-rated traders throughout the cut.
Second, the recession might have had a diﬀerential eﬀect on standard-rated traders.
The high degree of volatility in the zero-rated series prevents ﬁrm conclusions at this
stage.
In panel c) I conﬁrm the results of Crossley et al. (2013) by looking at durable and
non-durable consumption growth from national accounts. Growth rate of durable
consumption becomes positive half way into the cut while that of non-durable con-
sumption remain negative for that period. It seems consumption data shows a pos-
itive impact of the cut on durable goods. However, looking at growth of durables
before the cut, conﬁrms higher volatility of this series and it could well be that
durable consumption is just showing extreme volatility. Also growth rate of non-
durables starts to pick up as well but at a slower rate. Therefore, this pattern might
just be the natural evolution of the recession. Obviously, the correspondence be-
tween VAT rates and durable consumption is not clear cut and national accounts
are not clearly comparable to returns data. For example, durable imports are part
of durable consumption but are not directly included in returns data.
2.2.3 Other confounding policies
To tackle the ﬁnancial crisis the government undertook many other policy reforms.
For example, when the VAT cut was announced on 24 November 2008 the Chancellor
also announced a rise in top income tax rate to 45 percent and an increase of 0.5
percentage point in national insurance both starting from 201125. These tax changes
were announced at the time of the VAT cut but become eﬀective after the cut
expiry26. Corporate tax rate was also reduced from 30 to 28 for proﬁts greater than
¿1.5 million, and increased from 20 to 21 for proﬁts less than ¿0.3 million for 2008/9
ﬁnancial year. However, marginal corporate tax rates change even before the cut.
Furthermore, standard and zero-rated sectors include all forms of ownership and not
just incorporations.
growth rate of value added is similar to the standard-rated growth rate.
25The chancellor also announced ¿60 Christmas gift for pensioners (120¿ for couples) on top of
the usual ¿10 bonus.
26Under the assumption that a constant share of income is spent on standard and zero-rated
categories, income changes would not create a heterogeneous impact on treatment and control.
However, given the fact that necessities are zero-rated while luxuries are standard-rated, we might
expect a diﬀerential spending response.
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Figure 2.3: Change in value added and consumption (% on quarter a year earlier)
Notes: Figures show percentage change in variables in the given quarter relative to the same quarter one year earlier.
In ﬁgure a) black line shows average change in log gross value added as observed in my data for the population of
traders classiﬁed into standard or zero-rated on the sales dimension. Gray line shows percentage change in total
consumption expenditure from national accounts (growth of ABJR series from ONS UK Economic Accounts data).
In ﬁgure b) black line shows average change in value added for standard-rated traders while the gray line is for zero-
rated traders. Figure c) uses classiﬁcation of consumption into durables and non-durables from national accounts.
Most durables are standard-rated items while non-durables (specially food) are mostly zero-rated. Two vertical lines
show onset and end of VAT cut. Notice GDP is a real variable whereas gross value added is nominal.
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Two policy reforms would have a more direct impact on the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
estimation. First, in order to oﬀset the eﬀect of standard-rate cut on price of alcohol,
tobacco, and fuel the government raised the excise duties on these items. Therefore,
these products are essentially unaﬀected by the cut. Second, to help car manufactur-
ers the government implemented a generous car scrappage scheme from May 2009
until March 2010. This scheme oﬀered ¿2000 cash toward the purchase of a new
car for customers with used cars with a minimum age of 10 years. I remove traders
involved in both of these sectors in my analysis in order not to confound the impact
of the VAT cut with these two changes.
2.3 Data
The data used in this paper is the universe of all returns submitted to HMRC between
the ﬁrst quarter of 2002 and ﬁnal quarter of 201027. Administrative VAT returns
data is well suited for studying the impact of the cut for several reasons. First,
I observe eﬀective tax rates on sales and purchases and therefore, could identify
standard-rated traders (i.e. treated). Second, amount of measurement error should
be minimal relative to survey data because of potential penalties for mis-reporting.
Third, I observe a large number of traders over the course of 32 quarters and therefore
could control for a rich set of ﬁxed eﬀects (e.g. trader ﬁxed eﬀects and sector by date
ﬁxed eﬀects) to alleviate concerns regarding confounding factors. The caveat of this
data is that I do not observe quantities and prices separately. So I will not be able
to separately identify price and quantity responses to the VAT cut28.
Traders report net of tax sales, purchases, and the corresponding VAT on sales and
purchases. I use three outcome variables to investigate the impact of the VAT cut:
gross value added, gross sales, and gross purchases. I deﬁne gross value added as the
diﬀerence between gross sales and gross purchases. Gross sales and purchases are
respectively the result of adding up sales VAT to net of tax sales and purchases VAT
to net of tax purchases (hereafter I drop the gross pre-ﬁx). Sales, purchases, and
27I have access to returns from July 2001 to June 2011 but do not use observations prior to
January 2002 or after December 2010. The beginning restriction is discretionary but does not
aﬀect any of the conclusions. The ending restriction is because from January 2011 the standard
rate was increased to 20 percent. It is interesting to see the responses to the permanent increase
in standard-rate from January 2011 but I do not have enough data points to identify any impacts.
28Oﬃce of National Statistics (ONS) compiles a set of price indices (e.g. producer price index)
that could be merged with the returns data to convert nominal series into real (quantity) series. I
have not yet pursued this avenue.
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value added show high seasonal variation and are trending. In order to remove the
trend and seasonality, I use the change in log of outcomes relative to the same quarter
a year earlier as the main dependent variable and refer to it as percentage change
in the original level variable29. I use the ∆4 operator to denote this diﬀerencing:
∆4 ln yit , ln yit − ln yit−4, where yit is the original outcome variable for trader i at
date t.
I start from a total number of 66,375,762 returns between 2002q1 and 2010q4 and
drop around 26 million observations (40 percent) in the following steps to arrive at a
clean sample. I drop a) returns with zero reported sales (≈10 million), b) majority
exempt sectors (health, education, ﬁnance), alcohol, fuel, and tobacco related sectors,
and sectors relating to wholesale and retail of cars (≈6 million), c) forms of ownership
other than sole proprietors, partnerships, and incorporations (≈2 million), d) ﬂat rate
scheme traders (≈4 million), and e) traders that could not be matched to a trader
characteristics dataset (≈ 4 million).
Table 2.2 reports summary statistics for the main variables. Mean value added is
¿150,133 but the distribution is very dispersed and the standard deviation is 300
times larger than the mean. Average sales and purchases are ¿627,955 and ¿482,127
respectively with a similar level of dispersion. The mean and standard deviation of
log variables show much less dispersion (logs are deﬁned only for positive values and
therefore the number of observations is smaller). Standard and zero-rated traders
constitute 55 and 14 percent of observations respectively. 31 percent of the sample
are left unassigned. Standard-rated traders are on average smaller and have lower
grow rates compared to zero-rated ones. Average growth rate of sales is respectively
1 and 2.1 percent for standard and zero-rated traders. Growth rates show high
standard deviations. Standard-rated group is dominated by incorporated businesses
whereas zero-rated traders are equally split between various forms of ownership30.
Majority of VAT registered traders submit four returns during a year31. Due to the
29Notice the change in logs is equivalent to percent change in level variable only when the change
is small. If the log change is β =∆4 ln yit = ln yit − ln yit−4, then percent change in level variable
is %∆4yit = e
β − 1 which is equal to β if β is small.
30The changes in number of observations from level variables to log versions and from log versions
to diﬀerenced versions is due to negative values, and the requirement that traders need to have at
least 4 quarters of data to get a non-missing growth rate. I have removed zero sales and therefore
there is no change in number of observations for sales when I take logs. For value added, however,
traders could have negative value added which would show up as missing when I take logs.
31A very small number of traders submit monthly or annual returns. The former group are often
larger traders while the latter are smaller traders. I drop annual traders but keep monthly traders.
To make them comparable to quarterly traders, I add up the value of three monthly returns in a
calendar quarter.
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Table 2.2: Summary statistics
All traders Standard-rated sales Zero-rated sales
Variable Obs. Mean S.D. %
Obs.
Mean S.D. %
Obs.
Mean S.D.
Sales 38,952,778 627,955 6x107 55 445,605 2x107 14 867,202 6x107
Purchases 38,952,778 482,127 5x107 55 329,702 3x107 14 718,846 7x107
Value added 38,952,778 150,133 5x107 55 119,768 4x107 14 151,218 5x107
ln(sales) 38,952,778 10.71 1.73 55 10.82 1.63 14 10.51 1.94
ln(purchases) 38,276,569 10.13 1.90 55 10.10 1.85 14 10.31 1.89
ln(value added) 32,230,441 9.90 1.71 59 10.03 1.62 11 9.58 1.92
∆4 ln(sales) 32,450,522 0.0036 0.751 57 0.0100 0.664 15 0.0210 0.850
∆4 ln(purchases) 31,826,653 -0.0051 0.772 57 0.0006 0.759 15 0.0166 0.724
∆4 ln(value added) 24,501,010 0.0097 0.997 63 0.0142 0.931 11 0.0218 1.183
% incorporated 38,952,778 0.52 53 0.55 14 0.33
% sole proprietor 38,952,778 0.29 53 0.29 14 0.32
% partnership 38,952,778 0.19 53 0.16 14 0.35
Notes: Summary statistics for level variables are calculated using observations between 2002q1 and 2010q4. Value
added, sales, and purchases are all gross values, i.e. they include VAT.
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sheer number of traders (around two million), VAT accounting periods are staggered
within quarters. For around 38 percent of traders, accounting periods correspond
to end of calendar quarters, i.e. end of March, June, September, and December.
An equal share of the remaining traders submit returns at the end of the two other
months in a calendar quarter. I collapse the data to trader-quarter observations, so
I have one observation per quarter for each trader. For traders submitting returns
that correspond to part of a calendar quarter I assume transactions are equally split
between the three months covered in the return and take a weighted average of the
two returns that have an overlap with the calendar quarter. For example, for traders
submitting returns in February, I use a weight of two third on the February return
and a weight of one third on the next period return (May return) to arrive at the
adjusted returns for the ﬁrst calendar quarter32.
I deﬁne eﬀective output tax rate, τo, to be the ratio of reported sales VAT to net Sales.
I use average eﬀective tax rates during the four quarters preceding the cut period to
assign traders into treatment and control. Denoting the average of τo during 2007q4
and 2008q3 as τ¯o. A trader is, respectively, deﬁned to have standard and zero-rated
sales if τ¯o ∈ [14, 18] and τ¯o ∈ [0, 4]33. Figure 2.4 a) shows the distribution of eﬀective
output tax rates before and during the VAT cut. The before distribution (black line)
shows more than 40 percent of traders have purely standard-rated sales (spike at 17.5)
and 10 percent have pure zero-rated sales (spike at 0). Using the speciﬁed bands for
treatment deﬁnition, 55 and 14 percent of observations are respectively assigned to
traders with standard and zero-rated sales. About 31 percent of observations are left
unassigned due to either traders not being in the data between 2007q4 and 2008q3
or traders with τ¯o outside the designated bands. The large spikes around standard
and zero-rate suggest the banding I used for treatment deﬁnition are unimportant
because it is unlikely that inclusion of few other traders, away from the spikes, has
a signiﬁcant impact on the results.
The binary classiﬁcation of traders into standard and zero-rated groups leaves out
traders with intermediate eﬀective tax rates (i.e. those with τ¯o ∈ (4, 14)). Bigger
traders with a wide range of activities are likely to have intermediate tax rates
32The results with no adjustment or solely focusing on those with a perfect overlap with calendar
quarters are very similar.
33In principle, I could use VAT law and relate 5-digit SIC codes to activities listed under diﬀerent
VAT rates. While this approach is feasible, certain zero-ratings cross the border of 5-digit SIC codes
and make identiﬁcation of pure zero and standard-rated sectors impossible. For example, most
exports are zero-rated but any ﬁrm within any sector could be an exporter. Furthermore, there are
exclusions within broad zero-rated sectors. For example, supply of food is generally zero-rated but
items like ice creams, biscuits, cereal bars, etc are standard-rated.
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and therefore might be excluded from the analysis. In order the see the impact of
this exclusion, it is useful to check what percentage of total sales, purchases, and
value added is removed from the analysis. It turns out that about 58-59 percent
of total sales, purchases, and value added are included in the sample. This is 10
percentage points less than share of observations included in the sample (69 percent)
and suggests that a higher number of large traders are being excluded from the
analysis. I experimented with wider and narrower bands for deﬁnition of treatment
traders and the quality of results remained unchanged34.
One potential concern with the treatment deﬁnition is changes in composition of sales
in response to the cut. For example, demand for standard-rated items might increase
and therefore there might be an increase in eﬀective output tax rates. The gray line
in ﬁgure 2.4 a) shows the distribution of τo during the cut. There is essentially no
change in fraction of zero-rated traders but the fraction of purely standard-rated
traders is 10 percentage points lower than before the cut. While this might be
suggestive of composition eﬀects, closer investigation shows reduction in mass of
purely standard-rated traders is due to transitions in and out of the temporary rate
which distributes tax rates between 15 and 17.5. Furthermore, it seems the whole
distribution is shifted to the left which is not consistent with a change in composition
in favor of standard-rated items35.
A related concern with the deﬁnition of treatment is stability of eﬀective tax rates
over time. Do the identiﬁed standard and zero-rated traders remain as such over
time? To investigate this, table 2.3, shows transition probabilities for bands of
eﬀective output tax rate. The diagonal elements are the largest of row/column values
and represent the probability of remaining in the same band as the last quarter. On
average traders with τo within [0,4) remain in the same interval with 86 percent
probability. Similarly traders with eﬀective output tax rates within [17,18) continue
to be in the interval with 88 percent probability.
A ﬁnal concern with treatment assignment is the changes in the sample size. The
mechanical eﬀect of using average tax rates during 2007q4 and 2008q3 to assign
traders to treatment is that there is a rise in the sample size up until these dates and
a subsequent fall in the sample size after these dates. This is because of new traders'
VAT registration prior to the treatment deﬁnition window. Newly registered traders
34I have carried out the analysis with [0,1] and [17,18] or [0,8] and [14,18] for zero and standard-
rated assignments and the quality of the results are essentially unchanged.
35The temporary nature of the cut also reduces the possibility of a VAT induced product line
switching for businesses.
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Figure 2.4: Distribution of eﬀective output and input tax rates before and during
the VAT cut
Notes: The bin width for distribution plots is 0.1 percentage point and the mass shows fraction of observations that
fall in an interval centered around the indicated bin. Before period is from 2002q1 until 2008q3 and the during period
is from 2008q4 until 2010q1. Eﬀective output tax rate is calculated as the ratio of sales VAT to net sales (similarly
for input tax rate). I am excluding observations between 2010q2 and 2010q4 from these graphs but their inclusion
does not change any of the ﬁgures.
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Table 2.3: Transition probabilities between bands of τo prior to VAT cut
Output tax rate τo[t]
[0,4) [4,6) [6,15) [15,17) [17,18) [18,∞)
τo[t− 1]
[0,4) 86.3 4.05 5.5 0.9 2.84 0.4
[4,6) 29.86 35.21 27.67 2.17 4.21 0.89
[6,15) 6.54 4.61 64.62 9.91 12.76 1.57
[15,17) 1.78 0.57 16.43 45.82 32.85 2.54
[17,18) 0.91 0.19 3.35 4.97 88.57 2.01
[18,∞) 2.8 0.81 8.75 8.76 49.79 29.09
Notes: the cells show probability that a trader with eﬀective output tax rate within a given band switches to another
band in the next quarter. Diagonal elements show probability of remaining in the same band.
are considered for treatment assignment but only show up in the analysis from the
time they register for VAT. Furthermore, some of the traders who were present during
2007q4 and 2008q3 exit the sample after this date. To see the potential impact of
a changing sample size, I have experimented with a balanced panel of traders that
appear in all dates and the results remain the same. However, the balanced panel
restriction removes about half of the traders. Therefore, I decided to present the
more inclusive results with the unbalanced panel.
So far I have deﬁned treatment based on whether sales are standard-rated. However,
the standard-rate cut also aﬀects input tax rates leading to potential behavioral
responses. In principle, I could break down the sample to four groups based on
standard and zero-rated distinction along the sales and purchases dimension. Two
by two comparisons of these groups could deliver estimates of behavioral responses
on the two dimensions of treatment (and their interactions). Two features of my
setting, however, makes this approach unreliable. First, unlike sales, majority of
businesses use a range of inputs and there seems to be little specialization in input
use (as expected). Figure 2.4 b) plots the distribution of eﬀective input tax rate, τi,
deﬁned as the ratio of purchases VAT to net purchases. τi distribution is much more
dispersed and the standard and zero-rate spikes are much smaller. Before the cut
13.1 percent of traders used purely standard-rated inputs and less than 1 percent
used only zero-rated inputs. This means categorization of traders to standard and
zero-rated purchases leaves out a large part of the sample. Second, the joint density
of τo and τi does not show enough concentration of traders for the four groups.
Speciﬁcally the only group of traders with a large fraction is traders with standard-
rated sales and purchases. The mass is particularly small for traders with zero-rated
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Table 2.4: Joint density of eﬀective output and input tax rates before cut period
τi
Marginal
[0,4) [4,6) [6,15) [15,17) [17,18) [18,∞)
τo
[0,4) 4.6 1.6 6.5 1.6 1.5 0.3 16.1
[4,6) 0.4 0.4 1.1 0.3 0.3 0.1 2.4
[6,15) 0.9 0.9 8.6 2.2 1.7 0.4 14.8
[15,17) 0.4 0.4 3.8 2.5 1.5 0.3 8.9
[17,18) 2.3 1.9 17.8 11.6 19.9 1.9 55.4
[18,∞) 0.1 0.1 0.9 0.4 0.6 0.3 2.4
Marginal 8.8 5.2 38.6 18.6 25.4 3.3 -
Notes: Cells show fraction of observations that have an eﬀective output and input tax rate within the bands speciﬁed
by row and column headings.
sales and standard-rated purchases. Therefore, I do not carry out a two by two
analysis and to control for potential responses arising from the purchases dimension,
I restrict attention to the sub-sample of traders with standard-rated or zero-rated
purchases36 in some of the ﬁgures.
2.4 Empirical Strategy
The main empirical strategy used in this paper is diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences (DD) esti-
mation using zero-rated traders as a control group for standard-rated ones. I compare
the average change in outcomes for standard-rated traders during the cut period to
the average change for zero-rated traders to estimate the stimulus eﬀect. This strat-
egy could be implemented in a regression as follows
∆4 ln yist = αi + βt + γ1SRatedi × Cutt + ist (2.1)
where ∆4 ln yist is the change in log of value added (or sales or purchases) for trader
i operating in sector s in date t relative to four quarters earlier, αi is trader ﬁxed
eﬀects, βt is date ﬁxed eﬀects, and SRatedi × Cutt is the interaction of a dummy
variable for traders with standard-rated sales with a dummy showing the duration of
the cut period. The coeﬃcient of interest is γ1 and shows the diﬀerential change in
growth rates for standard-rated traders during the cut period. Trader ﬁxed eﬀects
36This is deﬁned in a similar way as standard-rated sales. A trader has standard-rated purchases
if the average input tax rate during 2007q4 and 2008q3 is around the standard-rate, i.e. τ¯i ∈ [14, 18]
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control for anything that is constant over time and has an inﬂuence on growth rate of
value added. For example, larger traders might have slower but more stable growth
rates on average. Time ﬁxed eﬀects control for any event that aﬀect standard and
zero-rated traders to the same extent.
To claim that γ1 is an unbiased estimate of the stimulus eﬀect, I need to assume that
in the absence of the cut the change in growth rates would have been the same for
standard and zero-rated traders. This is obviously a contentious assumption given
the fact that the cut was in response to the great recession. Some of the zero-rated
activities relate to necessities like food while some of standard-rated traders are
involved in sales of durable goods. The recession might have a stronger impact on
standard-rated traders because of more elastic demand. Therefore, the confounding
recessionary eﬀect could induce a downward bias on the estimates of γ1 from the
basic speciﬁcation in (2.1).
I experiment with several extensions of the basic speciﬁcation to control for the
confounding recession eﬀect. From ﬁgure 2.3 it seems the recession started to impact
aggregate variables from 2008q1. Therefore, in the ﬁrst extension I introduce a
second interaction term that allows for a heterogeneous impact of the recession on
standard-rated traders from 2008q1 onwards
∆4 ln yist = αi + βt + γ1SRatedi × Cutt + γ2SRatedi × Rect + ist (2.2)
where Rect is a dummy that is switched on from 2008q1 onward. Eﬀectively, this
speciﬁcation relies on three quarters before the start of the VAT cut and three quar-
ters after the end of the cut to identify the recession eﬀect37. Under the assumption
that the diﬀerential recession eﬀect remains the same during and outside the cut
period, estimates of γ1 from (2.2) would give causal impact of the cut. If, however,
the diﬀerential impact of the recession is changing over time the estimates here are
still biased.
In the second extension, I allow two-digit sectors to receive heterogeneous impacts
from the recession by including interactions of two-digit sector dummies with the
recession dummy.
∆4 ln yist = αi + βt + γ1SRatedi × Cutt + δs × Rect + ist (2.3)
37The estimated magnitude of γ1 from this regression is identical to a regression based on equation
(2.1) where the sample is restricted to the post recession dates (other coeﬃcient estimates would
be diﬀerent).
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where δs is a set of 66 two-digit sector dummies. The potential factors controlled in
this speciﬁcation are slightly diﬀerent from (2.2). As far as standard and zero-rated
traders within the same two-digit sector are subject to the same recession eﬀect,
the remaining within sector diﬀerences between the two groups capture the causal
eﬀect of the cut. If however, sectors with majority standard-rated traders experience
a greater recession impact right in the middle of the cut period, this speciﬁcation
would fail to give the causal estimates of the cut.
2.5 Results
In this section I ﬁrst present graphical evidence on the response of ﬁrms to the VAT
cut. In the second subsection I present regressions using ﬁrm level data. I investigate
the responses of three dependent variables to the VAT cut: growth of sales, growth
of purchases, and growth of value added. The main variable of interest is growth
of sales because this variable is directly aﬀected by the rate cut and would be the
ﬁrst to respond to changes in consumer spending. Purchases and value added would
receive an indirect impact from the changes in sales via the production function.
I also present graphs and regressions for various sub-samples. I start from the largest
sample and look at evolution of the dependent variables but this is not necessarily
the most interesting sample. Under normal VAT accounting, any input VAT could
be reclaimed. Therefore, while collection of VAT is through the production chain its
ﬁnal burden would be on consumers. If the VAT chain is unbroken and in the absence
of evasion, only ﬁnal demand should respond to VAT rate changes. Of course, ﬁnal
demand responses would feedback to intermediate demand but the response would be
dissipated. Therefore, the second sub-sample I investigate is the sample of retailers
(or business to customer sectors as I deﬁne later)38.
The third sub-sample I study is the sample of traders with standard-rated purchases.
For most of the results, classiﬁcation into treatment and control is based on VAT
rates on sales. The standard-rate change could, however, change the applicable tax
rates on purchases. Focusing on sales and ignoring tax rates on purchases could lead
to confounding eﬀects. Therefore, to alleviate such concerns I restrict the sample
to traders with a similar input tax rate. The ﬁnal sub-samples I consider split the
traders based size (turnover). Larger ﬁrms could change their prices more quickly
38I start oﬀ with the whole sample because the VAT system in the UK features certain exemptions
that could result in responses for intermediate sectors.
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or increase the salience of the cut through advertising. Therefore, there might be a
larger impact for bigger traders. I split the sample into traders with average annual
sales below and above ¿2.8 million39 to investigate this possibility.
2.5.1 Graphical evidence
Figure 2.5 shows evolution of average growth rate of sales, purchases, and value added
in three panels. Panel a) shows average sales growth for standard-rated traders (black
line) is around 5 percent up until 2007q2. From 2007q3 the growth rate starts to
decline and turns negative from 2008q3. After the start of the VAT cut (ﬁrst vertical
line) average growth of sales continues to fall and the decline only stops after 2009q2.
By the end of the VAT cut (second vertical line) sales growth is -3 percent and right
after the end of the cut, when you expect to see a backlash in standard-rate activities,
it jumps to 2 percent and remains there for the following quarters.
While this pattern seems inconsistent with a positive impact of the rate cut, it is
impossible to conclude anything in the absence of a valid counterfactual. The gray
line in ﬁgure 2.5 shows the average growth rates for zero-rated traders which is used
to build a counterfactual. The zero-rated series is much more volatile, partly due to
a smaller sample40. Nevertheless, it seems average growth rate for zero-rated traders
starts to fall approximately around 2008q4 but the decline in growth rates seem to be
smaller (and much more volatile). During the recession a clear gap emerges between
the two series which suggests standard-rated traders experienced lower growth rates
during this time. It seems the start of the cut does not have an eﬀect on the gap
and the two series keep their distance. However, after the cut and towards the end
of the recession the two series converge.
On the ﬁgure, I also report the estimated impact of the VAT cut using a simple DD.
Speciﬁcally the reported number on the graph shows coeﬃcient estimates (robust
standard errors) on the interaction term from a regression of the plotted variable on
a cut dummy, standard-rated dummy, and their interaction. For sales this number
is -0.037 with a standard error of 0.023 which suggests growth rate of sales was
3.7 percentage points lower for standard-rated traders during the VAT cut period
(insigniﬁcant). Including a recession interaction term would increase this coeﬃcient
to 0.03 but it remains insigniﬁcant. Therefore, it seems sales growth is not diﬀerent
39This is one of several criteria that deﬁne a small business in the UK.
40Average per quarter observations for zero-rated traders is around 76,000 while for standard-
rated traders it is 441,000.
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for standard-rated traders during the cut. Obviously the deepest and possibly most
heterogeneous part of the recession could happen during the cut and this estimate
could only reﬂect that.
Panels b) and c) in ﬁgure 2.5 show evolution of average growth rates for purchases
and value added41. A very similar pattern is observed here. Average growth rates
for both of these variables fall more for standard-rated traders relative to zero-rated
ones and the estimated stimulus impacts are around -3.5 and -5.5 percentage points
for purchases and value added respectively. It is interesting to note that purchases
series show a perfect co-movement right up to the recession where the gap emerges.
Including a recession interaction in panels b) and c) would increase the coeﬃcients to
-1 and -5 percentage points for purchases and value added respectively. The impact
on value added remains signiﬁcant in the two speciﬁcations but is insigniﬁcant for
purchases (at 5 percent). This suggests the recession induced gap between standard
and zero-rated series remains constant before and during the cut period for purchases
but expands for value added.
In summary, ﬁgure 2.5 shows during the recession a clear gap emerges between
average growth rates of standard and zero-rated traders. The size of the gap seems
to remain stable for sales and purchases while for value added it is expanding during
the cut. Obviously one could argue that the recession induced gap would have
expanded right at the time of the VAT cut had the VAT cut not been implemented.
While I am unable to rule this possibility out, the convergence of the three series
right after the recession and the absence of a set-back period supports a zero impact
on sales and purchases. In what follows, I discuss similar graphs for the sub-samples
of retailers, traders with standard-rated purchases, and large traders.
Restricting to retail sector
In order to see if ﬁnal demand responses are diﬀerent for standard and zero-rated
traders, ﬁgure 2.8 looks at average growth rates of sales, purchases, and value added
for the sub-sample of retailers42. All series have similar growth rates for standard
and zero-rated retailers up until 2007q2. At this point a gap appears in the average
growth rates with the growth rate of zero-rated sales and purchases increasing while
the opposite happens for standard-rated retailers. During the cut period sales and
41Notice ln(value added) = ln(sales − purchases), therefore the magnitudes in panel c) are not
directly calculated from panels a) and b).
42This is all 5-digit codes within the 74 two-digit SIC2007 code.
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purchases growth rates are negative for both groups and they broadly follow a similar
U pattern as for the overall averages in ﬁgure 2.5. DD estimates show that during
the cut period the growth rates of sales and purchases is 1 and 1.6 percentage points
lower for standard-rated retailers. At the time of the cut, value added growth jumps
sharply for zero-rated retailers while that of standard-rated retailers only picks up
slowly. While the movement for zero-rated traders seems a bit puzzling, it does not
seem these ﬁgures are very diﬀerent from ﬁgure 2.5. Furthermore, it is hard to see a
positive impact of the VAT cut from these graphs.
Controlling for input tax rates
One potential concern with ﬁgure 2.5 is that the VAT cut aﬀects tax rates on both
purchases and sales. In ﬁgures 2.6 and 2.7 I respectively restrict to the sub-sample of
traders with standard and zero-rated purchases and consider whether among these
groups those with standard-rated sales saw a positive impact from the VAT cut. It is
worth noting that the sample size here is much reduced because of the higher disper-
sion of eﬀective input tax rates and therefore results may not be directly comparable
to ﬁgure 2.5.
Figure 2.6 shows average growth rates for sales, purchases, and value added for the
sub-sample of traders with standard-rated purchases. The zero-rated series are less
volatile compared to ﬁgure 2.5 and overall it seems all three growth rates are similar
up until the recession. Interestingly, for sales (panel a) and value added (panel c)
standard and zero-rated series closely track each other even during the cut, while
purchases (panel b) show a recession induced gap similar to what was observed in
ﬁgure 2.5. Simple DD coeﬃcients are also smaller here. Sales growth is estimated
to be 1.5 percentage points lower for standard-rated traders during the cut, while
purchases and value added growth are 3.7 and 0.8 percentage points lower. None
of these coeﬃcient are signiﬁcant, though. A somewhat similar, but noisier picture
emerges when I restrict attention to the group of traders with zero-rated purchases
in ﬁgure 2.7.
Responses of large and small ﬁrms
Figure 2.9 shows the three dependent variables for large and small traders (as deﬁned
above). Large standard and zero-rated traders have very similar average growth
rates (across panels) right up to the time of the VAT cut. During the cut, sales
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Figure 2.5: Change in log sales, purchases, and value added for standard and zero-
rated traders
Notes: Graphs show average change in log of a) sales, b) purchases, and c) value added for standard and zero-rated
traders over quarters. I use average eﬀective output tax rate (ratio of sales VAT to net sales) during the four
quarter preceding the cut (2007q4-2008q3) to deﬁne standard-rated traders. The trader is classiﬁed as standard-
rated when this variable is between 14 and 18 percent and as zero-rated when it is between 0 and 4 percent. The
reported DD estimates are coeﬃcient estimates (robust standard errors) of the interaction term in a regression of
plotted variable on standard-rated dummy, cut period dummy, standard-rated×cut period dummies, group speciﬁc
quarter dummies and linear trends. The regression uses aggregated data with 64 observations. The ﬁrst and second
vertical lines mark 2008q4 and 2010q1 corresponding to the ﬁrst and ﬁnal quarter were the VAT cut has any
eﬀect. Total observations for log value added is 14,683,318 standard-rated trader returns and 2,454,875 zero-rated
ones, approximately corresponding to 524k standard-rated and 82k zero-rated unique traders during the 4 quarters
preceding the cut. 84
Figure 2.6: Change in log sales, purchases, value added (restrict to traders with
standard-rated purchases)
Notes: This is a similar ﬁgure to ﬁgure 2.5 except for the fact that the sample is restricted to traders with standard-
rated purchases (i.e. average eﬀective input tax rate during 2007q4-2008q3 between [14,18] percent. See ﬁgure 2.5
for notes deﬁning standard and zero-rated traders on the sales dimension.
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Figure 2.7: Change in log sales, purchases, and value added (restrict to traders with
zero-rated purchases)
Notes: This is a similar ﬁgure to ﬁgure 2.5 except for the fact that the sample is restricted to traders with zero-rated
purchases (i.e. average eﬀective input tax rate during 2007q4-2008q3 between [0,4] percent. See ﬁgure 2.5 for notes
deﬁning standard and zero-rated traders on the sales dimension.
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Figure 2.8: Change in log sales, purchases, and value added (restrict to retail sector)
Notes: This is a similar ﬁgure to ﬁgure 2.5 except for the fact that the sample is restricted to traders within the
retail sector (SIC2007 codes of 47XXX). See ﬁgure 2.5 for notes deﬁning standard and zero-rated traders on the sales
dimension.
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Figure 2.9: Change in log sales, purchases, and value added (Large vs. small traders)
Notes: This is a similar ﬁgure to ﬁgure 2.5 except for the fact that the sample is split into small and large traders.
A trader is small if its average gross annual sales is less than ¿2.8 million during all years of appearance in the data.
See ﬁgure 2.5 for notes deﬁning standard and zero-rated traders on the sales dimension.
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growth rate for large standard-rated traders is 3 percentage points higher (albeit
insigniﬁcant). Purchases growth rate seems to be unaﬀected (DD estimate is 0.3
percentage points). However, when I consider growth rate of value added, the DD
estimate and the ﬁgure reveal a signiﬁcant negative impact of 4.9 percentage points43.
The pattern of movements for small traders is very similar to the overall picture in
ﬁgure 2.5 and does not support a positive impact of the cut.
2.5.2 Regression evidence
Table 2.5 shows the estimation results for the full sample. Columns (1) and (2)
report DD estimates in the absence of recession controls. Column (1) uses a basic
DD (OLS) speciﬁcation and conﬁrms coeﬃcient estimates for the interaction term are
similar to those reported in ﬁgure 2.5. Controlling for trader and date ﬁxed eﬀects
in column (2) makes the estimated magnitudes larger (FE speciﬁcation). For the
three outcome variables these two speciﬁcations deliver implausibly large negative
estimates of the cut impact.
Columns (3) - (5) control for recession heterogeneity. Columns (3) and (4) include
an interaction of recession dummy with the standard-rated dummy in the OLS and
FE speciﬁcations. The estimated stimulus eﬀect for sales and purchases is now very
small and insigniﬁcant. It seems the diﬀerence between standard and zero-rated
traders emerges before the start of the cut and there is not a discernible impact on
sales and purchases for standard-rated traders during the cut. To take magnitudes
seriously, DD estimates suggest growth rates of sales and purchases for standard-
rated traders are respectively 0.2 and -0.9 percentage points diﬀerent from zero-rated
traders (column (3)). The cut, however, continues to have a negative impact on value
added growth (Panel C). Value added growth rate is 4.6 percentage points lower for
standard-rated traders during the cut (signiﬁcant at 5 percent). If the recession had
a heterogeneous impact on standard-rated traders but the heterogeneity remained on
average the same across the set of recessionary quarters, then group speciﬁc recession
dummies would ﬁx the identiﬁcation problem and the coeﬃcient estimate of S-rated
43As discussed earlier ∆4 ln(value added) = ∆4 ln(sales-purchases) 6= ∆4 ln(sales) −
∆4 ln(purchases). Therefore, I will not be able to relate panel b) and c) directly to panel a).
Qualitatively, however, I expected a positive impact on value added. It might be that changes in
number of observations and the way I calculated growth rates are responsible for these patterns.
Speciﬁcally, not all observations present in panel b) and c) are used in panel a). For example,
traders with negative value added would be excluded from panel a) because ln(value added) is
missing for them. This reduction in sample size is non-trivial specially because the recession could
change the number of traders with negative value added diﬀerentially across the two groups.
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Sales ×Cut term in columns (3) and (4) would capture the causal eﬀect of the VAT
cut.
In column (5) instead of a recession interaction, I include the interactions of 65 two-
digit sector dummies with the recession dummy to allow for a heterogeneous impact
of the recession across sectors (SIC2d speciﬁcation). This has a small impact on
estimates. The fact that estimates remain remarkably similar across columns (3) -
(5) is encouraging. However, none of these would deal with a time varying reces-
sion heterogeneity. In other words if the recession starts to disproportionately aﬀect
standard-rated traders right at the time of the VAT cut, estimation results under
columns (3)-(5) would be biased. To increase reliability of estimates, I experimented
with a more ﬂexible speciﬁcation where I controlled for sector by date ﬁxed eﬀects.
This speciﬁcation allows sectors to evolve freely in each quarter, eﬀectively estimating
stimulus eﬀect from within sector-date diﬀerences between standard and zero-rated
traders. While this speciﬁcation is still vulnerable to within-sector heterogeneous
impacts on standard-rated traders, it is quite rich and deal with many possibilities.
Unfortunately estimating this speciﬁcation with more than 2000 regressors is com-
putationally demanding and I only ran this speciﬁcation for a 10 percent sample of
the data. The (unreported) results from these regressions were broadly similar to
the results in column (5).
Table 2.6 reports estimates of the stimulus eﬀect, i.e. coeﬃcient of S-rated Sales×Cut,
for various sub-samples. I have reported estimates from two speciﬁcations for the
three dependent variables. FE and SIC2d speciﬁcations correspond to speciﬁcations
in columns (4) and (5) of table 2.5. FE speciﬁcation controls for recession hetero-
geneity using the interaction of S-rated Sales dummy and Rec dummy. SIC2d spec-
iﬁcation uses interactions of two-digit sector dummies with the recession dummy to
isolate the recession eﬀect. First row, reports the coeﬃcient estimates for the whole
sample as a benchmark while the other rows show estimates for other sub-samples.
The second row focuses on retailers to see whether traders at the end of the VAT
chain receive a higher impact. I estimate a very small negative insigniﬁcant eﬀect
on sales and purchases. Value added growth, however, shows a larger reduction but
still insigniﬁcant. Another way to identify traders dealing with ﬁnal consumers is
to use Input-Output tables and classify sectors based on the share of ﬁnal demand.
I use Input-Output tables from ONS for the year 2007 and classify sectors into
being business to customer (B2C) if the share of ﬁnal demand is greater than 50
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Table 2.5: Regression results for the whole sample
Basic Recession control
OLS FE OLS FE SIC2d
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: ∆4 ln (Sales), 21,598,298 observations (991,690 traders)
S-rated Sales× Cut -0.037∗ -0.057∗∗ 0.002 -0.0003 -0.001
(0.016) (0.019) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
S-rated Sales× Rec -0.052∗∗ -0.081∗∗
(0.015) (0.020)
R-square 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.011
Panel B: ∆4 ln (Purchases), 21,192,026 observations (980,959 traders)
S-rated Sales× Cut -0.036∗ -0.050∗∗ -0.009 -0.010 -0.007
(0.015) (0.017) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011)
S-rated Sales× Rec -0.035∗∗ -0.058∗∗
(0.012) (0.015)
R-square 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.007
Trader and Date FE N Yes N Yes Yes
SIC2d×Rec N N N N Yes
Panel C: ∆4 ln (Value added), 16,555,223 observations (949,438 traders)
S-rated Sales× Cut -0.056∗∗ -0.074∗∗ -0.046∗ -0.046∗ -0.044∗∗
(0.015) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018) (0.015)
S-rated Sales× Rec -0.014 -0.041∗
(0.013) (0.016)
R-square 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.006
Notes: Table shows coeﬃcient estimates and standard errors from estimation of ﬁve speciﬁcations for three outcome
variables. The dependent variables in panels A, B, and C are respectively ∆4 ln (Sales), ∆4 ln (Purchases), and
∆4 ln (Value added). Column (1) estimates a basic DD speciﬁcation with treatment dummy, cut dummy, and their
interaction. Column (2) includes trader and date ﬁxed eﬀects (speciﬁcation 2.1). In columns (3) - (5) I control
for recession heterogeneity. Column (3) adds a recession dummy and its interaction with standard-rated dummy
to the OLS speciﬁcation. Column (4) adds recession interaction to the ﬁxed eﬀects speciﬁcation (speciﬁcation 2.2).
Column (5) includes interactions of 65 two-digit sector dummies with the recession dummy as in speciﬁcation 2.3.
Cut dummy is equal to 1 for all quarters between 2008q4 and 2010q1 and zero otherwise. Recession dummy is equal
to 1 for all quarters after 2008q1 and zero otherwise. Standard-rated sales dummy is deﬁned in the text. All standard
errors are clustered at 5-digit SIC2007 codes (around 570 clusters).∗ and ∗∗ show coeﬃcient estimates are signiﬁcant
at 5 and 1 percent conﬁdence levels respectively.
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Table 2.6: Coeﬃcients and standard errors for DD estimate of the cut impact
Dep. Var.: ∆4 ln (Sales) ∆4 ln (Purchases) ∆4 ln (Value added)
FE SIC2d FE SIC2d FE SIC2d
Sample (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Whole
-0.0003 -0.001 -0.010 -0.007 -0.046∗ -0.044∗∗
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.018) (0.015)
Retail
-0.0030 - -0.009 - -0.055 -
(0.011) - (0.010) - (0.042) -
B2C
0.041∗ 0.028 0.020 0.014 -0.012 -0.022
(0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.014) (0.028) (0.021)
S-rated purchases
0.015 0.014 -0.006 -0.016 -0.026 -0.007
(0.020) (0.020) (0.018) (0.016) (0.057) (0.041)
Large
0.019 0.023 0.0009 0.008 -0.062 -0.048∗
(0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.033) (0.023)
Trader and Date FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
S-rated Sales× Rec Yes N Yes N Yes N
SIC2d×Rec N Yes N Yes N Yes
Notes: Each cell shows coeﬃcient estimates and standard errors on the interaction of cut and standard-rated dummies
from a separate regression. Columns (1), (3), and (5) use FE speciﬁcation allowing for heterogeneous impact of the
recession on standard-rated traders (same speciﬁcation as in column (4) of table 2.5). SIC2d speciﬁcation (columns
(2), (4), (6)) estimate equation (2.3) where I include interaction of two-digit sector dummies with the recession
dummy (same speciﬁcation as in column (5) of table 2.5). The ﬁrst row replicates estimates of interaction terms
for the whole sample from column (4) of table 2.5. The second row restricts attention to the retail sector (SIC2007
equal to 47XXX, 11 percent of the whole sample). The third row shows results from regressions on sectors identiﬁed
as business to customer sector, i.e. with share of ﬁnal demand greater than 50 percent from input-output tables
2007 (38 percent of whole sample). The fourth row shows results for the sub-sample of traders with standard-rated
purchases (around 50 percent of whole sample). The ﬁfth row restricts to large traders deﬁned as those with average
annual sales greater than ¿400,000 (32 percent of the whole sample). Cut dummy is equal to 1 for all quarters
between 2008q4 and 2010q1 and zero otherwise. Recession dummy is equal to 1 for all quarters after 2008q1 and
zero otherwise. Standard-rated sales dummy is deﬁned in the text. All standard errors are clustered at 5-digit
SIC2007 codes. The number of clusters are 570 for the whole sample, 558 for standard-rated purchases sample, 42
for retail sample, 255 for B2C sample, and 556 for large trader sample. ∗ and ∗∗ respectively mark signiﬁcance at 5
and 1 percent levels.
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percent44. The third row shows the results for B2C sectors. Interestingly, estimates
show a positive impact on sales and purchases growth during the cut period. FE
speciﬁcation shows sales growth was 4.1 percentage points higher (signiﬁcant at
5 percent) for standard-rated traders. SIC2d speciﬁcation delivers a smaller and
insigniﬁcant eﬀect here. Purchases and value added impacts are not signiﬁcant at 5
percent.
The fourth row restricts to traders with standard-rated inputs and the ﬁfth row con-
siders large traders. Coeﬃcient estimates for sales are between 1.4 to 2.3 percentage
points which is larger than the whole sample but all are insigniﬁcant. For purchases
the coeﬃcient estimates are all very small and insigniﬁcant. Value added growth
seems to be the only variable showing a signiﬁcant reduction during the cut period.
To summarize, table 2.6 shows sales growth for standard-rated traders was either the
same or slightly better than zero-rated ones across the sub-samples studied. Value
added growth on the other hand show a negative impact across the sub-samples45.
Most of the estimates are, however, not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at 5 percent.
The ﬁndings that sales and purchases growth rates are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent for
standard-rated traders does not necessarily suggest the stimulus was ineﬀective in
boosting the real economy. Under full pass through the VAT cut would mechanically
lower gross sales for standard-rated traders by 2.1 percent, therefore a zero impact on
gross sales suggests quantity demanded has increased by 2.1 percent. In other words,
the price elasticity of demand for standard-rated products is -1 and price reductions
lead to proportionate increases in demand. Similarly the 2.8-4.1 percentage points
estimates for B2C sectors would translate to a 4.9-6.2 percentage points increase
in quantity demanded under full pass through. These estimates correspond to an
elasticity between -2.3 and -2.9.
44IO tables provide data on 110 sectors. This relates to two or three-digit SIC2007 codes. About
59 out of 110 sectors are identiﬁed to have a greater than 50 percent share of ﬁnal demand. Some
of these B2C sectors are a) products of agriculture, hunting and related services, b) preserved meat
and meat products, c) dairy products, d) textiles, e) wearing apparel, f) furniture, g) gambling and
betting, h) repair of computer and personal and household goods.
45The negative estimates for value added series are probably the least reliable because the deﬁni-
tion of growth rates implies a much lower number of observations for this series. From table 1.3 we
can see that total observations for growth rates of sales and purchases are around 32 million while
for value added growth I have only 24 million observations. This is due to many traders having
more purchases than sales (hence negative value added).
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2.6 Conclusions
In this paper, I used a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimation strategy to identify the
stimulus impact of 2008 VAT rate cut in the UK. Graphical evidence suggests the
recession had a stronger impact on standard-rated traders. During the recession
sales, purchases, and value added growth is lower for standard-rated traders relative
to zero-rated ones. This suggests a simple DD estimate would confound the recession
eﬀect with potentially positive eﬀects of the VAT cut. Regression results conﬁrm this
intuition with implausibly large negative estimates.
However, after I allow the recessionary period to exert a heterogeneous inﬂuence
on growth rates of standard-rated traders, the growth rate of sales and purchases
seem to be similar for standard and zero-rated traders. In other words, the cut
does not seem to have had a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect. This suggests the cut has
boosted standard-rated demand just to compensate for the reduction in prices leading
to an underlying price elasticity of -1. Restricting the sample to potentially more
responsive groups (retailers and large traders) I estimated positive but insigniﬁcant
eﬀects on sales which alludes to a price elasticity less than -1. While these ﬁndings
suggest the temporary standard-rate cut was eﬀective in boosting real activity of
the standard-rated traders (especially the retailers), my inability to provide direct
evidence on price and quantity changes prevents ﬁrm conclusions.
It is worth emphasizing that the recession poses a real challenge to the identiﬁcation
of the impact of the VAT cut. The speciﬁcations estimated in this paper allow for
some forms of heterogeneous recession eﬀects but due to the high overlap of the
recessionary period and the cut it is impossible to prove causality. In the most
stringent speciﬁcation, I allow two-digit sectors (66 of such codes) to have diﬀerent
average growth rates during the recessionary period. This speciﬁcation relies on the
variation between standard and zero-rated traders within the same two-digit sector
during the cut to identify the stimulus eﬀect. To the extent that the recession eﬀects
are sector speciﬁc I could claim causal estimation of the cut impact.
The other issue with the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences methodology is its inability to detect
across the board eﬀects. For example, the cut reduces prices and frees up income
to be spent on any item (income eﬀect). If consumers decide to spend this on both
zero and standard-rated products DD would not pick up any eﬀect while the overall
impact of the cut is positive.
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Chapter 3
Educational Impact of Iran Iraq War
3.1 Introduction
Events such as wars, natural disasters, and pandemics could have long lasting eﬀects
on individual well-being. On the macro side these events could shift the equilibrium
of the economy and leave local economies in a poverty trap. Empirical literature,
however, was generally unable to provide support for this theoretical possibility1.
From a micro perspective catastrophic events could impact exposed individuals in
the long run even though they have no detectable aggregate eﬀect. Young indi-
viduals who are still in the process of accumulating human capital are particularly
vulnerable to negative shocks. Destruction of schools, interruption of classes, loss of
teachers, loss of family members, and loss of household income are a few mechanisms
that could reduce educational attainment of young individuals. Exposure to catas-
trophes could also aﬀect individuals' health which itself could have an inﬂuence on
educational outcomes. Given the large economic literature on importance of events
during mother's pregnancy and before age of 5 for adulthood outcomes, the health
mechanism is particularly relevant2.
1For example, Davis and Weinstein (2002) and Davis and Weinstein (2008) ﬁnd no evidence
of multiple equilibria in the context of allied forces bombing of Japanese cities. Japanese cities
converge to their pre-bombing population trends in the long run. Miguel and Roland (2011) are
unable to uncover local poverty traps for heavily destroyed areas after the Vietnam War. Bosker
et al. (2007), however, seem to ﬁnd some evidence of multiplicity for German cities subject to WWII
destruction.
2For example, Almond and Mazumder (2005) and Almond (2006) study the 1918 inﬂuenza
pandemic in the US, Almond et al. (2009) investigate the eﬀects of Chernobyl's radioactive radia-
tions, Almond et al. (2010) consider Chinese famines, and Almond et al. (ming) and Almond and
Mazumder (2011) study the impact of fasting during pregnancy on children. All these studies de-
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This paper looks at educational attainment of Iranian children exposed to Iran Iraq
War (IIW) 18 years after the end of the war. In September 1980 large scale Iraqi
invasion of Iranian territory marked the beginning of an eight year war. By June
1982 the war displaced more than 1.6 million individuals across ﬁve war-hit provinces,
approximately 22 percent of the population living in these provinces. Furthermore,
most cities in these provinces came under aerial attacks or artillery ﬁre. While there
is a vast literature on analysis of motivations, operations, and strategic implications
of the war, there is little work on economic impact of the war. I provide ﬁrst reduced
form estimates of impact of IIW on educational attainment3.
I use a 2 percent sample of the 2006 Iran Population Census and compare high school
graduation rates for children exposed to war to those not exposed. Date of birth and
place of residence jointly determine whether a child was exposed to IIW. Therefore,
I employ a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences (DD) estimation strategy and compare war time
cohorts across war and non-war provinces to pre-war cohorts. I distinguish between
early childhood and school time exposure to war to provide separate estimates of
the war impact on cohorts born during the war (1980-86 birth cohorts) and cohorts
that went to school during the war (1963-1979 birth cohorts). The large literature on
importance of early childhood events suggests that the chaotic war-time environment
should have a negative impact on physical and psychological development of very
young children. On the other hand the large scale displacement of individuals could
have interrupted schooling and led to negative eﬀects for school cohorts. I would be
able to provide a comparison of early childhood and school time eﬀects which might
be useful in formulating mitigation policies for similar catastrophic events.
The DD estimates show that the probability of high school graduation is reduced by
4.8 percentage points (signiﬁcant at 10 percent) for the cohorts born during the war
while there is only a 1.9 percentage points (insigniﬁcant) reduction for the cohorts
that spent some of their school years during the war. In my sample 38.8 percent of
individuals have completed high school, therefore, these numbers correspond to 12.4
and 4.9 percent reduction in high school graduation. The estimates suggest early
childhood eﬀect is 2.5 times higher than the school time eﬀect. The early childhood
tect signiﬁcant large impacts of the early childhood event on adult human capital and labor market
outcomes. For review of the literature see Almond and Currie (2011a) and Almond and Currie
(2011b).
3My search of the Farsi and English literature has returned no study of educational impact of the
war. Moﬁd (1990) and a few other Farsi publications provide aggregate estimates of the economic
cost of the war. A handful of articles studied the impact of exposure to chemical warfare during
IIW on health outcomes (e.g. Ahmadi et al. (2010), Ahmadi et al. (2009), Kadivar and Adams
(1991), and Khateri et al. (2003)). Mahvash (2011) studies impact of the war on divorce patterns.
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eﬀect is robust with respect to several alternative speciﬁcations. For example, when
I control for diﬀerential trends across war and non-war provinces, the war impact
continues to be signiﬁcant for early childhood cohorts but becomes insigniﬁcant for
school cohorts.
To interpret these estimates as causal, I need to rule out several potential confound-
ing factors. First, the 2006 Census does not provide data on wartime residence of
individuals. Therefore, I rely on birth locations to identify whether individuals were
in war provinces during the war. Furthermore, I only know the birth place of in-
dividuals who are living in their birth place in 2006. I denote these individuals as
non-migrants and restrict the sample so I can deﬁne treatment status properly (61
percent of all individuals are non-migrants). Non-migrants in war provinces may not
be comparable to non-migrants from non-war provinces because war induced many
individuals, who would not have migrated otherwise, to migrate out of war provinces.
If the well-endowed individuals are more likely to migrate and permanently settle out
of war areas, the sample restriction would imply a downward bias for the estimates
of war impact.
Two pieces of evidence relieve some of the concerns arising from the sample restric-
tion. First, province-level migration ﬁgures from 1986 and 1996 Censuses suggest
war provinces are being de-populated during the war and then partially re-populated
after the war. Therefore, at least part of the migrants have returned to their home4.
Furthermore, intra-province migration ﬁgures are higher for war provinces during
the war compared to non-war provinces. This abnormal pattern continues to the
1996 Census round but in the 2006 Census, intra-province migration rates for war
and non-war provinces become very similar. The intra-province migration patterns
suggest many war migrants were settled in the same province during the war and
probably have returned to their homes later. Second, there is not a discernible diﬀer-
ence between the fraction of non-migrant individuals within each birth cohort across
war and non-war provinces. In other words, the same share of individuals from each
cohort is included in the sample across war and non-war provinces. Unfortunately,
these patterns cannot fully rule out the possibility that war induced migration could
be responsible for the estimated eﬀects.
The rest of the confounding factors that might aﬀect causal interpretation of my
estimates are simultaneous events that might have a heterogeneous impact on cohorts
4The reverse pattern is observed for some of the provinces neighboring war provinces which
shows temporary settlement of war migrants in neighboring provinces and their subsequent return
once the war is ﬁnished.
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in war provinces. The DD identiﬁcation requires that in the absence of IIW the
educational gap between war and non-war provinces stays the same for treated and
control cohorts (parallel trends). Therefore, anything that happens at the same time
as the war is a potential confounder.
The ﬁrst simultaneous event is a dramatic increase in population growth during 1976
and 1986. Average yearly population growth during this decade was 3.9 percent while
in the preceding and proceeding decades it was respectively 2.7 and 2.5 percent.
Interestingly, the baby boom resulted in similar birth increases in war and non-war
provinces. But, the larger negative impact of the war on early childhood cohorts
may simply reﬂect inability of war provinces to accommodate the baby boom. To
alleviate this concern, I collect province-level yearly ﬁgures on number of schools and
students at the primary level. Once I include these measures of educational resources
in the regressions the DD estimates remain the same.
The second simultaneous event is a series of ethnic rebellions that started right after
the revolution. Short lived rebellions happened in Khuzestan, Azerbaijan, and Sistan
but Kordestan uprising was the most prominent and continued until 1982. When I
exclude Kordestan from the sample, the war eﬀect changes slightly. Furthermore, I
notice that the war impact seems to be increasing over time which is in constrast to
an expected impact of the rebellions that ﬁnished by the end of 1982.
This paper speaks to the vast literature on the impact of early childhood circum-
stances on adult outcomes and conﬁrms conclusions in the literature that very young
children are more vulnerable and could suﬀer long lasting eﬀects from catastrophic
events. On the speciﬁc subject of conﬂict, there are several papers that estimate
impact of conﬂict on educational attainment of children using DD methodology.
In a cross country setting, Ichino and Winter-Ebmer (2004) compare Austria and
Germany to countries not involved in WWII. They ﬁnd that school age children
exposed to WWII attained lower education relative to non-war cohorts. They also
ﬁnd signiﬁcant earning losses 40 years after the war that could be attributed to lower
educational attainment of these cohorts. Using within country variation Shemyakina
(2011) estimates that Tajikistan civil war had a signiﬁcant impact on enrollment of
girls and their rate of ﬁnishing mandatory schooling but she does not ﬁnd any impact
on boys5.
5Several other papers employ a DD methodology and ﬁnd signiﬁcant negative impact of conﬂict
on educational attainment of children in various contexts: see Akresh and Walque (2008) for the
impact of Rwandan Genocide, Blattman and Annan (2010) for child soldiering in Uganda, Mer-
rouche (2006) for eﬀect of landmines in Cambodia, and Chamarbagwala and Moran (2010) and
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section gives a brief overview
of Iran's education system and IIW. Section 3 and 4 describe the data and the
identiﬁcation strategy. In section 5 I present the graphical evidence and regression
results. Section 6 discusses the issue of sample selection and other simultaneous
events that could result in biased DD estimates. The last section concludes.
3.2 Context
3.2.1 Education system in Iran
Establishment of modern primary and secondary schools in Iran dates back to the be-
ginning of the twentieth century. In 1910 the Ministry of Education was founded and
one year later, with the passage of Fundamental Law of the Ministry of Education,
primary education became compulsory and free of charge. This was equivalent to 6
years of education but due to lack of access and insuﬃcient resources even literacy
rates remained low (Arasteh (1962)). In 1943 the Law of Compulsory Free Public
Education once again commissioned the government to expand free compulsory pri-
mary education to all areas within 10 years (Menashri (1992)). It also stipulated
a ﬁne for preventing children from attending schools. However, as ﬁgure 3.1 shows
literacy rate only started to increase gradually. Starting from around 40 percent
in 1940, the literacy rate rose to 88 percent in 19706. Primary completion rates
remained 15 percentage points below literacy rates during the same period.
In 1971 the education system was restructured to three levels: 5 years of primary,
3 years of intermediate, and 4 years of high school (table 3.1). This reform also ex-
tended free compulsory education to the end of the intermediate level. This change
seems somewhat eﬀective with the high school completion rate starting to accelerate
after 1970 but intermediate school completion rate never exceeds 80 percent (ﬁg-
ure 3.1). In 1992, and in response to high failure rates, the high school level was
transformed to a unit-based system.
Chamarbagwala and Moran (2011) for impact of Guatemala civil war. There are also a few studies
that look at other dimensions of human capital like health. As an example Akbulut-Yuksel (2010)
ﬁnds signiﬁcant impact of allied bombing on children educational attainment, health and adult
labor market outcomes in Germany during WWII. She attributes the educational impact to the
physical destruction of schools an teacher absence and the health impact to malnutrition during
WWII.
6The rapid rise in literacy over cohorts is due to both expansion of education system over time
and a successful adult education campaign after 1979 revolution.
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Table 3.1: Evolution of education system in Iran
Initial system Re-organized
system
New high school
system
Period 1911-1970 1971-1991 1992-2006
Primary school 6 years 5 years 5 years
Intermediate school - 3 years 3 years
High school 6 (3+3) years 4 years 4 (3+1) years
Notes: During the initial system, the upper high school level was reformed several times through additions of various
majors. The 1971 re-organization of the system started in 1967 by changing primary schools to a 5-year system.
The ﬁrst intermediate schools opened in 1971, while the ﬁrst 4-year high schools opened in 1974. The re-organized
system was subject to various changes at the high school level. The new high school system was approved in 1990
to reduce grade repetition partly in response to the baby boom that inﬂated the number of students going to high
school. Under the new high school system, students need to retake only the courses they could not pass during a
school term. Whereas earlier students had to repeat the whole grade if they failed a number of courses. The role out
of the new high school system started in 1992 with 10 percent of ﬁrst year high school students. By 1998 all high
school grades were functioning under the new system. Source: Menashri (1992) and various educational laws from
the website of the Islamic Parliament Research Center.
Children start grade 1 of primary level at age 6 and with no grade repetition will
graduate from grade 12 at age 18. At the end of each level students sit through
centrally administered exams to obtain the relevant degree. For most of my sample
high school diploma is awarded in grade 127. Grade repetition was not uncommon
during the period of analysis. Figure 3.1 shows a clear dip for the last few data
points in each series which is indicative of grade repetition or late start. However,
for high school, full grade repetition is less likely partly due to the introduction of
the unit-based system8.
3.2.2 Iran Iraq War (IIW)
Iran Iraq relationship was very contentious right from Iraq's independence in 1932.
The major source of dispute was over the control of the bordering river, Arvand-Rud.
However, except for a few skirmishes the relationship was by and large peaceful.
The main agreement during this period was the Algiers Agreement in 1975 that
7In most pre-1992 years this corresponds to the 12th grade. Post-1992, diploma was awarded
after successfully ﬁnishing 11th grade. In the new system the 12th grade was designed to prepare
students for entering university.
8A study by the Islamic Parliament Research Center suggests around 2.5 and 7.8 percent of
primary and intermediate students had to repeat a grade due to failure during 2002-2006 school
years. After the introduction of the new high school system in 1992, grade repetition is very
uncommon as students need to retake only the failed courses.
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Figure 3.1: Expansion of modern education in Iran
Notes: Figure shows fraction of individuals with the speciﬁed degree for each birth cohort using the 2 percent sample
of 2006 Census used in this paper. I restrict to individuals who are 6 years or more at the time of the census for the
fraction of literate individuals. This corresponds to those born up until 2000. Similarly for fraction of individuals
ﬁnishing primary, intermediate, and high school I respectively restrict to those aged 11, 14, and 18 years old in 2006
Census. This corresponds to 1995, 1992, and 1988 birth cohorts. The ﬁgure starts from 1935, corresponding to
cohort of 71 years old individuals. For cohorts that studied under the old system the equivalent level is calculated.
For example grade 8 of the old system corresponds to the ﬁnal year of intermediate level.
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set the frontier along the thalweg in Arvand-Rud allowing Iran to freely use the
river's navigational routes. The 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran and the subsequent
instability, however, encouraged Saddam to denounce the Algiers Agreement and to
engage in an unprecedented large scale war lasting for about 8 years and claiming
213,255 lives on the Iranian side9.
On 22 September 1980 Iraq started an ambitious ground invasion of Iranian territory
along the 650 miles border. Until November 1980 Iraq captured vast swathes of Ira-
nian territory including ten important cities and came close to a few major cities10.
The advancement of Iraqi forces soon came to a halt and after some unsuccessful
oﬀensive during 1981, Iran was able to recover most of the occupied territory (in-
cluding some major cities) until June 1982. From this time until the signing of UN's
598 resolution and the subsequent cease ﬁre on 20 August 1988, there was virtually
little territorial exchange and the war continued with attacks and counter-attacks
along the border.
From the beginning till the end of the war all bordering villages and cities were battle
fronts subject to constant shelling, aerial, and ground attacks. I use the ﬁve oﬃcially
war hit provinces of Khuzestan, Ilam, Kermanshah, Kordestan, and West Azerbaijan
as treated areas in my analysis (ﬁgure 3.2). However, many industrial and civilian
centers well inside the country were targeted by aerial and missile attacks during the
war, especially in 1985, 1987 and 1988 during the so called episodes of war of cities11.
3.3 Data
The variables for my analysis are coming from a 2 percent sample of individual
records of 2006 Iran Population Census from Statistical Centre of Iran (SCI)12. 2006
Census administered an extended questionnaire to about 20 percent of randomly
selected households. Current data is a 10 percent extraction of this sub-sample. The
9Many books and articles are written on the background of the conﬂict and the development
of the war during its 8 years. See Bakhash (2004), Cordesman (1987), Souresraﬁl (1989), Karsh
(2002) and Hiro (1989) for detailed chronologies of war events and Cordesman and Wagner (1990)
and Potter and Sick (2004) for in-depth analysis of war events.
10The captured cities are Khorramshahr, Susangerd, Bostan, Mehran, Dehloran, Ghasreshirin,
Howeize, Naftshahr, Sumar, and Musian. The cities subject to continuous shelling are Abadan,
Ahwaz, Andimeshk, Dezful, Shush, Islamabad, and Gilangharb.
11The exact timing and location of missile attacks could be used as an alternative identiﬁcation
strategy for studying the war impact. I am building a database of all missile and aerial attacks on
Iranian cities to conduct this analysis.
12This is freely available from Statistical Centre of Iran in Farsi and from IPUMS in English.
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Figure 3.2: War hit provinces
Notes: Figure shows a map of Iran provinces. The grayed areas are the ﬁve provinces oﬃcially declared as war hit.
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sampling unit is a household and it is stratiﬁed at district by urban location. It
provides data on current residence, date of birth, migration during the past 10 years,
educational attainment, employment status and other characteristics. The sample
within each stratum is random but SCI provides individual probability weights (i.e.
inverse of sampling probability) that could be used to calculate nationwide aggregate
statistics. All calculations presented in this paper use these weights unless stated
otherwise but the results without weights are very similar13.
The main variable used for educational attainment is a dummy that shows whether
the individual has ﬁnished high school. I focus on high school graduation because
primary and intermediate graduation rates are quite high among the young cohorts
(ﬁgure 3.1) and show little diﬀerence between war and non-war provinces14.
I restrict the working sample to individuals aged between 20 to 66 years in 2006.
Children aged 6 need to enroll for the ﬁrst grade of primary school and with no grade
repetition, they would ﬁnish grade 12 by the age of 18. To minimize the impact of
grade repetition I restrict the sample to individuals aged 20 or more in 2006. On
the other hand, very old cohorts have a small sample size and also have very low
high school completion rates, therefore, I restrict to cohorts aged 66 or less. These
individuals were expected to ﬁnish high school in 1958 when average literacy and
high school graduation rate were about 72 and 28 percent (ﬁgure 3.1)15.
The school year begins on 23 September each year and ends in June next year,
therefore, the age conditions outlined above are based on age as of 22 September.
This is also the way I deﬁne birth cohorts throughout the paper. For example, all
individuals born between 23 September 1939 and 22 September 1940 are assigned to
the 1940 birth cohort and will start primary school in 23 September 1946, i.e. 1946
school year. Therefore, the age restriction above is equivalent to constraining the
analysis to 1940 and 1986 birth cohorts.
Panel A and B in table 3.2 show summary statistics for these variables in the full
sample and with the above age restriction. The restricted sample has higher educa-
tional attainment. While on average 76 percent of individuals are literate in the full
sample, the restricted sample has 84 percent literacy rate. Similarly 61 percent of
individuals ﬁnished primary in the full sample while this number is 74 percent in the
13Average high school completion rates for very old cohorts is lower without using the weights
(across war and non-war provinces).
14Educational variables are derived from a single coded variable in the original dataset. I could
also use years of education but the mapping from the coded variable to years of education is less
clear and is subject to greater error.
15Lowering or increasing this upper age by 10 years does not change the results signiﬁcantly.
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restricted sample. Rate of high school graduation is 0.13 percentage points higher in
the restricted sample but unemployment rates are very similar (12 vs. 11 percent).
Restricted sample is also on average older (due to removal of the large number of
individuals aged 0-19).
To match the 2006 Census records to war measures I would need to have information
on the residence of individuals during the war. Unfortunately, Census records data
only on current residence and whether the individuals are living in their birth place.
Therefore, I could only identify birth place of those living in their birth place in
200616. Therefore, I restrict the sample to these individuals and use the term non-
migrants to refer to them17. I acknowledge this could pose a serious challenge to my
identiﬁcation and discuss some supporting evidence in section 3.6.1.
Panel C in table 3.2 shows summary statistics for non-migrants born between 1940
and 1986. About 61 percent of individuals in sample B are non-migrants, i.e. appear
in sample C. Interestingly, samples B and C do not show considerable diﬀerences
for most of the variables in the table. The non-migrant sample seems to be slightly
more educated, has higher unemployment rate, is younger, and has a lower share of
urban individuals18.
3.4 Empirical Strategy
I employ a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences (DD) identiﬁcation strategy to estimate the war
impact on educational attainment. I compare the diﬀerence between average high
school completion rates for cohorts exposed to war to those not exposed across war
and non-war provinces19. The war started in 1980 and theoretically could impact
all individuals under the age of ﬁnishing high school. The oldest cohort that could
potentially receive an impact is the cohort of individuals in their 12th grade in 1980.
These individuals are 17 years old in 1980 and therefore correspond to the 1963 birth
cohort. The youngest cohort that is aﬀected by the war is the 1988 birth cohort,
16Since the war has ended 18 years before the Census I am unable to use migration questions
(which relate to past 10 years) to identify war time residence of all individuals.
17Technically some of these individuals could be return migrants, i.e. those who have returned
to their birth places after a temporary leave.
18This is mainly due to high rural to urban migration rates in Iran.
19Implementation of a DD strategy for estimating war impact on high school completion is
feasible because in the absence of recall bias it does not matter whether I measure completion rates
in 2006 or exactly at the time the individuals have ﬁnished high school. Using a similar strategy
for unemployment rate is not feasible because age has an eﬀect on unemployment.
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics
Variable All cohorts Born between 1940-1986
A: Whole sample B: Everyone C: Non-migrants
Obs. Mean S.D. Obs. Mean S.D. Obs. Mean S.D.
Literate 1,357,394 0.76 0.43 711,779 0.84 0.37 463,552 0.85 0.36
Primary 1,357,394 0.61 0.49 711,779 0.74 0.44 463,552 0.76 0.43
Intermediate 1,357,394 0.41 0.49 711,779 0.54 0.5 463,552 0.56 0.5
High School 1,357,394 0.24 0.43 711,779 0.37 0.48 463,552 0.39 0.49
Years of schooling 1,357,394 5.96 5.28 711,779 7.63 5.52 463,552 7.85 5.46
Unemployment 441,083 0.12 0.33 357,405 0.11 0.31 242,719 0.13 0.33
Age 1,357,394 28.13 18.64 711,779 35.85 12.03 463,552 34.64 12
Male 1,357,394 0.5 0.5 711,779 0.5 0.5 463,552 0.49 0.5
Family size 1,357,394 4.72 2 711,779 4.52 1.93 463,552 4.59 1.98
Urban 1,357,394 0.69 0.46 711,779 0.71 0.45 463,552 0.65 0.48
Head is in birth place 1,357,394 0.56 0.5 711,779 0.56 0.5 463,552 0.84 0.37
Ind. is in birth place 1,357,394 0.7 0.46 709,219 0.61 0.49 463,552 1 0
Notes: Table shows actual number of observations, weighted mean and standard deviation of main variables for three
sample. Sample A consists of all individuals in the data. Sample B restricts to individuals born between 1940 and
1986. Finally sample C restricts to individuals living in their birth places during the Census (in 2006). Sample C is
the main sample for subsequent analysis.
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i.e. individuals born in the last year of the war. Unfortunately, I will not be able to
observe high school outcomes for this cohort in 2006. Therefore, the youngest cohort
included in the treatment is the 1986 birth cohort.
I distinguish between two types of war exposure: early childhood exposure and school
time exposure. The large literature on importance of early childhood events suggests
there might be a larger impact on very young children. Therefore, I split the treated
cohorts in to early childhood exposure (1980-1986 birth cohorts) and school time
exposure (1963-1979 birth cohorts) leaving 1940-1962 birth cohorts as the control
group20. Equation (3.1) shows a regression speciﬁcation that implements the DD
methodology with two treatment groups.
yics = α + βWar_provs + δEEarlyc + δSSchoolc (3.1)
+γEWar_provs × Earlyc + γSWar_provs × Schoolc + ics
where yics is either a dummy that shows whether individual i in birth cohort c living
in province s has ﬁnished high school, War_provs is equal to 1 for the ﬁve war hit
provinces, Earlyc is equal to 1 for 1980-1986 birth cohorts, Schoolc is equal to 1 for
1963-1979 birth cohorts, and α is a constant. Coeﬃcients of interest are γE and
γS which respectively show the war impact on cohorts exposed to war during early
childhood and during school. I cluster standard errors at province level to allow
for correlated shocks for all cohorts within a given province21. I also estimate an
extended speciﬁcation where I control for province and cohort ﬁxed eﬀects as follows
yics = α+βs+δc+γEWar_provs×Earlyc+γSWar_provs×Schoolc+ΨXics+ics (3.2)
where βs is a set of province ﬁxed eﬀects, δc is a set of cohort ﬁxed eﬀects, and Xics
is a set of individual or province level controls22. The identiﬁcation assumption for
20I take a non-overlapping deﬁnition here despite the fact that 1980 and 1981 cohorts started their
primary during the war and hence are in some sense twice treated. Similarly, cohorts born between
1975 and 1979 are aged 5 or less when the war breaks out and therefore, might be considered in the
early childhood group too. Later, I use continuous overlapping measures of treatment by looking at
the number of years under age of 6 spent during the war and number of school years spent during
the war.
21Since I have 30 provinces, the small sample bias of standard errors might be signiﬁcant. How-
ever, I experimented with district level clustering (336 clusters) and the standard errors were smaller
for coeﬃcients of interest. Therefore, I take the conservative approach of clustering at the highest
level.
22The set of controls included are indicators for urban households, the gender of the individual,
family size, and their interactions with War_prov dummy. It is not possible to include parents
educational attainment as I do not observe that for individuals living apart from their parents. In
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causal interpretation of γE and γS is that in the absence of the war the diﬀerence
between high school graduation rates across war and non-war provinces would have
been the same for control and treated cohorts. In other words, the DD estimation
would identify the war impact from changes in the size of the war non-war educational
gap for younger cohorts. Therefore any other factor that aﬀects younger cohorts in
war provinces diﬀerentially could pose a challenge to causal interpretation. DD is,
however, robust to ﬁx diﬀerences between provinces and country-wide cohort speciﬁc
variation.
There are two types of concerns with identiﬁcation here. First, the restriction of the
sample to non-migrant individuals is likely to result in a downward bias in the esti-
mation of the war impact simply because war might have induced more well-endowed
households to migrate out of war provinces. The second category of concerns arises
due to the conditions of Iran right after 1979 revolution. A baby boom generation
(1979-1986 birth cohorts), various ethnic rebellion (e.g. Kordestan uprising), and
terrorist activities in major cities are a few simultaneous events that could produce
a bias in my estimates. I ﬁrst discuss estimation results in the following section and
in section 3.6 I try to address some of these concerns.
3.5 Results
I start by presenting average outcomes for treatment and control cohorts. Table 3.3
shows average high school graduation rates for treatment and control. In panel A
I compare early childhood cohorts (1980-1986 birth cohorts) to the control cohorts
(1940-1962 birth cohorts). Columns (1) and (2) show high school graduation rates
respectively for war and non-war provinces. Treated cohorts have an average high
school graduation rate of 43 and 54.6 percent in war and non-war provinces. Column
(3) reports the diﬀerence between these numbers. Obviously not all of this diﬀerence
is due to the war impact. Using the educational gap between war and non-war
provinces for the control cohorts (5.5 percentage points), in the third row of column
(3) I have calculated the DD estimate of the impact of the war. This suggests, high
school graduation rates are 6.1 percentage points lower for treated cohorts in war
provinces as a result of the war. Panel B shows cohorts exposed to war during their
school time received a smaller impact compared to early childhood cohorts.
some of the robustness checks I include yearly number of schools and students in the province as
additional controls.
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In panel C of table 3.3 I compare two control cohorts as a placebo test. I compare
1940-62 birth cohorts to 1930-39 birth cohorts. Neither of these groups has received
any impact from the war because they should have ﬁnished high school education
by 1980. The DD estimate for high school graduation shows the war non-war gap
has widened for younger cohorts by 2.9 percentage points (insigniﬁcant). This is a
comparable number to the estimated eﬀect for the cohorts exposed to war during
their schooling and suggests probably the panel B treated cohorts are not impacted
by the war. It is however, much smaller than panel A estimates of war impact.
3.5.1 Graphical evidence
Figure 3.3 plots evolution of high school graduation rates for birth cohorts in war and
non-war provinces. The ﬁrst, second, and third vertical lines mark 1963, 1980, and
1986 birth cohorts. In the ﬁgure I also report estimates of γE and γS from the basic
speciﬁcation (3.1) using aggregated data. Consistent with table 3.3, ﬁgure 3.3 shows
a lower fraction of individuals ﬁnish high school in war provinces even before the
war but the movements of the two series seems to be fairly parallel. For the cohorts
exposed to war during their late education there does not seem to be a change in the
gap between war and non-war provinces. However, the gap seems to be widening
from 1972 birth cohorts (i.e. second grade in 1980). This pattern becomes clearer
for 1980-86 cohorts. Reported coeﬃcient estimates also show cohorts exposed to war
during their early childhood in war provinces are on average 7 percentage points less
likely to ﬁnish high school. This is more than three times the magnitude of the eﬀect
on school exposed cohorts. Interestingly the early childhood eﬀect is signiﬁcant while
the school exposure eﬀect is not.
3.5.2 Regression results
Table 3.4 shows regression results for various speciﬁcations for high school comple-
tion. Column (1) reports coeﬃcient estimates from the basic DD estimation with
no controls (equation (3.1)). Coeﬃcient estimates are very similar to those reported
in ﬁgure 3.3. Once I add gender, urban, and family size and their interactions with
War_prov as controls in column (2), the coeﬃcient estimates are slightly reduced.
Column (3) shows the estimation results from the full speciﬁcation (equation (3.2))
with province and cohort ﬁxed eﬀects. This is my preferred estimate of the impact
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Table 3.3: Average rate of ﬁnishing high school
High school graduation rate
Province
war Non-war diﬀerence
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Early childhood exposure to war
Treatment 0.430 0.546 -0.116
Born 1980-1986 (0.020) (0.043) (0.048)
Control 0.172 0.227 -0.055
Born 1940-1962 (0.010) (0.047) (0.048)
Diﬀerence 0.257 0.318 -0.061
(0.022) (0.014) (0.025)
Panel B: School time exposure to war
Treatment 0.304 0.382 -0.078
Born 1963-1979 (0.010) (0.051) (0.052)
Control 0.172 0.227 -0.055
Born 1940-1962 (0.010) (0.047) (0.048)
Diﬀerence 0.132 0.155 -0.023
(0.013) (0.006) (0.015)
Panel C: Placebo experiment
Treatment 0.172 0.227 -0.055
Born 1940-1962 (0.010) (0.047) (0.048)
Control 0.029 0.054 -0.026
Born 1930-1939 (0.003) (0.020) (0.020)
Diﬀerence 0.144 0.173 -0.029
(0.009) (0.027) (0.029)
Notes: Columns (1) and (2) show average rates of ﬁnishing high school for cohorts born in war and non-war provinces.
Column (3) reports the diﬀerence. The last row in each panel also reports the diﬀerence. Therefore, the third row of
column (3) is the DD estimate of the war impact. Standard errors are clustered at province level (30 clusters) and
reported in parenthesis below coeﬃcients. Sample restricts to individuals living in their birth place. Note diﬀerence
between numbers in this table and ﬁgure 3.3 is due to use of aggregated data in the ﬁgure and individual data in
the table.
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Figure 3.3: Average high school graduation rate for birth cohorts
Notes: ﬁgure shows average high school graduation rates for each cohort born in war and non-war provinces. The ﬁrst,
second, and third vertical lines mark 1963, 1980, and 1986 birth cohorts. reported DD(E) and DD(S) correspond to
estimates of γE and γS from the basic speciﬁcation (3.1) using aggregated data. Robust standard errors are reported
under coeﬃcient estimates. The sample is restricted to non-migrant individuals and averages are calculated using
sampling weights.
of the war. Based on this probability of ﬁnishing high school is reduced by 4.8 per-
centage points for early childhood cohorts (signiﬁcant at 10 percent). Given the
sample mean of 39 percent high school graduation rate, this amounts to a 12 percent
reduction23. The war impact on school age children is about one third of the early
childhood eﬀect and is insigniﬁcant.
In column (4) I estimate a much more stringent speciﬁcation with household ﬁxed
eﬀects. This speciﬁcation would control for unobserved household characteristics
that could impact educational outcomes. While this is an interesting speciﬁcation
it is subject to a potential caveat. Individuals in the control cohorts are most likely
parents in the household while younger cohorts are still with their parents. Educa-
tional outcomes are shaped by household characteristics while the individual is still
a child. But inclusion of household ﬁxed eﬀects in my sample would not control
for the relevant ﬁxed eﬀects for parents. However, if there is high inter-generational
correlation in educational attainment, inclusion of household ﬁxed would correct for
some of the factors that mattered for both parents and children education. With this
potential caveat in mind, column (4) delivers the same estimate for the impact of
23The sample mean for 1980s cohorts is 0.528 and with this the eﬀect is about 9 percent.
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the war on early childhood cohorts but the impact on cohorts exposed to war during
schooling is now vanished. The standard errors are slightly larger here and none of
the coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant at 10 percent.
Column (5) uses continuous measures of exposure to war. I have calculated the
number of years individuals have spent during the war while under age of 6 (early
variable) and the number of years they have spent during the war while aged between
6 and 17 (school variable). Here individuals born between 1975 and 1981 have
positive number of years for both of treatment measures (i.e. overlap). Coeﬃcient
estimates suggest each additional year of exposure to war while aged under 6 reduces
probability of high school completion by 0.7 percentage points (signiﬁcant at 10
percent) but exposure above age 6 does not seem to have a signiﬁcant eﬀect24.
Column (6) allows for diﬀerential linear trends for high school completion of cohorts
in war and non-war provinces. Here I revert to binary treatment measures used
in columns (1)-(4) and instead of cohort ﬁxed eﬀects include a linear trend and
its interaction with War_prov dummy. This speciﬁcation signiﬁcantly reduces the
estimated war eﬀect and both coeﬃcients are insigniﬁcant now. While this might
suggest that diﬀerential trends are responsible for the estimated war impact, I leave
further discussion of this result to the end of this section.
In table 3.5 I carry out several robustness checks. Column (1) reports the benchmark
estimation results from the preferred speciﬁcation in column (3) of table 3.4. In
columns (2) to (4) I exclude several cohorts and the estimates remain remarkably
the same. In column (5) I extend the control group by including 1930-39 birth
cohorts and none of the estimate change.
I can extend the regression in equation (3.2) and look at the whole set of cohort
by war province interaction terms. This allows us to look at the evolution of the
war non-war gap for all cohorts which could be useful in assessing the signiﬁcance of
diﬀerential trends. The regression equation for this is as follows:
yijc = α + βj + δc +
1986∑
k=1941
(War_provs × dik)γk + ΨXics + ijc (3.3)
where dik is a set of cohort dummies, and γk captures the average diﬀerence between
individuals in cohort k living in war and non-war provinces relative to the 1940
24For those exposed for the full 6 years while under age 6, this amounts to 4.2 percentage points
reduction. For cohorts exposed to war for 8 years of their education the estimate suggests 0.8 re-
duction in probability of ﬁnishing high school. The former estimate is close to the binary treatment
estimates but the latter is much smaller.
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birth cohort (1940 is the reference group and dummies are omitted for this cohort).
γk is expected to be zero for cohorts who ﬁnished schooling before the war and
should become negative for younger cohorts. Figure 3.4 shows estimates of γs for
high school graduation rates. The gray lines show 95 percent conﬁdence intervals
(calculated form province-level clustered standard errors). This ﬁgure reveals that
there is a sharp decline in magnitudes of coeﬃcients after 1972 birth cohorts. In
other words, older cohorts seem to have parallel trends and the diﬀerential trend
seem to appear after 1972.
To more formally test for this, I redeﬁne treatment so that 1972-79 and 1980-86
birth cohorts form the two treatment groups while 1940-1971 birth cohorts form the
control group. Regression results for this deﬁnition of treatment and control are
reported in table 3.6. Columns (1) - (3) combine the two treatment groups. 1972-86
birth cohorts in war provinces are on average 0.04 percentage points less likely to
ﬁnish high school (signiﬁcant at 5 percent). Controlling for diﬀerential trend makes
this coeﬃcient very small and insigniﬁcant (column (3)). Perhaps more interestingly
when I split the two treatment groups, it turns out the war impact on 1980-86 birth
cohorts is robust and remains signiﬁcant at 10 percent even after controlling for
diﬀerential trends. Results in column (6) suggest 1980-86 birth cohorts are 4.2 less
likely to ﬁnish high school in war provinces. 1972-79 cohorts do not seem to have
received a signiﬁcant war impact. This table conﬁrms the intuition that very young
cohorts have received a larger impact compared to the older ones. Furthermore,
even after controlling for diﬀerential trends in column (5) the war impact remains
signiﬁcant at 10 percent for 1980-86 birth cohorts.
3.6 Alternative Explanations
Before interpreting the estimated impacts as causal, I would need to address sev-
eral concerns. First, I deal with concerns due to the restriction of the sample to
non-migrants. I present aggregate migration ﬁgures that help alleviate some of the
concerns but in the end I cannot fully rule out the possibility that my estimates
are driven by war induced migration of higher ability individuals. Second, I dis-
cuss potential challenges due to the Iran baby boom during 1979-1986. Here, I use
provincial number of students and schools as additional controls to see whether a
diﬀerential deterioration of educational resources could explain my results. The last
set of confounding factors I try to rule out are post-revolution events. Following the
113
Table 3.4: Main regression results
Basic Controls FE HH Continuous Trend
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. Var.: Finished high school
Early×War_prov -0.061∗∗ -0.050∗ -0.048∗ -0.047 -0.007∗ -0.011
(0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.028) (0.004) (0.015)
School×War_prov -0.023 -0.020 -0.019 -0.003 -0.001 0.005
(0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.017) (0.001) (0.010)
Observations 463,552 463,552 463,552 442,521 463,552 463,552
R-squared 0.061 0.178 0.214 0.177 0.214 0.213
Mean Dep. Var. 0.388 0.388 0.388 0.324 0.388 0.388
Controls N Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Prov. FE N N Yes N Yes Yes
Cohort FE N N Yes Yes Yes N
Household FE N N N Yes N N
Notes: Table shows coeﬃcient estimates and standard errors from 6 regressions. Dependent variable is a dummy
showing whether the individual has ﬁnished high school. Early and School are two indicators capturing 1980-1986 and
1963-1979 birth cohorts. I report only the two coeﬃcient of interest, equations (3.1) and (3.2) show full speciﬁcations
for column (1) and (3) respectively. In columns (2), (3), (5), and (6) I include urban, gender, and family size and their
interactions with War_prov as controls. Column (4) includes gender and its interaction with War_prov as controls.
Column (5) uses two continuous measures of treatment. Column (6) drops cohort ﬁxed eﬀects and includes dummies
for school exposure, and early childhood exposure together with a linear trend and its interaction with War_prov.
In all cases standard errors are adjusted for 30 province clusters. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ respectively show signiﬁcance at 10,
5, and 1 percent levels. All regressions use sampling weights but Household ﬁxed regressions are unweighted. Sample
restricts to individuals born between 1940 and 1986.
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Table 3.5: Robustness regressions
Benchmark
1940-86
Excl.
1980-86
Excl.
1963-79
Excl.
1940-49
Incl.
1930-39
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dep. Var.: Finished high school
Early×War_prov -0.055* - -0.056* -0.053* -0.056*
(0.028) - (0.028) (0.030) (0.028)
School×War_prov -0.015 -0.013 - -0.013 -0.017
(0.014) (0.014) - (0.016) (0.013)
Observations 463,552 309,902 267,338 430,264 490,018
R-squared 0.132 0.116 0.164 0.115 0.149
Notes: Table shows results of 7 regressions using high school completion as the dependent variable. Diﬀerent columns
use diﬀerent samples. Column (1) is the same as column (3) in table 3.4, here the sample is non-migrant individuals
born between 1940-86. Column (2) excludes school treatment cohorts, column (3) excludes early treated cohorts.
Column (4) extend the control cohorts to individuals born between 1930-39. Column (5) restricts the control cohorts
to those born between 1950-62. In all speciﬁcations I have included cohort and province ﬁxed eﬀects in addition
to controls (urban, gender, and family size and their interactions with war province dummy). All regressions use
sampling weights. In all cases standard errors are adjusted for 30 province clusters. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ respectively show
signiﬁcance at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.
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Figure 3.4: Coeﬃcients estimates for interactions of cohort by war province
Notes: Figure plots coeﬃcient estimates and 95 percent conﬁdence intervals for the full set of birth cohort by
War_prov interactions as in equation (3.3). Dependent variable is whether the individual has ﬁnished high school.
1940 birth cohort is set as the reference. First and second vertical lines mark 1963 and 1980 birth cohorts. Sample used
for regressions is individuals born between 1940 and 1986 who are currently living in their birth place. Regressions
use sampling weights and standard errors are clustered at province level.
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Table 3.6: Regression results for redeﬁned treatment groups
FE HH Trend FE HH Trend
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. Var.: Finished high school
I[1972-86]×War_prov -0.040** -0.043* -0.029
(0.019) (0.022) (0.019)
I[1980-86]×War_prov -0.047∗ -0.053∗∗ -0.042∗
(0.024) (0.026) (0.021)
I[1972-79]×War_prov -0.030∗∗ -0.024 -0.026
(0.015) (0.015) (0.019)
Observations 463,552 442,521 463,552 463,552 442,521 463,552
R-squared 0.214 0.177 0.210 0.214 0.177 0.212
Mean Dep. Var. 0.388 0.324 0.388 0.388 0.324 0.388
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Prov. FE Yes N Yes Yes N Yes
Cohort FE Yes Yes N Yes Yes N
Household FE N Yes N N Yes N
Notes: Table shows coeﬃcient estimates and standard errors from 5 regressions. Dependent variables is a dummy
showing whether the individual has ﬁnished high school. I report only the two coeﬃcient of interest. Regression
speciﬁcations and controls included are similar to the similarly named columns in table 3.4. I[1980-86] is a dummy
variable that is equal to 1 for 1980-86 birth cohorts and zero otherwise. Similarly, I[1972-79] is a dummy variable
that is equal to 1 for 1972-79 birth cohorts. I[1972-86] is equal to 1 when either I[1980-86] or I[1972-79] is equal to
1. Sample restricts to individuals born between 1940 and 1986, therefore 1940-71 birth cohorts are used as control
cohorts. In all cases standard errors are adjusted for 30 province clusters. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ respectively show signiﬁcance
at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. All regressions use sampling weights but Household ﬁxed regressions are unweighted.
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1979 revolution, Iran experienced great instability and a series of events overlapping
with early years of war. DD estimates would be confounded by simultaneous events
that have a diﬀerential impact on war provinces. Ethnic rebellions and terrorist
activities are two major post-revolution phenomena that I try to rule out in the last
two sub-sections.
3.6.1 Sample selection
Restricting the sample to non-migrants poses a challenge for causal inference. War
forced some individuals, who would not have migrated otherwise, to permanently
migrate25. To the extent that educational attainment of these individuals are dif-
ferent from those who remained in (or returned to) war areas, my treatment eﬀect
is biased. If those with better means permanently settled outside war areas, the
treatment group deﬁned here captures the set of individuals who would have had
lower educational attainment even in the absence of the war causing an overestimate
of the war impact26.
Based on SCI publications, the war resulted in a peak displacement of more than 1.6
million individuals by June 1982 (table 3.7). War migrants were settled in temporary
camps, nearby cities, or large cities like Tehran and Esfahan. Khuzestan was the
hardest hit province both because it is larger than the other provinces and because
large cities like Khorramshahr and Abadan were fully evacuated during the early
stages of the war. As table 3.7 shows 76 percent of war migrants are from Khuzestan.
The interesting feature of migration patterns is that majority of war migrants were
settled in the same province. 49, 92, 98, and 90 percent of war migrants from
Khuzestan, Ilam, Kordestan, and Kermanshah provinces were settled in the same
province.
Given most of these settlements were temporary it is likely that the majority of
migrants have returned to their homes after the war. On the other hand the war
lasted for about 8 years and while the large cities were freed in the second year of
25Note the term permanent is important here as the sample of temporary migrants would have
returned to their birth place and are included in my sample. There is, however, a potential bias
even from temporary migration. Households migrated outside war areas during the war might have
given birth to children at that time. These children are brought back to household original living
place after the war but the children themselves are not living in their birth place and therefore are
excluded from my sample. Nonetheless, these children are aﬀected by the war.
26Forced migration itself is a mechanism for the impact of war on educational attainment. In-
terruption of schooling due to forced migration could result in school dropout. The bias discussed
above is due to exclusion of war migrants who settled in locations other than their birth place.
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Table 3.7: War migrants as of June 1982
Current residence
Residence before war
Khuzestan Ilam Kordestan Kermanshah Other
Khuzestan 49.2 1.3 0 0.1 90.2
Ilam 0.6 91.7 0 4.7 0
Kordestan 0 0 98.1 0.9 4.2
Kermanshah 0.5 0.4 0 89.9 4.6
Other 49.7 6.7 1.9 4.3 0.9
Total Number 1,253,786 42,501 5,797 144,846 189,817
% of total 76.6 2.6 0.4 8.8 11.6
Notes: The ﬁgures are calculated from a publication of SCI. Columns show fraction of war migrants from each war
hit province that settled in any of the provinces listed in the rows. The last row shows total number of war migrants
in each province.
the war not many residents returned to those cities right away. Living in a place
for 8 years increases the chances of permanent settlement. In order to get a broad
idea of migration patterns during and after the war, I use aggregate statistics from
three rounds of censuses. I use 1986 census for migration numbers between 1976 and
1986, i.e. during the war period. The next round of census in 1996 would suggest
how many of the war migrants have returned to their home after the war. Finally, I
use 2006 census as a comparison for the two earlier rounds to get an idea of non-war
migration patterns (benchmark census).
Figure 3.5a shows net in-migrants entered each province as a fraction of end year
province population for the three censuses. I have ordered provinces so the ﬁrst block
shows ﬁve war provinces, the second block shows provinces neighboring Khuzestan,
and the bottom block shows other provinces. During the war Khuzestan and Ko-
rdestan show very high de-population rates. Around 9 percent of Khuzestan's popu-
lation moved out of the province between 1976 and 1986. Interestingly, neighboring
provinces show high in-migration rates, with Boushehr having the highest rate in
the country. It is worth noting that Fars and Esfahan are two big provinces and low
in-migration rates reﬂect their large populations whereas Boushehr is fairly small.
All neighboring provinces accommodated large numbers of migrants from Khuzes-
tan. These patterns are reversed in the after war census. Khuzestan now shows high
in-migration rate while neighboring provinces show de-population with Boushehr
having highest de-population rate in the country.
The rightmost panel in the ﬁgure 3.5a shows net in-migration for the benchmark
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census. Generally speaking Tehran, Yazd, and Boushehr show relatively high rates
of in-migration while Kermanshah, Kordestan, Hamedan, and E. Azerbaijan have
high de-population rates. This benchmark show modest degree of mobility in normal
times (between -5 and 5 percent), and corroborates the abnormality of high war time
de-population of Khuzestan and its partial re-population after the war.
As table 3.7 showed majority of war migrants were settled in the same province.
The earlier ﬁgure captured only inter-province migration. Figure 3.5b shows intra-
province migration rates for the three rounds of censuses. During the war and after
the war, war hit provinces have highest intra-province migration rates which shows
higher than average reshuing within these provinces. In the benchmark census 18
years after the end of the war, intra-province migration rates for war provinces are
still quite high but comparable to other provinces. For example, Khuzestan shows
an intra-province migration of about 15 and 14 percents in 1986 and 1996 censuses
but in 2006 this falls to less than 10 percent. These patterns are consistent with
the idea that individuals were displaced at the time of the war but returned to their
homes afterward27.
High intra-province migration rates suggest that while individuals might not be liv-
ing in their birth place, they might still be in the same province. Since my treatment
measure is deﬁned at province level, in table 3.9 column (2) I run the preferred spec-
iﬁcation on the full sample of individuals born between 1940 and 1986 assuming that
anyone who lives in a war (non-war) province in 2006 is in the treatment (control)
group. The results show little change for the early childhood impact but the co-
eﬃcient estimate for school impact is reduced signiﬁcantly. The fact that the war
impact remains stable for the sample of all individuals supports plausibility of the
sample restriction. In column (3), I exclude Khuzestan to see if results are driven by
the high migration rates in this province. The coeﬃcients are now insigniﬁcant but
magnitudes remain the same to the benchmark sample.
Another way I can check the plausibility of the sample restriction is to see whether
the probability of being included in the sample is aﬀected by the treatment. Figure
3.6a plots average fraction of non-migrant individuals for each cohort in war and non-
war provinces. About 55 percent of older cohorts and about 75 percent of youngest
cohort in the sample currently reside in their birth place. Interestingly, war and
non-war provinces have fairly similar fraction of non-migrant individuals. Running
a regression conﬁrms that the same fraction of treated cohorts are non-migrant in
27Overall large internal migration rates in Iran are due to high migration rates from rural areas
to urban centers.
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(a) Net inter-province in-migrants (% of province population)
(b) Intra-province migrants (% of province population)
Figure 3.5: Net in-migration into provinces during and after war period
Notes: ﬁgures (a) and (b) respectively show inter and intra-province migration rates for three rounds of censuses
for 24 provinces. I have deﬁned provinces in a consistent way to make results comparable across rounds of censuses
and merged 6 newly formed provinces with their original province. None of the war provinces had split in to further
provinces over time. Migration rates are calculated by dividing the relevant migration numbers by total province
population at the end date. Source of data is from SCI census publications.
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(a) Fraction of non-migrant individuals in each cohort
(b) High school completion gap between non-migrants and migrants
Figure 3.6: Impact of non-migrants restriction on war and non-war provinces
Notes: Panel (a) shows fraction of individuals who are living in their birth places in 2006 Census for various birth
cohorts in war and non-war provinces. Panel (b) plots the diﬀerence between average high school completion rates
for non-migrant and migrant individuals. Sample used here is the full sample of individuals born between 1940-1986
and I use sampling weights in calculation of averages.
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Table 3.8: Regression results for probability of living in birth place
Basic Controls FE HH
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Var. Individual living in birth place
Early×War_prov -0.020 -0.020 -0.019 -0.013
(0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.032)
School×War_prov -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001
(0.019) (0.018) (0.017) (0.020)
Controls N Yes Yes Yes
Prov. FE N N Yes N
Cohort FE N N Yes Yes
Household FE N N N Yes
Observations 709,219 709,219 709,219 675,240
R-squared 0.021 0.054 0.088 0.072
Mean Dep. Var. 0.612 0.612 0.612 0.614
Notes: Table reports results from regressions of a dummy variable that shows whether the individual is in his/her
birth place on covariates. The speciﬁcations under each column correspond to speciﬁcations estimated in table 3.4.
Standard errors are clustered at province level (30 clusters). Clustering at district level (336 districts) does not
change signiﬁcance of any of the coeﬃcients.
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war and non-war provinces. Using the same speciﬁcations as in equations (3.1) and
(3.2) but using an indicator for being in birth place as the dependent variable, table
3.8 shows the interaction terms are not signiﬁcant in any of the speciﬁcations. In
terms of magnitude the estimates suggest cohorts born between 1980 and 1986 are
2 percentage points less likely to be in their birth place if they are currently residing
in war provinces. Given the mean of the dependent variable this is a 3 percent
reduction.
Even if a balanced fraction of individuals are included in the sample across war and
non-war provinces, the included sample might be diﬀerent on characteristics that
matter for educational attainment. In ﬁgure 3.6b I take a step further and look
at the educational gap between non-migrants and migrants across war and non-
war provinces to see if in terms of the outcome variable the included individuals
are diﬀerent from excluded ones. In war provinces non-migrants seem to be on
average more educated than migrants across most of the cohorts. However for non-
war provinces it seems older non-migrants have attained lower levels of education
compared to same age migrants, whereas younger non-migrants seem to outperform
migrants. Overall it seems the educational gap is broadly similar across war and
non-war provinces.
While the above mentioned arguments go some way to relieve concerns, they cannot
fully rule out the bias induced from the sample restriction. It is hard to assess this
in the absence of micro data on migration patterns during the war28.
3.6.2 Baby boom
Between 1976 and 1986 Iran had a baby boom with an average yearly population
growth rate of 3.9 percent. The population growth rates in the preceding and pro-
ceeding decades are respectively 2.7 and 2.5 percent. Figure 3.7a shows number of
registered births in the country sharply rises after 1979 from 1.5 million to 2.5 million.
The birth rates remain fairly high during 1980-1986 but start to fall after 198629.
In this section, I provide two pieces of evidence that suggest the higher war impact
on 1980-1986 birth cohorts is not due to the diﬀerential impact of the baby boom
in war provinces. First ﬁgure 3.7b plots average annual registered births for war
and non-war provinces for ten birth cohorts around the baby boom period. While
28Unfortunately, I did not have access to micro data for 1986 and 1996 Censuses.
29The rise and fall in birth rates were mostly due to government campaigns to ﬁrst increase
fertility after the 1979 revolution and then decrease fertility during the second half of the war.
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non-war provinces have on average higher number of births, the diﬀerence between
the two regions is fairly stable.
Even though birth ﬁgures move in parallel across provinces, the educational impact
of the population expansion could be heterogeneous. For example, war provinces
might have built fewer schools to accommodate the baby boom and hence could
have overcrowded classes leading to worse educational outcomes. In order to ad-
dress this concern, I have collected yearly province-level data on number of students,
schools and classes from various Iran Statistical Year Books. In table 3.9, column
(4) I included log number of schools and students as additional controls in the main
speciﬁcation. While these variables have the right sign both of them are insigniﬁ-
cant. Furthermore, their inclusion does not aﬀect the estimated war impact on early
childhood and school cohorts. If anything, the estimated eﬀect seems to be larger
now.
3.6.3 Ethnic rebellions
The third event that could potentially bias DD estimates is the rebellion movements
in West Azerbaijan, Kordestan, and Khuzestan. In the turbulent aftermath of the
revolution these rebellions started out mostly as ethnic movements for independence.
In fact Iraq expected help from the Arab rebels in Khuzestan but the invasion marked
a uniﬁcation of Arabs and Persians. The most powerful and long lasting rebellion
was the Kordestan uprising. In table 3.9, column (5), I have excluded Kordestan to
check the robustness of results. The estimated war eﬀects are slightly smaller and
the early childhood eﬀect is now insigniﬁcant but overall the results are in the same
ball park. Furthermore, the rebellions were almost ﬁnished in the second half of
the war (1984-88) but ﬁgures 3.3 and 3.4 suggest a larger impact of the war for the
youngest cohorts in my sample (1984-1986).
3.6.4 Other confounding events
Apart from the simultaneous baby boom and ethnic rebellions, two other events
warrant some discussion. Right after the 1979 revolution, some factions of the revo-
lutionary groups started to oppose the policies undertaken by the mainstream forces.
Soon the opposition moved underground and embarked on assassinations and ter-
rorist bombings in a few major cities between 1979 and 1982. Several observations
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(a) Country-wide registered births
(b) Average provincial registered births
Figure 3.7: Number of registered births over time
Notes: Figure (a) shows number of registered birth in calendar years. First, second, and third vertical lines mark
1963 , 1980, and 1986 birth cohorts. Source of this data is from National Organization for Civil Registrations. Figure
(b) plots average number of births in war and non-war provinces. Source of this data is various Statistical Year books
from SCI. Registered births are diﬀerent from actual births during a calendar year because some birth events were
registered with delay.
125
Table 3.9: Regressions for ruling out alternative stories
Benchmark All Excl.
Khuzestan
Educ.
inputs
Excl.
Kordestan
Excl.
prov.
capitals
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. Var.: Finished high school
Early×War_prov. -0.048∗ -0.038 -0.053 -0.058∗∗ -0.040 -0.054∗
(0.027) (0.023) (0.036) (0.025) (0.028) (0.032)
School×War_prov. -0.019 -0.007 -0.017 -0.030∗ -0.017 -0.014
(0.012) (0.011) (0.019) (0.016) (0.014) (0.015)
Ln(schools) 0.027
(0.028)
Ln(students) -0.011
(0.047)
Observations 463,552 711,779 437,350 350,047 454,591 361,773
R-squared 0.214 0.168 0.217 0.182 0.213 0.187
Notes: Table shows several robustness checks for ruling out competing stories. Column (1) replicates estimation
results from the preferred speciﬁcation in table 3.4 for comparison purposes. Column (2) estimates the same speci-
ﬁcation as column (1) but includes all (i.e. migrant and non-migrant) individuals in the analysis. Here anyone who
lives in a war (non-war) province in 2006 is assumed to assigned to treatment (control). The rest of the table focus
on non-migrant individuals as in column (1). Column (3) and (5) exclude individuals from respectively Khuzestan
and Kordestan provinces. Column (4) includes log number of primary schools and log number of primary students
in each province-year as additional controls in the regression. Due to data availability, the sample for this column
runs from 1960-1986 and the number of clusters is 22 provinces. Column (6) excludes 30 districts that contain the
provincial capitals. Standard errors are clustered at province level (30 provinces). ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ respectively show
signiﬁcance at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.
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make it less likely that the terrorist activities are responsible for the estimated ef-
fects. First, most of terrorist activities took place in major cities (often Tehran).
However, when I exclude all provincial capitals the estimated war impact on early
childhood cohorts becomes slightly larger (table 3.9, column (6)). Second observa-
tion that alleviates concerns is the fact that the treatment eﬀect seems to be stronger
for younger cohorts (ﬁgures 3.3 and 3.4). This is despite the fact that little terrorist
activities happened after 1982.
The other event that requires some explanation is the Cultural Revolution which
closed all universities between 1980 and 1982. The stated objective was to bring the
tutoring in line with Islamic thought. This event could reduce incentives for ﬁnishing
high school as the prospect of entering university was unclear. However, it is not
entirely obvious that the Cultural Revolution had a heterogeneous impact on war
provinces. Furthermore, the strongest impact of the war is on cohorts who started
primary or are born during the war. These cohorts are quite far from university
education and the universities were expected to open soon.
3.7 Conclusions
In this paper I estimated the reduced form impact of IIW on educational attainment
of children. DD estimates suggest probability of ﬁnishing high school is reduced
by 4.8 percentage points for cohorts born during the war in war provinces, whereas
cohorts that spent some years of their schooling during the war saw a reduction
of 1.9 percentage points. These estimates suggests a stronger impact for younger
cohorts. It seems 1980-86 birth cohorts (born during the war) have received a robust
negative war impact which remains signiﬁcant at 10 percent even after controlling
for diﬀerential trends. On the other hand, 1972-79 birth cohorts (aged between 8-1
years old when war started) seem to have received a much smaller and insigniﬁcant
impact. Older cohorts are unaﬀected.
The main issue with interpreting these estimates as causal is the sample restriction.
I have focused on non-migrants in order to identify birth place of individuals. War,
however, might inﬂuence migration patterns and result in biased DD estimates. Ag-
gregate migration statistics from three rounds of censuses, however, support the idea
that at least part of the war migrants returned to their homes. Furthermore, I have
shown that a balanced number of individuals are removed from cohorts across war
and non-war provinces due to this restriction. But in the end it is hard to address all
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concerns in the absence of war time micro data on migration patterns. I have also
tried to rule out other simultaneous events as potential confounding factors. Most
importantly, I have ruled out a baby boom as a candidate for explaining the esti-
mated eﬀects by including number of schools and students in each province directly
in the regression.
The results of my analysis show very young and unborn children are more susceptible
to adverse shocks. It seems school age children have managed to maintain their
education levels in war provinces but children born during the war seem to have
suﬀered a sustained negative impact. It is beyond the scope of this paper to suggest
potential remedies for compensation of these eﬀects but spending more resources for
education of aﬀected cohorts seems like a reasonable idea. It is not unreasonable to
think that some of these results are applicable to contexts beyond IIW. For example,
natural disasters (ﬂoods and earthquakes) could have negative eﬀects on pregnant
women and their prospective babies and could warrant government intervention.
I am planning to extend the analysis in this paper by collecting detailed data on ex-
act timing and location of missile and aerial attacks on cities outside war provinces.
Combining this data with birth date and location of individuals would allow a careful
investigation of the early childhood and in-utero eﬀects during aerial attacks. This
data would deliver cleaner identiﬁcation of the causal eﬀect because of its precise tim-
ing and location. Furthermore, so far I have delivered mostly reduced form estimates
of the war eﬀect. It is equally, if not more, important to know the mechanisms that
led to these eﬀects. Here I am investigating the use of several rounds of Household
Expenditure Surveys during the second half of the war to look at changes in average
incomes, and school enrollment rates to shed more light on potential mechanisms.
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Appendix A
Flat rates for FRS categories
136
Category of Business
24 Apr 02 - 
31 Dec 03
1 Jan 04 - 
30 Nov 08
1 Dec 08 - 
31 Dec 09
1 Jan 10 - 
3 Jan 11
4 Jan 11 
Onwards
Post offices** 6 2 2 4.5 5
Retailing food, confectionery, tobacco, newspapers or children’s clothing 5 2 2 3.5 4
Wholesaling food 7 5.5 5 6.5 7.5
Membership organisation 7 5.5 5.5 7 8
Pubs 6 5.5 5.5 6 6.5
Farming or agriculture that is not listed elsewhere 6.5 6 5.5 6 6.5
Retailing that is not listed elsewhere 7 6 5.5 6.5 7.5
Wholesaling agricultural products 7 6 5.5 7 8
Retailing pharmaceuticals, medical goods, cosmetics or toiletries 8 7 6 7 8
Retailing vehicles or fuel 8 7 5.5 6 6.5
Sport or recreation 8 7 6 7.5 8.5
Wholesaling that is not listed elsewhere 8 7 6 7.5 8.5
Printing 8.5 7.5 6.5 7.5 8.5
Repairing vehicles 8.5 7.5 6.5 7.5 8.5
Agricultural services 9 7.5 7 10 11
Library, archive, museum or other cultural activity 8.5 7.5 7.5 8.5 9.5
Manufacturing food 8.5 7.5 7 8 9
General building or construction services* 9 8.5 7.5 8.5 9.5
Manufacturing yarn, textiles or clothing 9.5 8.5 7.5 8 9
Manufacturing that is not listed elsewhere 10 8.5 7.5 8.5 9.5
Packaging 9 8.5 7.5 8 9
Repairing personal or household goods 10 8.5 7.5 9 10
Hiring or renting goods 9.5 8.5 7.5 8.5 9.5
Social work 9 8.5 8 10 11
Forestry or fishing 10 9 8 9.5 10.5
Mining or quarrying 10 9 8 9 10
Courier Services** 6 9 8 9 10
Transport or storage, including couriers, freight, removals and taxis** 10 9 8 9 10
Travel agency 10 9 8 9.5 10.5
Advertising 11 9.5 8.5 10 11
Hotel or accommodation 10.5 9.5 8.5 9.5 10.5
Photography 10 9.5 8.5 10 11
Publishing 10 9.5 8.5 10 11
Veterinary medicine 11 9.5 8 10 11
Dealing in waste or scrap 11 9.5 8.5 9.5 10.5
Any other activity not listed elsewhere 11 10 9 10.5 12
Investigation or security 11 10 9 10.5 12
Manufacturing fabricated metal products 11 10 8.5 9.5 10.5
Boarding or care of animals 11 10.5 9.5 10.5 12
Film. radio, television or video production - 10.5 9.5 11.5 13
Business services that are not listed elsewhere 12.5 11 9.5 10.5 12
Entertainment or journalism 12 11 9.5 11 12.5
Estate agency or property management services 11.5 11 9.5 10.5 12
Laundry or dry-cleaning services 12 11 9.5 10.5 12
Secretarial services 11.5 11 9.5 11.5 13
Computer repair services 13.5 11 10 9.5 10.5
Financial services 12 11.5 10.5 12 13.5
Hairdressing or other beauty treatment services 13 12 10.5 11.5 13
Catering services, including restaurants and takeaways 13 12 10.5 11 12.5
Real estate activity not listed elsewhere 13 12 11 12.5 14
Architect, civil and structural engineer or surveyor 13.5 12.5 11 13 14.5
Management consultancy 13.5 12.5 11 12.5 14
Accountancy or book-keeping 13.5 13 11.5 13 14.5
Computer and IT consultancy or data processing 14.5 13 11.5 13 14.5
Lawyer or legal services 13.5 13 12 13 14.5
Labour-only building or construction services* 14.5 13.5 11.5 13.5 14.5
Number of FRS categories 54 56 56 56 56
Number of flat rates 17 16 16 18 17
Range of flat rates 5 - 14.5 2 - 13.5 2 - 12 3.5 - 13.5 4 - 14.5
Standard VAT rate 17.5 17.5 15 17.5 20
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Appendix B
Calculation of FRS gains
To calculate counterfactual FRS liability I need to multiply FRS turnover by the
applicable ﬂat rate. FRS turnover is total gross business income which should include
exempt, zero rated, reduced rated, and standard rated sales as well as any VAT
received on sales. Under normal VAT accounting, VAT liability is VAT received
on sales minus VAT paid on purchases (subject to certain qualifying rules). VAT
traders report net of tax sales and purchases and corresponding VAT on them in VAT
returns. Reported sales includes exempt, zero-rated, reduced-rated, and standard-
rated sales but doesn't include VAT itself. Therefore, to arrive at FRS turnover I
add up reported sales and the corresponding VAT.
In order to calculate FRS gains for VAT traders, I ﬁrst assigned a ﬂat rate to each
trader (base on reported SIC codes) and then calculated FRS turnover from returns
data (as above). FRS gains is then derived as the diﬀerence between reported VAT
liability and calculated counterfactual FRS liability. Assuming the assigned ﬂat rate
is τF and FRS turnover is Sg I calculate FRS gains as follows
FRS gains = TV − TF
TF = τF × Sg
TV = TS − TP
TF represents FRS liability while TV shows reported net VAT which itself is the dif-
ference between sales VAT (TS) and purchases VAT (TP ). FRS turnover is basically
sum of net of VAT sales and VAT on sales. Both of these values are reported on
VAT tax return.
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In the next subsection, I explain the details of how I assigned ﬂat rates to VAT
traders. Then I present reliability checks I have done to make sure the assigned rates
are correct. Finally I discuss several complications in the calculation of gains.
B.1 Assigning ﬂat rates to traders
In principle there are two ways to assign the appropriate ﬂat rate to each ﬁrm. In
the ﬁrst method ﬂat rates are set based on observed eﬀective output tax rate for
FRS ﬁrms within the same SIC2007 code. Two conditions are required for proper
functioning of this method: a) non zero mass of FRS traders for most sectors and
b) a tight distribution of eﬀective output tax rates for FRS traders in each sector.
Out of 719 SIC2007 codes, 304 sectors have less than 30 FRS traders. Ignoring
low FRS sectors however removes only about 2% of FRS eligible traders. The more
serious issue with this method is the disperse distribution of ﬂat rates within sectors.
The scheme requires traders to account for special transactions outside the scheme
but report only the sum of all transactions under outputs and output VAT. For
example if a trader purchases services (e.g. consultancy) from another EU member
state, these are accounted under the reverse charge scheme at the relevant VAT rate
(standard, reduced, or zero) but I don't observe each element separately. Therefore
the observed eﬀective output tax rate for FRS traders may not reﬂect the applicable
ﬂat rate. Furthermore, some traders might join FRS in the middle of an accounting
period, and therefore have a weighted average of standard rate and ﬂat rates as
eﬀective output tax rate. The 1 percentage point discount on new VAT registrations
further complicates matters.
Therefore, I use traders' reported SIC2007 codes to assign ﬂat rates. HMRC pub-
lishes list of applicable ﬂat rates for around 56 categories of business and lists
several associated trade names under each category (332 trade names). I match
these trade names to SIC2007 code descriptions from the Oﬃce of National Statistics
(ONS) to form a mapping between reported SIC2007 codes and published ﬂat rates.
For example, ONS describes SIC2007 code of 70229 as management consultancy
activities (other than ﬁnancial management). This description matches with the
FRS category for management consultancy with τF = 12.5 percent during 2004-
07. Using this manual matching, 78 percent of FRS eligible traders are assigned
a ﬂat rate. The largest sectors left out are construction and part of retail sectors
because reported SIC2007 codes map to several ﬂat rates. Table B.1 lists the main
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Table B.1: Main sectors that are not assigned a ﬂat rate
SIC2007 ONS description Why unassigned?
41100 to
41202
(3 codes)
Construction of buildings Both sectors might include labor-only or general
building or construction services based on the share
of labor inputs. The former has a ﬂat rate of 8.5
percent while the latter's 13.5 percent during
2004-2007.
43120 to
43999
(12 codes)
Specialized construction activities
47190 Other retail sale in non-specialized
stores
This includes department stores, general stores (food
not predominant), and household stores. Depending
on share of sales they could fall in diﬀerent FRS
categories.
47710
47721
Retail sale of clothing in specialised
stores
Retail sale of footwear and leather
goods in specialised stores
Codes combine sale of children and adult clothing
but FRS (and VAT) distinguishes between the two.
68100 to
68320
(4 codes)
Real estate activities Estate agency or property management services
sectors left out of the analysis and the reason why ﬂat rates could not be assigned.
In the last three years of the sample (2008-9 to 2010-11) there were two ﬂat rates
in place during a single ﬁnancial year (due to changes in the standard VAT rate).
I use the variable stagger that shows the periods returns correspond to, to assign
appropriately weighted ﬂat rates to traders during this period. The full weighting
used in the assignments are shown in table B.2. For example, during 2008-9 ﬁnancial
year the standard VAT rate was reduced from 17.5 to 15 percent between 1 December
2008 and 31 December 2009. This means there are two sets of ﬂat rates applicable
during this time. I denote the pre December 2008 ﬂat rates by τF,1 and post this time
by τF,2. For a trader submitting annual returns at the end of March 2009 (stagger
equal to 0 or 1), I use a weight of 8/12 and 4/12 on τF,1 and τF,2 respectively to arrive
at the year-wide ﬂat rates, i.e. τF,2008−9 = 8/12 × τF,1 + 4/12 × τF,2. HMRC advises
traders to use the appropriate rates on sales done before and after 1 December 2008,
but I don't observe the break down of sales. Therefore, the method explained here
is equivalent to assuming a uniform distribution of sales across all months. The
degree of measurement error depends on the extent that sales diﬀer across months
(e.g. December is a high sales volume period for retailers) and the ability of traders
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Table B.2: Weights used for assignment of ﬂat rates during the change years
Return period for
2008-9
Weights for 2008-9
(change: 1
December 2008)
Weights for 2009-10
(change: 1 January
2010)
Weights for 2010-11
(change: 4 January
2011)
τF,1 τF,2 τF,2 τF,3 τF,3 τF,4
1 April 2008 -
31 March 2009
8/12 4/12 9/12 3/12 8/12 4/12
1 February 2008 -
31 January 2009
10/12 2/12 11/12 1/12 10/12 2/12
1 March 2008 -
28 February 2009
9/12 3/12 10/12 2/12 9/12 3/12
not sure (left out) - - - - - -
Notes: τF,1 shows the ﬂat rate applicable from January 2004 - 30 November 2008, τF,2 is ﬂat rate during 1 December
2008 - 31 December 2009, τF,3 is for 1 January 2010 - 3 January 2011, and τF,4 is for 4 January 2011 - onwards.
to shift reported sales to favorable tax periods. A look at distribution of eﬀective
output and input tax rates for VAT traders conﬁrms there is a signiﬁcant mass of
traders with eﬀective tax rates exactly at the weighted average of standard rates
using the weights in table B.2.
B.2 Assignment Reliability
To check the reliability of ﬂat rate assignment I use the observed ﬂat rates for existing
FRS traders in the same SIC2007 code. I calculate the observed ﬂat rates, τ oF , as
the ratio of output VAT over reported gross outputs. To get a clean measure of
applicable ﬂat rates, I restrict the sample of FRS traders to those satisfying three
conditions: a) on FRS for exactly 12 months, b) passed the FRS discount window,
and c) with τ oF smaller or equal to the maximum applicable ﬂat rate. The three
restrictions help to solve for some of the issues mentioned above about using the
observed ﬂat rates.
Figure B.1 shows the histogram of the diﬀerence between assigned ﬂat rates and
observed ones, τaF,s−τ oF,si, for the group of FRS traders satisfying the three conditions
(subscripts i and s denote traders and sectors, superscripts a and o denote assigned
and observed ﬂat rates). The ﬁgure shows two encouraging patterns. First, the
distribution of the deviation is almost symmetric around zero. This suggests, the
diﬀerence between observed ﬂat rates and assigned ones is not systematic and reﬂects
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Figure B.1: Histogram of the diﬀerence between assigned and observed ﬂat rates
trader speciﬁc circumstances and on average the reported number of gainers won't
be biased upward or downward. Second, 60 percent of the mass falls in the range of
-0.5 to 0.5 percentage points deviation.
To further check whether certain sectors show a high degree of deviation while others
don't, I deﬁne τ¯F,s to be average absolute diﬀerence between assigned and observed
ﬂat rates in sector s:
τ¯F,s = 1/N
∑
i
| τaF,s − τ oF,si | (B.1)
where N is the number of included FRS traders in sector s and summation is done
over the absolute diﬀerence for such traders. A large τ¯F,s signals potential problems
with the assignment process. Table B.3 shows the result of this reliability check.
55 percent of eligible VAT traders are in sectors with an average deviation of less
than 2 percentage points. These sectors also have higher fraction of FRS traders and
gainers.
τ¯F,s is susceptible to presence of outliers. Therefore, to make sure the assigned ﬂat
rates are correct, I investigated the histograms of the observed ﬂat rates for all
FRS traders within the sectors with τ¯F,s ≥ 1. In all sectors the histograms had a
clear mode at the assigned rate. As a ﬁnal precaution, I re-checked the matching of
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Table B.3: Sectoral average absolute diﬀerence between assigned and observed ﬂat
rates
Average absolute
diﬀerence (τ¯F,s)
Number of
Sectors
Number of observations % FRS % gainer
FRS traders FRS eligible FRS gainers
[0, 0.5] 121 210,666 1,224,939 300,134 17% 30%
(0.5, 1] 84 46,720 596,268 124,237 8% 23%
(1, 1.5] 55 20,792 474,182 73,305 4% 16%
(1.5, 2] 48 8,167 344,337 43,046 2% 13%
(2,∞) 254 117,122 1,569,015 59,100 7% 4%
Total 562 403,467 4,208,741 599,822 10% 16%
Notes: The diﬀerence between numbers here and numbers in the paper is because some sectors with smaller than 30
FRS trader or FRS gainers are removed from this table.
sectoral descriptions to HMRC trade names for these sectors and found no error or
ambiguity.
B.3 Complications in calculation of gains
There are two potential sources of error in calculation of counterfactual FRS liability.
First, I use Standard Industry Classiﬁcation (SIC) codes to assign ﬂat rates but
reported SIC codes are usually based on traders declared activities at the time of
VAT registration. Some traders might be involved in activities other than those
implied by SIC codes leading to measurement error (see appendix C for other errors
in SIC codes). While it is not clear whether this causes a systematic over or under
estimate of gains, setting the ﬂat rates to the maximum applicable rate in each year
shows still 12% of eligible traders beneﬁt from FRS (table 1.5 column (6)). This is
a very conservative estimate of FRS gains and still a signiﬁcant number of traders
beneﬁt. Using this method I can estimate gains for categories that I was unable to
assign a ﬂat rate. Results show 9% of all eligible traders beneﬁt from FRS under
this scenario. This estimate is encouraging and shows the sample of traders left out
of the analysis (unassigned ﬂat rate) are not very diﬀerent.
The second source of error is unobservable complications in the calculation of FRS
turnover. Normally FRS turnover is gross turnover, i.e. net sales plus VAT received
on sales, but certain transactions are treated diﬀerently. Reverse charge transactions
are accounted for by purchasing partner as if they are self supplied. VAT on these
143
items appears as output VAT and could be reclaimed as input VAT even under
FRS. In FRS liability calculations I can't separate reverse charge transactions and
hence overestimate FRS liability because I ignore the possibility of reclaiming input
VAT. Similarly provisions for bad debt relief under FRS are ignored leading to an
overestimate of FRS liability. Therefore FRS turnover errors are likely to lead to an
overestimate of FRS liability and an underestimate of FRS gains.
There are other reasons to believe that the actual number of FRS beneﬁciaries is
higher than what I estimated. First, as mentioned earlier ignoring deductibility of
input VAT on certain capital goods results in an underestimation of FRS gains. In
my sample 34% of FRS traders claim any input VAT with an average of ¿1,350.
Therefore this could potentially be a large factor working against me. Second, I
ignore the 1 percentage point discount on ﬂat rates for new VAT registrations which
leads to an underestimate of gains for the population of new entrants. Considering
this raises the fraction of gainers by 1 percentage point to 27% of eligible traders.
Third, I ignore FRS compliance cost saving which leads to an underestimate of the
number of gainers. Finally, I calculate counterfactual liability based on realized sales
under VAT accounting. The optimal level of sales however could be diﬀerent under
FRS which leads to higher FRS proﬁts than what I estimate.
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Appendix C
Data cleaning procedures for chapter
1
In this appendix I explain all the cleaning and adjustment procedures I have done
on the data used in chapter 1 of the thesis.
C.1 SIC2007 corrections
The VAT returns data include a variable that capture the Standard Industry Classi-
ﬁcation (SIC) code of traders' main activity. HMRC uses descriptions traders declare
in question 6 of VAT 1 - Application for Registration form to construct SIC codes
but I don't know the exact procedures followed. As SIC codes are used to assign
ﬂat rates to traders they hugely inﬂuence FRS gains and the analysis in this pa-
per. Therefore it is crucial to make sure this variable is correctly capturing traders'
activities.
The main complication in use of SIC codes is the change in the classiﬁcation system
in 2007. Oﬃce of National Statistics (ONS), the body responsible for publishing and
maintaining of SIC, revised the system in 2007. The SIC codes reported in VAT
data should correspond to SIC2003 codes for 2004-5 until 2006-7 ﬁnancial years and
then map to SIC2007 codes for 2007-8 until 2010-11 ﬁnancial years. To check this, I
match SIC2003 and SIC2007 codes from ONS to those reported in the VAT data in
the respective periods.
As table C.1 reports, there are very few missing SIC codes in VAT data (column (2)).
For ﬁrms reporting a correct (in the sense deﬁned below) and constant SIC2007 over
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Table C.1: Mis-matches in SIC codes
year Total
observations
Missing SIC
in VAT data
Unmatched
SIC
Unique SIC
codes in VAT
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2004 1,894,281 <30 2,275 700
2005 2,177,146 8386 13,819 962
2006 2,221,095 <30 2,738 701
2007 2,118,581 <30 114,164 1,365
2008 2,173,988 79 30,684 1,330
2009 2,123,464 <30 15,077 799
2010 2,120,600 <30 16,396 801
Total 14,829,155 8,482 197,144 -
Notes: Column (3) shows the number of observations that had non-missing SIC codes in VAT data but didn't match
with SIC codes from ONS. Number of unique SIC codes in ONS data is 699 and 728 respectively in 2003 and 2007
classiﬁcations.
the non-missing years, I ﬁll out the missing SIC observations. There is, however,
a signiﬁcant number of mis-matches between ONS and VAT SIC codes in 2007-
8 ﬁnancial year (column (3)). This suggests not all SIC codes reported in 2007
are based on SIC2007 and some of the observations continue to use SIC2003 in
this year. Column (4) conﬁrms this idea by showing that in 2007 and 2008 there
are signiﬁcantly more unique codes in the VAT data than the ones exist in ONS
classiﬁcation. Furthermore, when I match the unmatched codes from 2007-8 ﬁnancial
year to SIC2003 codes, 579 unique codes are matched up. This is despite the fact
that only two codes remain unchanged moving from 2003 to 2007 classiﬁcation (ONS
tables).
These observations lead me to believe that some traders still report SIC2003 codes
in 2007-8 ﬁnancial year. While the numbers of unmatched observations seem small
in table C.1, the problem is deeper. There are around 80 codes that are common in
the two classiﬁcations but map to diﬀerent codes. For example 01240 in SIC2003
is farming of poultry and maps to 01470 in SIC2007. But the same SIC2003
code of 01240 exists in SIC2007 classiﬁcation and corresponds to growing of pome
fruits and stone fruits. In other words, not all the matched observations in table
C.1 correspond to correct SIC2007 codes. Fortunately, as I said earlier, there are
only two SIC2003 codes that map to an identical code in 2007. Therefore I can
safely assume that all traders that don't change their SIC codes when moving from
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Table C.2: Change of SIC2007 codes across years
Transition years Number of SIC2007 code switchers
Before correction After correction
From 2004 to 2005 26,821 26,821
From 2005 to 2006 10,989 15,524
From 2006 to 2007 774,983 19,672
From 2007 to 2008 10,197 8,712
From 2008 to 2009 20,383 5,876
From 2009 to 2010 5,106 4,776
Notes: Table shows the number of traders that change their ﬁve digit SIC2007 codes moving from one ﬁnancial year
to the following before and after the corrections mentioned in the text are applied.
ﬁnancial year 2006-7 to 2007-8 are mistakenly reporting SIC2003 codes. If these
ﬁrms keep on reporting the same SIC code in 2008-9 ﬁnancial year I still assume
they are reporting SIC2003 codes and so on.
The ﬂat rate assignments are based on SIC2007 codes (not SIC2003 codes). There-
fore, I need to construct a mapping between SIC2007 and SIC2003 for traders re-
porting SIC2003 codes in VAT data (majority during ﬁnancial years before 2007).
ONS provides the correspondence between the two classiﬁcation systems. The diﬃ-
culty is, however, the multiple to multiple mapping of classiﬁcations. 418 SIC2003
codes correspond to a unique SIC2007 code but 281 SIC2003 codes could correspond
to up to 15 diﬀerent SIC2007 codes (136 codes correspond to 2). I randomly pick
one of the SIC2007 codes that correspond to the given SIC2003. To partly correct
for potential mis-assignments I use the SIC2007 codes reported in VAT data for the
same trader from 2007-8 onwards and assign this instead of my random assignment.
No corrections are, however, made for traders not observed after 2007-8.
Table C.2 shows the number of traders changing SIC2007 codes from one year to
the following. In 2007-8 when the classiﬁcation system changed, I see an unexpected
increase in number of switchers. This is due to the two problems mentioned above:
mis-reporting of SIC2003 in place of SIC2007 codes after the change and multiplic-
ity of correspondence between SIC2003 and SIC2007. Carrying out the corrections
outlined above, however, results in a much more reasonable number of switchers.
I have replace date of joining FRS with missing if it was prior to 1 April 2002 or
147
after 1 April 2012. Furthermore, a sizable number of traders report FRS date to be
missing in 2006-07 ﬁnancial year. I replace for FRS date using 2005-06 or 2007-08
ﬁnancial years for these traders. Finally, I use the minimum recorded FRS date
for traders that report multiple FRS dates but don't report a change in their FRS
condition.
C.2 Deleted observations
In order to increase the reliability of the analysis and as reported in table 1.2 I
have dropped several observations. In this section I explain each set of dropped
observations and the reason for leaving them out of the analysis.
The ﬁrst set of observations removed are for traders that are reported to be inactive
or deregistered. This is through two variables in the VAT dataset. First, I only keep
returns associated with traders reporting as not deregistered (dereg_ind equal
to 0). I also keep traders reported to be alive (actively trading) at the end of
ﬁnancial year. Deregistration is associated with special treatments and I remove
these observations not to confound such special treatments with FRS gains.
The second set of observations removed are based on reported values of sales and
purchases. I remove traders that report a zero or missing value for total outputs.
These traders either have all tax variables equal to zero (inactive) or have high
purchases (e.g. because of start-up costs). I also drop observations that fall above
the 99th percentile of the overall distribution of sales or purchases respectively. This
is to make sure that outliers don't inﬂuence the results. Notice the percentiles of the
distributions are calculated after zero sales observations are dropped.
The third set of observations I remove are for traders that show unusual values for
eﬀective input and output tax rates. I deﬁne eﬀective output tax rate as the ratio
of sales VAT to net sales (both are reported in returns). This could vary from zero
to the standard VAT rate. For traders in standard rated activities (e.g. retail of
household appliances like TV) the eﬀective output tax rate should be equal to the
standard VAT rate (equal to 17.5 percent for 2004-5 to 2007-8). Similarly I deﬁne
the eﬀective input tax rate as the ratio of purchases VAT to net purchases. Based
on the distribution of inputs used by each trader the eﬀective input tax rate could
vary from zero to the standard VAT rate. Despite this I observe several traders
with eﬀective tax rates higher than standard VAT rate. These might be accounting
for errors in previous returns, getting bad debt relief, accounting for penalties, and
148
Table C.3: Number of observations dropped in the cleaning process
Stage Number of obs FRS traders
Initial sample 14,829,026 1,084,737
Droppings 1,517,647 2,677
Group 1: Inactive traders 2,873,609 100,926
Group 2: Unusual sales or purchases 837,436 -
Group 3: Unusual eﬀective input/output tax rates 260,078 2,116
Group 4: Other ownership forms 10,460,181 964,356
Cleaned sample 10,460,181 964,356
Notes: Adding individual number of observation for each cleaning step doesn't give total obs dropped because there
is overlap between diﬀerent categories.
other special cases. I drop all traders that show an eﬀective input or output tax rate
higher than the standard rate plus 0.5 percentage points (e.g. I drop traders with
eﬀective input or output tax rate higher than 18 percent when the standard rate is
17.5 percent).
The fourth set of observations dropped are for traders that report to be registered as
clubs, associations, charities, and other organizations. In other words I only include
VAT registered traders that report to be a sole proprietor, a partnership, or a limited
company (incorporation). Table C.3 shows the number of observations under each of
the four categories above and reports the fraction of FRS traders in each sub-sample.
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